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1 Background
1.1 Risk Assessment Purpose
The purpose of this risk assessment is to aid the North Atlantic Systems
Planning Group (NATSPG) and the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) in the implementation of the Data Link Mandate and 25NM Lateral
Reduced Separation procedures by identifying and analyzing the impacts of
program risks to safety, operational efficiency, and the costs and benefits of
Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) and Operators.
1.2 Mandate Background
In early 1995, the ANSPs providing service for the Pacific Ocean
implemented a satellite based air traffic control capability called Controller
Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) to improve operational efficiency
in over water operations without radar coverage. The participating aircraft
required upgraded communications, surveillance and navigational
equipment. The upgraded aircraft equipment became known as the Future
Air Navigation System or FANS 1/A. The participating aircraft were
allocated preferred flight routes over the pacific and received more efficient
climb profiles because the new equipment allowed them to safely reduce
their separation with respect to other CPDLC equipped aircraft (NAT SPG 45
Summary, 2009).
In the 1990's Eurocontrol implemented a CPDLC capability in domestic
airspace using an equipment standard called the Aeronautical
Telecommunication Network (ATN), a different standard than FANS 1/A.
The Aeronautical Telecommunication Standard differs from FANS 1/A in 3
key ways: first, the communication task is accomplished using ground based
systems instead of satellites; second, there is no surveillance standard and
the third, the data between pilots and controllers is exchanged in a different
format and presented to the pilots in a different format. The Europeans
created an implementation rule mandating the use of ATN in European
Airspace by 2011
In 2004, ICAO commissioned a study to understand the feasibility of
incorporating CPDLC into the North Atlantic airspace to improve safety and
operational efficiency. The findings showed that FANS 1/A would be
compatible for use in the North Atlantic Airspace and that ATN, because of a
lack of oceanic coverage and incompatible message sets, would not be
compatible (NAT SPG 45). These studies also found that FANS 1/A ground
stations were incapable of providing service to ATN aircraft.
Efforts to enable ATN ground stations in European domestic airspace to
support FANS 1/A aircraft began in 2007. These efforts culminated with a
mandate for datalink equipage and a phased roll out of reduced separation
procedures at the NAT SPG (Systems Planning Group) meeting 45. The
upgrades were broken into two mandates. The first is an equipment
mandate designed to increase the percentage of aircraft equipped with the
upgraded avionics equipment in the North Atlantic. It requires operators to
upgrade avionics equipment to CPDLC by steadily limiting the airspace in the
North Atlantic in which unequipped aircraft can fly. The second is a
procedural mandate. It is designed to enable reduced separation procedures
in the airspace mandated for the new equipment to increase operational
efficiency (NAT SPG 45 Summary, 2009).
2 Previous Literature
This section will review methods of risk assessment in previous literature
coming from finance, economics and transportation. This review aims to
reveal the important procedural steps, sources of uncertainty or complexity
that warrant analysis in a risk assessment and, a basic methodology for
completing the assessment.
2.1 Finance
The financial risk assessment considered comes from Froot & Stein (1997).
It aims to provide a framework for understanding the risk involved in trading
assets. The main sources of uncertainty were the future market conditions
and the main source of complexity was the heterogeneity of stakeholders.
The market conditions influence the risk to the return on investment because
they determine the future value of the invested asset. In the case of finance,
maximizing the future value of the asset is the objective. This risk is
quantified as an expected future value of the asset, and, the probability that
the actual future differs from the expected value by a given margin.
Heterogeneity of stakeholders is a source of complexity in the financial
system and must be understood. The behavior of the stakeholders influences
the market conditions and therefore contributes to the uncertainty
surrounding the objective, maximizing the future value of the asset. When
the stakeholders have different individual objectives, or, play different parts
in the system, they can be classified has heterogeneous. The stakeholder
behavior can be influenced by their knowledge of the system, their perceived
best interest, their knowledge of other stakeholders and a variety of other
factors. The stakeholders may also have conflicting interests causing them
to act in ways that penalize each other. Understanding how the stakeholders
will likely behave and even perhaps influencing their behavior can be an
effective tool for mitigating risk (Froot & Stein 1997).
The behavior of the stakeholders in the financial system can present many
scenarios with varying values of the final asset. The stakeholders in the
financial system described by Froot & Stein (1997) are the bank itself, the
competing banks, the government, and the general public. The banks
compete to invest and buy assets in an effort to maximize profits for their
stakeholders. At times, an asset can be bought by one bank from another
bank. The bank buying the asset wishes to purchase the asset lowest price
possible while the bank selling the asset wishes to sell it at the highest price
possible. The actual price of the asset is determined by the both
stakeholders' willingness to negotiate, their perceived value of the asset, and
the amount of money paid for similar assets in the system. If the buyer is
unwilling pay what the seller wants for the price, then the assets value goes
down from an expected value because of the behavior of the buying
stakeholder. Alternatively, the selling stakeholder can find another buyer for
the asset in an effort to increase the value above the expected value. In both
scenarios, the heterogeneity of the stakeholder interests and behaviors
influenced the final value of the asset and thus and must be considered as
part of the risk to future value of the investment.
2.2 Work force
An economic risk assessment for the work force is described by Calmfors
(1994). As with the financial assessment, market conditions are a cause of
uncertainty. Competing market forces are a cause of complexity that result
in an equilibrium between the demand for jobs and the price paid for labor.
It may be convenient to view the prevailing (or future) market condition as
an equilibrium between (future) uncertain forces. The difference with the
financial system is in that case, the objective is to influence the equilibrium
instead of maximizing the value of an asset that is determined by the
equilibrium.
The work force assessment begins by mapping the behavior of the
equilibrium against forces by quantifying the relationship between the forces
and equilibrium. This step is intended to understand the nature of the
uncertainty in the system.
Real wage
Employment rate
Figure 1: Wage vs. Employment Rate for different scheduling strategies
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the forces acting on the equilibrium
(Demand for Wages labeled "Wage-setting schedule", and, Demand for
Employment labeled "Employment schedule"). The equilibrium point is
point A, which corresponds to the values of the stakeholder value-variables:
Wages labeled Real Wage on the Y Axis, and Employment rate on the X axis
and is determined by the strength of the competing forces. A second
equilibrium point is labeled "Full-employment schedule". It corresponds to
the point where all workers are employed.
The next step is to find the level of equilibrium that will best satisfy the
heterogeneous stakeholders. The stakeholders are the workers who wish to
both have a job and maximize their wage, and, the employers also wish to
have workers but minimize their wage. The workers can be viewed as a
group of heterogeneous stakeholders because they have varying behaviors.
Some workers are willing to work for less money than others and, they all
have a different objective in maximizing their own individual income (not the
income of other workers). The government must then find an equilibrium
that satisfies the worker stakeholders by increasing the number of jobs and
satifies the employers by not increasing the price of jobs too much.
The study then goes on to identify the "crucial design features" for
employment policies that can help achieve the desired equilibrium. These
crucial design features include compensation levels, the extent of job
program targeting, the resources allocated for job placement and training
programs, and coordination of unemployment insurance. Specific nuances
and effects in each of these features are identified in a way that will aid the
policy maker in crafting a policy that will achieve the desired equilibrium
2.3 Transportation:
Corrigan et al. (1999) presents a quantitative risk assessment for
"transitioning from a ground-based navigation system to a satellite-based
system using signals provided by the Department of Defense's Global
Positioning System". This risk assessment most resembles in terms of
application and technology to the data link case study in this thesis which is a
program risk assessment. The technical objective of the GPS design study is
and risk assessment is quantitative: it is to find the parameters of the system
design needed to meet a set of quantitative of performance standards for
navigation. The risk assessment is intended to gain insight into the risks that
would prevent the system from meeting these performance standards. The
performance standards set requirements for accuracy, integrity, continuity,
and availability or, a required navigation performance standard (RNP). This
standard is the main technical performance specification that comes from the
program's stakeholders. The risk identification process showed that
"unintentional interference" and "propagation effects from the ionosphere"
were identified that could impact the ability of the GPS system to meet the
performance standard. The impact to the performance standards and the
impact of the possible mitigation strategies were determined with
mathematical models. A hazard risk index was developed to probability or
likelihood of occurrence, and, the impact of the occurrence. After the risks
and mitigation strategies were evaluated, recommendations were made as to
the best GPS configuration and mitigation strategies. The findings for each
risk were also described in detail so that the stakeholders could understand
the assumptions made in the assessment and nuances that were the driving
factors in the impact and likelihood of each of the risks.
2.4 Summary
The common steps in the risk analysis methods are designed to reduce the
uncertainty and complexity in the system of interest. The first step is a
stakeholder analysis; it is needed to gain insight in to stakeholder behavior.
The financial risk assessment included analytical models of stakeholders
(households, and banks) behavior and the unemployment policy assessment
included an analytical model of firm behavior and worker behavior. It is
important to note that each assessment recognized the heterogeneity in the
stakeholders and assigned different models when the behavior differed and
when different roles in the system were played. The second step was to
understand the relationships between the forces in the system and the
equilibrium. The equilibrium point can be thought of as a state vector or a
set of values of variables that are important to stakeholders. In the
unemployment assessment, the equilibrium point was the number of
employed workers, and, the wages the employed workers received. These
variables are influenced by a number of forces including the demand for
labor and the wage that workers are willing to accept. The relationship
between the forces and the equilibrium point was quantified analytically and
graphically as shown in Figure 1. The last step is to identify what causes
uncertainty in the forces on the equilibrium and try and come up with a
remedy to ether minimize or contain the uncertainty within acceptable
bounds, or introduce a new and perhaps overwhelming force to move the
equilibrium point to a more desirable location for the stake holders. The GPS
risk assessment used analytical models to determine the affects of
uncertainties on the performance metrics (or the equilibrium point). An
example of an overwhelming force could be a tax credit for employers who
raised their wages. The result of the tax cut would be increased wages and
employment for the workers and a lower cost of business for the employers.
Another overwhelming force that could be introduced is a mandate, that
could disallow wages below a certain threshold. After the stakeholder
behavior is understood, the relationship between the forces in the system
and the equilibrium point is understood, then mitigation strategies such as
introducing forces or reducing the uncertainty in the forces can be tested.
3 Framework
The framework described in this thesis divides the risk assessment into three
distinct phases: Identification, Assessment, and Mitigation and is depicted in
Figure 2. This framework is adapted from Campos (2008). The purpose of
the identification phase is to identify the major stakeholders, the value
categories of the stakeholders, and an initial set of risks that could impact the
value to the stakeholders. This step fulfills the need to understand what the
stakeholder values are and the behavior of the stakeholders. A mapping step
is required to transition from the identification phase to the assessment
phase. The mapping step is intended to match information needed to assess
the identified risks to the sources of information available for the
assessment. The assessment phase is used to determine the impact,
likelihood, and frequency of each risk, and the intensity of the network
effects of each risk. Network effects are effects stemming from interactions
between risks. They include the dependency and influence a risk has on
other risks. The root causes for each risk are also determined in the
assessment phase along with their corresponding network effects. These
steps are meant to identify the forces on the equilibrium point, and
understand their sources of uncertainty. Another mapping step, visually
mapping the network effects and the impact and likelihood simultaneously to
each risk is required to transition from the assessment phase to the
mitigation phase. The mitigation phase is intended to communicate the
integrated picture of network effects, impact, and likelihood of the entire set
of risks to the risk assessor so that a mitigation strategy can be formulated.
The complete assessment should include the integrated visualization, a set of
summaries about the caveats of each risk, and a statistical analysis of the
responses so the assessor can gauge the confidence of individual pieces of
the assessment and easily prioritize the order in which the risks should be
mitigated.
Figure 2: Framework Diagram
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3.1 Identification
The identification step consists of the stakeholder identification, stakeholder
value identification, and risk identification. This step may also seek insight
into stakeholder behavior but the full analysis is completed in the
assessment phase.
3.1.1 Stakeholder Category Identification
Stakeholder category identification should be conducted by first interviewing
the parties in charge of the policy to find out who the policy will affect, and
then by conducting a comprehensive investigation to determine the ways in
which stakeholders extract and contribute value to and from the system and
to other stakeholders. Sources of heterogeneity between the stakeholder
behavior and system roles should be identified at this stage and modeled as
separate entities.
3.1.2 Stakeholder Value
Determining the stakeholder values should be accomplished by conducting a
comprehensive investigation of the stakeholder behavior, economic and non-
economic values in the system, and through reviewing literature and notes
written about the system by stakeholders and others. Stakeholder values in
technology systems are usually of economic, technical and safety in nature.
Where possible, it is important to distinguish the between same value type
for different stakeholders categories. For example, if costs were identified as
a stakeholder value, the costs for stakeholder 1 and stakeholder 2 could be
independent and should be treated as such.
A comprehensive method for Stakeholder analysis is described in the class
notes by deWeck (2010) which are adapted from the NASA Systems
Engineering Handbook. The actual characteristics that need to be known
about the stakeholders should be determined in the context of the risk
assessment.
3.1.3 Risk
Risk identification should be accomplished by analyzing meeting notes,
technical papers, and interviews with experts and stakeholders. The risk
identification process should also culminate with verification by an expert
and should be allowed to continue throughout the assessment phase in case
any new risks are identified.
3.2 Mapping Phase I
The mapping phase is a transition phase meant to prepare the data gathered
and generated in the identification phase for further data gathering and
investigation. Each risk should be mapped to a set of data gathering
instruments which can include interviewing and experts, written sources of
information, or analytical models. The mapping should then be verified by a
third party or even the interviewees in the data gather instrument to insure
that the data can be gathered from the intended sources.
3.3 Assessment Phase
The assessment phase is intended to assess the, background, root causes, the
likelihood, impact and frequency (where applicable) of each risk along with
the various network effects or coupling effects that exist between risks. This
phase is similar to the risk analysis described in the GPS risk assessment.
The assessment phase should also attempt to assign a root cause and
outcome to each risk. The data gathering for the assessment phase should
be conducted by the investigator and should produce a set of comparable
data using ether analytical methods or ordinal data from stakeholders as
comparisons.
3.3.1 Impact
The impact assessment is meant to quantify in some way, the potential
impact of each risk to each value category and compare these results to the
impact results of other risks. The impact of each risk to each value category
must be assessed independently despite the fact that some people may not
identify the same risk impact as being part of the same category. At this
point in the process, little is known about the network effects between
impact categories and other risks but these effects, such as impacts to an
aggregate set of categories can be examined in the next step. When there is
little data available about the intended impacts of each scenario and the
potential impacts of the risks, ordinal data should be used to describe the
impact of each risk.
3.3.2 Network Effects
Risks can have dependencies on other risks, influence other risks, or act in a
compound with other risks to form a more impactful set of consequences, a
more likely outcome or a more frequent outcome. Questions of dependency
and influence can be assessed in survey and perhaps using the same data
gathering instruments used for assessing impact.
3.3.3 Root Causes & Outcomes
Root causes and possible outcomes should also be captured by the data
gathering instruments. The root causes need to analyzed to find possible
network effects and shared causes between risks. If possible, root causes and
backgrounds can be linked dynamically with other risks by combining the
data found and the network effects.
3.4 Mapping Phase 2
The second mapping phase involves creating a graphic representation of the
data collected in the assessment phase. The data collected in the assessment
phase has several dimensions: root causes, likelihood, impact to each impact
category, influence on other risk and dependencies on other risks. Much of
this data can be visualized using a combination of shapes, colors, network
diagrams and aggregating schemes.
3.5 Mitigation Phase
The mitigation phase is intended to present the data that is gathered in the
assessment phase in a way that is helpful in forming mitigation strategies.
The mitigation phase should consist of a statistical analysis in order to rank
risks with a weighting scheme which could include combinations of impact,
dependencies, or any of the dimensions reported in the assessment phase.
The mitigation phase should also contain an analysis of the root causes and
the background information gathered during the assessment phase. These
recommendations are based on the premise that a mitigation strategy is
likely to involve prioritizing risks and that the categories assessed are the
most relevant to creating an effective priority list. Further studies should be
conducted to determine the usefulness of basing mitigation strategies on
different types of prioritized lists and in comparison to other mitigation
strategies.
4 Conceptual Model of Oceanic Flight Operations
Computer pilot data link (CPDLC) emerged as a technology to deliver
enhanced communications during over water operations that are out of the
range of typical radar services. The data link equipment allows text
messages containing instructions and position reports to be exchanged
between pilots and controllers through satellite and ground stations. These
communications would otherwise be completed verbally and then
transmitted through high frequency radio and radio relay operators in places
without radar coverage. CPDLC communication has several advantages
over High Frequency radio (HF) including quicker message exchanges, a
larger number of allowable messages that can be exchanged over a given
period of time, and a lower probability for human error. These advantages
make reduced separation and more efficient operations possible (NAT
Concept, April 1999).
4.1 Traffic Flows:
The concept of operations in the North Atlantic involves a track system call
the Organized Track System (OTS) and the ability for aircraft to request
routes inside and outside of the track system. A depiction of a set of
westbound tracks in OTS is shown in Figure 3. The track system occupies a
section of airspace that contains optimal routes for flights between the upper
east coast of North America and the Upper West Coast of Europe. There are
two sets of tracks one for eastbound flight and one for westbound flights.
Within each set of tracks for aircraft, there are individual tracks that are
separated by laterally by 60 miles. In addition to the track separation, each
aircraft must maintain 10 minutes of separation from other aircraft flying on
the same track (ICAO, April 1999). Each aircraft enters or leaves a track at
the oceanic entry point (OEP). The OEP is in an area with radar coverage
represents the border between oceanic operations and domestic operations.
The positions of the tracks in OTS are updated twice per day depending on
the wind directions. There are also high and low points of traffic activity
along the tracks due to the travel patterns that passengers to prefer the most.
Figure 3: West Bound Tracks (OTS) Nat SPG 2005
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airspace or (MNPS) and is vertically bounded by a lower altitude of 28000
feet and an upper altitude of 41000 feet (NAT Concept, April 1999).
4.2 Oceanic Control Areas
There are several oceanic control areas or flight information regions (FIRs)
that cover the entire North Atlantic Airspace. When an operator is flying in a
designated FIR, that operator will interact with the corresponding Air
Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) and will also pay a communications fee
for the messages exchanged with the provider. A map of providers and FIR's
is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: North Atlantic Flight Information Regions (Adapted from FAA June 1999)
4.3 Inefficiencies
There are several inefficiencies present within the OTS. First, because of the
large aircraft separation distances required and the long lag time in using HF
radio communications, flights must often operate at suboptimal flight levels
for long periods of time before receiving clearance to operate at more fuel
efficient flight levels. Second, also because of the large separation distances,
there is a limit to number of aircraft that fly using the optimal tracks for coast
to coast routes. Aircraft that wish to fly these tracks may encounter delays
to wait for a space to become available or, suffer a fuel burn penalty for
leaving on time and operating on a less optimal track. It is difficult to know
which track an aircraft will be assigned so airlines must carry extra fuel
which also results in an additional fuel burn penalty when flying an optimal
route due to the extra weight of the extra fuel. Reducing the separation
distances is thought to have the potential of mitigating against these
inefficiencies by saving the operator fuel and increasing the number of
aircraft that can fly safely in the North Atlantic a given time. The data link
mandate and 25NM lateral reduced separation procedures are policies that
encourage operators to adopt data link equipment which would then allow
for the reduction in separation distances.
5 Framework Application
The framework application section will describe how the framework
described in section 3 was applied to this problem. For reference, the
framework diagram is reproduced in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Framework Diagram
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5.1 Identification
The identification step consists of the stakeholder identification, stakeholder
value identification, and risk identification. As mentioned in the framework
section, these steps must occur concurrently, require stakeholder input, and
determine the format of the data set that will be collected.
5.1.1 Stakeholder Category Identification
The stakeholder categories were determined by examining three types of
sources: past ICAO surveys, past ICAO meeting papers, and past ICAO papers.
After several iterations of the creating categories, a consensus was built with
FAA input.
5.1.2 Stakeholder Value Identification
The stakeholder value categories were identified by consulting stakeholders
and reviewing the stated benefits of the data link mandate and reduced
separation procedures. The categories consisted of safety benefits and
economic benefits aligned to the stakeholders.
5.1.3 Risk Identification
Lastly, the risks were identified, by reviewing previous ICAO meeting notes,
survey and technical papers. The stakeholders were given an opportunity
during the interviews to add and modify the list of risks during the
assessment phase. The risks were also separated by which risks influenced
reduced separation initiatives only and those that influence both the data
link mandate and reduced separation initiatives.
5.2 Mapping Phase
The mapping phase is a transition phase meant to prepare the data gathered
and generated in the Risk Identification Phase for further data gathering and
investigation. During this phase, a survey was created as the main data
collection instrument. The survey was given to stakeholders from each
stakeholder category for gathering ordinal data on the root causes, impact to
stakeholder value metrics, dependencies and mitigation difficulties for each
risk. Stakeholders were allowed to pick the questions they wished to
answer and were asked to indicate qualitative levels for some categories
such as "Very High, High, Medium, Low, Very Low, or None" to generate the
ordinal data and the ability to compare responses to those of other
stakeholders.
5.3 Assessment Phase
The assessment phase is intended to assess the collected data from the
survey instrument and analyze in a way that is meaningful the users of the
risk assessment. The assessment phase consisted of a data reduction step to
aggregate the responses of all of the stakeholders who took the survey in a
way that can be represented and graphically and analyzed to uncover key
insights.
5.3.1 Impact
The impact of each risk was assessed with ordinal data and reduced into an
aggregated average for each stakeholder value category. Based on these
averages, an aggregated impact category was created by summing the risk
impacts to each category. This strategy allows the user of the assessment to
have visibility into which risks have the largest overall impacts in addition to
the knowledge of how each risks impacts each stakeholder value category.
5.3.2 Network Effects
The network effects encompass the ways in which risks influence each other.
The respondents were asked to identify risk dependencies for each risk and
sometimes identified how risks influence other risks. These dependencies
and influences were mapped graphically and converted into a matrix to
reveal loops and co-dependencies that formed between risks.
5.4 Mapping Phase 2
Several graphical depictions of the impacts and network affects were
completed for the second mapping phase. These depictions were then used
to discern the key insights of this risk assessment which will be used by
others in the mitigation phase to form a mitigation strategy.
5.4 Mitigation Phase: It was determined that the mitigation phase was
outside the scope of this assessment and is left to the ICAO leaders who will
use the data gathered to decide on a mitigation strategy.
6.0 Results
The results of the risk analysis are presented in this chapter in four parts:
stakeholder categories, risk identification, a graphical depiction of the risk
impacts, dependencies and influences and, a discussion with key insights
about each stakeholder category and the important relationships depicted in
the graphical section.
6.1 Stakeholder Categories
The stakeholder impact categories are categories or dimensions in which the
impact of each risk was measured. These categories are considered
important to one or more stakeholders of the data link mandate plan.
6.1.1 Safety
The safety category captures any perceived risk to the safety of operations in
the North Atlantic. Impacts to overall safety can occur as changes to the
probability of a collision, the ability or time needed to detect or correct a
hazardous situation, the availability and reliability of equipment, and the
likelihood of human errors.
6.1.2 Operational Efficiency
Operational Efficiency encompasses any perceived change in efficiency in
operations of the ANSPs and aircraft operators. These operations include
but are not limited to, delivering climb and cruise clearance, filing flight plans
and making flight plan changes, handling congestion and the potential for
congestion along the tracks and oceanic entry points, the handling of delays
and equipment failures, and the potential throughput of the aircraft in the
North Atlantic System.
6.1.3 ANSP Costs
The ANSP costs category encompasses the perceived changes in costs to Air
Navigation Service Providers. These costs include but are not limited to
staffing costs, equipment costs, and training costs.
6.1.4 ANSP Revenues
The ANSP Revenues category encompasses the perceived changes in
revenues to Air Navigation Service Providers. These revenues include but are
not limited revenue changes due to changes in traffic volume, message
volume, and messaging fees.
6.1.5 Operator Costs
The Operator Costs category encompasses the perceived changes in costs
aircraft operators. These costs include but aren't limited to fuel burn costs,
ANSP costs, costs due to aircraft delays, and costs associated with aircraft
downtime for equipment installation, training and equipment upgrades.
6.1.6 Operator Revenues
The Operator Revenues category encompasses the perceived changes in
revenues to operator revenues. These revenues include but are not limited to
revenue changes due to flight cancelations and restrictions on aircraft that
were previously in service in the North Atlantic.
6.2 Risk Identification
The Risk Identification Process initially resulted in the identification of 23
risks with a 24th risk, added by one of the respondents. For the purposes of
the survey, the risks were identified by an alphabetical letter (A-Z) and a
short descriptive phrase of the risk and or possible result of occurrence. For
the purposes of this analysis each risk is first grouped by category, then the
identifying letter and descriptive phrase. A detailed analysis of each
individual risk is included as a separate appendix at the end of this thesis.
The risk categories are: Policies and Procedures, Coordination and Timing,
Technology, Equipage, Safety, and Business Concerns. These categories are
adapted from Campos, (2008 pg. 82).
6.2.1 Policies and Procedures
The Policy and Procedures category encompasses risks that can compromise
the development of policies and procedures to ensure a safe, efficient, and
seamless implementation of NAT SPG data link initiatives and the successful
accommodation of those aircraft that are unable to equip.
G: Failure to develop measures to accommodate unequipped aircraft
H: Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft
J: Operators choosing to operate in areas where other types of surveillance
are provided (e.g. radar, ADS-B)
M: Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate in Europe vs. FANS-
1/A mandate in the NAT
6.2.2 Coordination and Timing
The coordination and timing category encompasses risks that could hinder
the effective coordination and timely completion of planning tasks for data
link mandate and 25NM Lateral Separation.
D: Late completion of data link mandate plan. Not enough time for
commercial and business operators to plan and comply with mandate (e.g.
determination of entire flight level spectrum and OTS tracks where mandate
is to be applied, etc.).
E: Failure to achieve effective coordination with other ANSPs (harmonization
of technical systems and operating methods)
F. National Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25 NM lateral
separation (if required by ANSP) not completed within mandate timeframe
S: Late completion of 25NM lateral separation planning tasks.
C: ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other technologies, or local
rulemaking ready for implementation of 25 NM lateral separation (e.g.
ensuring that deviations from norm are captured quickly, etc.)
6.2.3 Technology
The technology risks category encompasses risks to the timely development
and approval of technical standards or technical designs for data link
equipment.
L: Failure to establish a plan or go forward with mitigation to meet RCP240.
This also includes failure of ground infrastructure to support RCP240
N: Impact of ICAO Annex 6 data link communications airborne recording
standard (See Appendix B)
R: No ICAO communication, navigation, and surveillance standards available
to support implementation of 25NM lateral separation (for example, RNP 4
meets navigation criteria for 30 NM)
P: Uncertainty in approval of Iridium-based equipage to meet requirements
for data link mandate and 25 NM reduced lateral separation
6.2.4 Equipage
The equipage risk category encompasses risks that could reduce the
availability and sustainability of data link equipment (or equipage) as well as
data link adoption by operators
A: Equipage for business operators not available or certified in time to meet
mandate
B: Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data link retrofit
packages to satisfy demand
I: Mixed equipage environment during transition
0: End of service life of 13 satellite services expected about 2016. New
equipage may be required to use classic aero services via 14 satellites.
Q: Failure to achieve percentage of equipped flights needed to move forward
with phases of 25NM lateral separation
W: Late delivery of new aircraft orders that are replacing older, unequipped
or unequippable aircraft
6.2.5 Safety
The safety category encompasses risks that could hinder the ICAO, the
operator's and, the ANSP's ability to maintain or improve safety levels in the
NAT through the implementation of data link mandate and 25NM lateral
separation.
T: Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM lateral separation (Feasibility
analysis may find that better performance is needed. Actual performance
may not meet feasibility analysis expectations
U: Failure to control vertical risk when 25 NM lateral separation is
implemented
Y: HF network may be unable to support communications demand in event of
total data link failure or reversion to normal separation.
K: Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than OTS routes
6.2.6 Business Concerns
The Business Concerns category encompasses risks that can hinder the
economic ability of the operators and ANSPs to comply with the data link
mandate and 25NM lateral separation.
V: High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to meet requirements
for data link mandate and 25 NM lateral separation
X: Cost benefit analysis may show that costs outweigh the benefits of
implementing the data link mandate and/or 25 NM lateral separation
6.3 Stakeholder Values and Graphical Depictions of Impact
and Likelihood
The following sub sections include a graphical depiction the impact,
likelihood, dependency, corrective action difficulty and category information
for each risk. The impact section will describe the potential risk impacts to
individual stakeholder categories and aggregated categories. The
dependency section will describe patterns in the risk dependencies along
with several examples of high impact risks that form the patterns. These
graphical depictions are meant to give insight into the relationships between
risks (dependencies and influences) and their relative impacts. The root
causes and outcomes are not depicted directly in these graphs but are
discussed in detail in the individual risk dependencies. The risk
dependencies are shown with a directional arrow. If an arrow is pointing
from risk A to risk B, then risk B is dependant upon risk A.
6.3.1 Impact Likelihood Summary
The following graphs depict the perceived possible impacts of each
risk on stakeholder categories, likelihood of occurrence for each risk, and
dependencies of each risk upon other risks. In addition to the stakeholder
categories, two additional aggregate categories are constructed from the
results of the individual stakeholder categories. The Aggregate Impact
category is a representation of the overall risk impacts. Each risk's impact is
computed as cumulative sum of the impacts from each risk category which
are converted to integers from ordinal data. The risks are then ranked into
quintiles with the highest 20% of overall impacts receiving the red color
signifying the "first fifth". The Aggregated Impact to benefits section is
computed in the same way but only the operational efficiency, ANSP Costs,
ANSP Revenues, Operator Costs, and Operator Revenues will be considered.
6.3.2 Aggregate Impacts:
The graphical depiction of the likelihood and aggregated impact of all the
risks for the Mandate and Reduced Separation is shown in Figure 6, for the
mandate only in Figure 7, and to economic benefits in Figure 8. The highest
aggregated impact risks shown in Table 1 come from the coordination and
timing category (Risks C and F), the technology category (Risk R), the
technology category (Risk R) and the safety category (Risks T and Y). The
coordination and timing risks (C, and F) both impact the rulemaking process.
The rulemaking process is required a safety certification process that is
conducted by local state authorities in order to verify the new standards or
procedures meet the individual safety requirements of each state. The timely
implementation of new procedures can be compromised by these risks
because the rulemaking process must be completed before the
implementation of any new procedures in the North Atlantic. The technology
risk R impacts the technical performance standards that must be met by the
data link equipment. These standards are needed by the equipment
manufacturers and must be set before the safety and verification processes
can take place. Impacts to standards definition can create significant delays
in implementation because later processes such safety certification tests and
equipment procurement need the definitions before moving forward. The
safety risks T and Y, can impact all processes that lead to implementation
because once a safety risk occurs, it must be addressed before 25NM lateral
implementation and the solution must again be verified through flight tests.
It is highly recommended by multiple respondents that risk Y (HF network
may be unable to support communications demand in event of total data link
failure or reversion to normal separation) be assessed as part of the safety
case so that an occurrence of an data link failure after implementation of
25NM lateral procedures will not impact the achieved level of safety. All of
these risks can compromise the ability of ANSPs and Operators to gain
economic benefits because they and delay implementation of 25NM lateral
which is expected to yield fuel burn, operational efficiency and capacity
improvements.
Risk Category Description
C Coordination ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other
and Timing technologies, or local rulemaking ready for
implementation of 25 NM lateral separation (e.g.
ensuring that deviations from norm are captured
quickly, etc.)
F Coordination National Rulemaking to support data link mandate
and Timing and 25 NM lateral separation (if required by ANSP)
not completed within mandate timeframe
R Technology No ICAO communication, navigation, and surveillance
standards available to support implementation of
25NM lateral separation (for example, RNP 4 meets
navigation criteria for 30 NM)
T Safety Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM lateral
separation (Feasibility analysis may find that better
performance is needed. Actual performance may not
meet feasibility analysis expectations)
Y Safety HF network may be unable to support
communications demand in event of total data link
failure or reversion to normal separation.
Table 1: Highest Impact Risks (Aggregated Impact)
Figure 6: Aggregate Impact (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
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Table 1 lists the highest-ranking risks for the Aggregated Impact category
and Aggregated Impact to benefits category. The impact of these risks is
summarized in beginning of this section.
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The aggregated impacts for risks affecting the mandate only are shown in
Figure 7. Risks M (Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate in
Europe vs. FANS-1/A mandate in the NAT) and P(Uncertainty in approval of
Iridium-based equipage to meet requirements for data link mandate and 25
NM reduced lateral separation) are part of the highest ranking risks when
only the risks affecting the mandate are considered. Risk M can result in
large equipment costs if operators need to equip with both ATN and FANS
1/A, significant numbers of data link equipped aircraft (FANS 1/A or ATN)
that come into service after 2015 could be restricted from serving
destinations between Europe and North America none of the current
equipage policies (Europe and North Atlantic), and restrictions (Europe and
North Atlantic) don't change. Risk P is an equipage risk that could also result
in significant numbers of data link equipped aircraft (using Iridium)
becoming out of compliance with the mandate if the Iridium satellite system
does not meet the necessary performance requirements. The primary goal
of the mandate is to increase safety by increasing the number of data link
mandate compliant aircraft.
Figure 7: Aggregate Impact, Mandate Only
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Figure 8 is a graphical depiction of the likelihood and aggregated impact to
economic benefits for all of the risks. The aggregated impact economic
benefits category considers each risks impact operational efficiency, ANSP
costs and revenues, and Operator costs and revenues according to the
. .. . .......... . ........ --------- ......
respondents. This is an important category because it highlights the
potential risks with the highest economic impact and captures the different
types of economic impacts in one category. These risks are summarized in
the beginning of this section shares the same highest impact risks as the
aggregated impact category.
Figure 8: Aggregate Impact to Economic Benefits, Mandate & Reduced Separation
m
Likelihood
Very Low Low Medium High Very High
Categories
Business
Techno o ECP&P C&T uipe e
Impact
Highest Fourth Third Second First
Fifth Fifth Fih fth Fifth N A
6.3.3 Safety Impact
The graphical depiction of the likelihood and Safety impact of each risk is
shown in Figure 9. The program risks can impact the level of safety by
causing a reduction in the number of equipped aircraft, hindering the ability
of operators and ANSPs to respond to operational failures, and, by increasing
the level of operational risks. The highlighted risks that impact these areas
are shown in Table 2. Risk Y is a safety risk that can impact the ability of
ANSPs and Operators to respond to a data link failure when there are high
traffic loads. Risk U describes the operational risk of a reduced vertical
safety margin when 25NM lateral procedures are implemented however, this
risk was given a low likelihood by the respondents. The respondents did
suggest that both risks Y and U be examined as part of the safety case. The
technology risk 0 can impact aircraft that are data link equipped and use the
Iridium satellite services. If risk 0 occurs, those aircraft would be out of
compliance with the mandate and the number of equipped aircraft could
drop significantly. Lastly, the technology risk L can impact the
communications requirement for 25NM lateral separation. If the RCP240 is
not met by ether the current data link equipment or the current ground
.................... .... ....... - .... .. ------------ ----- ------- - - --- - - - - - -- :- . . ............
infrastructure the 25NM lateral initiatives could ether be delayed or
Risk Category Description
L Technology Failure to establish a plan or go forward with
mitigation to meet RCP240. This also includes failure
of ground infrastructure to support RCP240
0 Equipage End of service life of 13 satellite services expected
about 2016. New equipage may be required to use
classic aero services via 14 satellites.
U Safety Failure to control vertical risk when 25 NM lateral
separation is implemented
Y Safety HF network may be unable to support
communications demand in event of total data link
failure or reversion to normal separation.
implemented with a lower performing communications standard.
Table 2: Highlighted Risks (Impact to Safety)
Figure 9 is a graphical depiction of the likelihood and safety impact for all of
the risks. The safety category considers a risks' potential impact to the
achieved level of safety in the North Atlantic and impacts that would require
some sort of safety mitigation before ether the mandate or reduced
separation procedures are implemented.
Figure 9: Impact to Safety: Mandate & Reduced Separation
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6.3.4 Operational Efficiency Impact
The graphical depiction of the likelihood and operational efficiency impact of
each risk is shown in Figure 10. Operational efficiency can be impacted by
risks that can reduce the number of equipped aircraft, by impending
restrictions that could result in congestion, delays to the implementation of
25NM lateral, and operational risks that can cause certain areas of the North
Atlantic to temporarily revert back to larger levels of separation. Some of the
risks that impact these areas are highlighted in this summary and are listed
in Table 3. Risks N and V can impact the levels of equipage in the North
Atlantic. Risk N, if enforced, would render all aircraft without a data link
recording capability out of compliance with the mandate. This would add
also to the economic barriers, which are encompassed in Risk V, that could
keep the levels of equipage down in the North Atlantic. The level of equipage
is an important determining factor in the achieved operational efficiency
because unequipped aircraft are subject to restrictions. These restrictions
are encompassed in Risk H and, some of the effects of these restrictions, such
as increased traffic in MNPS airspace (Risk K) outside of the OTS, can result
in traffic patterns that reduce operational efficiency. Risk Y is a safety risk
that can cause aircraft to revert back to larger separation distances in the
event of a data link failure. If risk Y occurs during peak travel times,
operators who have scheduled takeoffs may encounter delays or have to
accept less optimal flight levels. Additionally, operators that have flights in
the air may be forced to hold or slow down in order to increase the
separation distances. The ANSPs may need to reduce their aircraft
throughput rates and will need to safely separate the aircraft with a reduced
communications capability.
Table 3: Highlighted Risks (Impact to Operational Efficiency)
Risk Category Description
H Policies and Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft
Procedures
K Safety Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than OTS
routes
N Technology Impact of ICAO Annex 6 data link communications
airborne recording standard (See Appendix B)
V Business High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to
Concerns meet requirements for data link mandate and 25 NM
lateral separation
Y Safety HF network may be unable to support
communications demand in event of total data link
failure or reversion to normal separation.
Figure 10 is a graphical depiction of the likelihood and operational efficiency
impact for all of the risks. The operational efficiency category considers a
risks' potential impact to the achieved operational efficiency of the ANSPs
and aircraft operators. Operational Efficiency can encompass metrics such as
aircraft throughput, impacts to total flying time such as delays and
congestion, optimal route placement, and impacts fuel efficiency.
Figure 10: Impact to Operational Efficiency: Mandate and Reduced Separation
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6.3.5 ANSP Cost Impact
The graphical depiction of the likelihood and ANSP Cost impact of each risk is
shown in Figure 11. ANSP costs are impacted by the need for additional or
unanticipated equipment investments and additional or unanticipated
staffing investments. Some of the risks that impact these areas are
highlighted in this summary and are listed in Table 4. Risks C, F, R, and T,
and Y can all cause a need for additional or unanticipated equipment
investments. Risk C can result in upgrades to automation software that is
needed to handle conflict resolution for the lower separation levels of 25NM
lateral procedures. Risk F can result in additional hardware, software, or
staffing requirements if the rulemaking process finds that the current
capabilities of the ANSP are not sufficient. Risk R can result in additional
hardware and software investments if the final standards set by ICAO aren't
meant with the ANSP's current capabilities. Risk T, like risk F can result in
hardware, software, and staffing investments if the safety case finds that
additional ANSP capabilities are needed. In theory the safety case should be
evaluated and satisfied before the rulemaking process takes place. Risk Y,
can result in additional equipment investments such as Satcom phones, or
additional staffing requirements to mitigate against a data link failure in high
traffic loads.
Risk Category Description
.......... . .............. ... ....    ............ .. ....
C Coordination ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other
and Timing technologies, or local rulemaking ready for
implementation of 25 NM lateral separation (e.g.
ensuring that deviations from norm are captured
quickly, etc.)
F Coordination National Rulemaking to support data link mandate
and Timing and 25 NM lateral separation (if required by ANSP)
not completed within mandate timeframe
R Technology No ICAO communication, navigation, and surveillance
standards available to support implementation of
25NM lateral separation (for example, RNP 4 meets
navigation criteria for 30 NM)
T Safety Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM lateral
separation (Feasibility analysis may find that better
performance is needed. Actual performance may not
meet feasibility analysis expectations)
Y Safety HF network may be unable to support
communications demand in event of total data link
failure or reversion to normal separation.
Table 4: Highlighted Risks (ANSP Cost Impact)
Figure 11 is a graphical depiction of the likelihood and ANSP Cost impact for
all of the risks. The ANSP Cost category considers a risks' potential impact to
any further or unanticipated costs that could be incurred by the ANSP as a
result of complying with the mandate and implementing 25NM lateral
procedures.
Figure 11: Impact to ANSP Costs: Mandate and Reduced Separation
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6.3.6 ANSP Revenue Impact
The graphical depiction of the likelihood and ANSP Revenue impact of each
risk is shown in Figure 12. ANSP Revenues can be impacted by risks that
decrease the total number of aircraft flying in the North Atlantic, (equipped
or unequipped), risks that can cause the cancelation of flights, and risks that
result in fewer communication messages between ANSPs and operators.
Some of the risks that impact these areas are listed in Table 5 and are
described in this summary. Risk D can delay the implementation of 25NM
lateral separation if the ANSPs automation systems are not ready in time. An
occurrence Risk Q can also delay the implementation of 25NM lateral
procedures if the rulemaking process is delayed. The 25NM lateral
separation procedures will increase the capacity and any delay to the
implementation of these procedures can limit the capacity of the North
Atlantic airspace and thus impact the revenues of ANSPs.
......... ................ . . ............
Table 5: Highlighted Risks (ANSP Revenue Impact)
Risk Category Description
D Coordination ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other
and Timing technologies, or local rulemaking ready for
implementation of 25 NM lateral separation (e.g.
ensuring that deviations from norm are captured
quickly, etc.)
Q Coordination National Rulemaking to support data link mandate
and Timing and 25 NM lateral separation (if required by ANSP)
I not completed within mandate timeframe
Figure 12 is a graphical depiction of the likelihood and ANSP revenue impact
for all of the risks. The ANSP Revenue category considers a risks' potential
impact to the potential revenues received by ANSPs possibly through a
reduction in the number of aircraft operating in the North Atlantic or
regulations affecting ANSP message pricing.
Figure 12: ANSP Revenue Impact: Mandate and Reduced Separation
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6.3.7 Operator Cost Impact
The graphical depiction of the likelihood and Operator Cost impact of each
risk is shown in Figure 13. Operator costs can be impacted by risks that
impact the ability for an operator to comply with the mandate, the
restrictions that come from not complying with the mandate, the economic
burdens from operational failures, and the economic burdens of added
equipment costs. Some of the risks that impact these areas are listed in
Table 6. Risks A and B can make it more difficult for operators to comply with
the mandate. Risk A can result in business operators not having a way to
comply with the mandate because the equipment may not yet exist or be
certified before the mandate deadline. Risk B can impact the ability to of an
operator equip due to delays in the supply chain. All of the high costs or
economic burdens that make it difficult for operators to equip are
encompassed in risk V. If risk V occurs, some operators will not be able to
pay for the costs of equipping. These costs can come from equipment costs,
aircraft downtime costs, and training costs. Risks N and 0 both represent
unanticipated increases to equipment costs. Risk N could force operators to
purchase new equipment to record data link transactions. Risk 0 could force
operators to remove their existing satellite communications hardware and
replace it with heavier, more expensive hardware.
Table 6: Highlighted Risks (Operator Cost)
Risk Category Description
A Equipage Equipage for business operators not available or
certified in time to meet mandate
B Equipage Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft
data link retrofit packages to satisfy demand
H Policies and Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft
Procedures
G Policies and Failure to develop measures to accommodate
Procedures unequipped aircraft
0 Equipage End of service life of 13 satellite services expected
about 2016. New equipage may be required to use
classic aero services via 14 satellites.
N Technology Impact of ICAO Annex 6 data link communications
airborne recording standard (See Appendix B)
V Business High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to
Concerns meet requirements for data link mandate and 25 NM
lateral separation
Figure 13 is a graphical depiction of the likelihood and Operator Cost impact
for all of the risks. The Operator Cost category considers a risks' potential
impact to operator costs including fuel costs, aircraft downtime costs,
equipment costs, and communications message costs.
Figure 13: Operator Cost Impact: Mandate and Reduced Separation
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6.3.8 Operator Revenue Impact
The graphical depiction of the likelihood and Operator Revenue impact of
each risk is shown in Figure 14. Operator Revenues can be impacted by risks
add barriers to operators that wish to increase or maintain the level of air
service across the North Atlantic. Possible barriers include restrictions
which could prevent new aircraft from complying with the both North
Atlantic and European data link mandates (Risk M), which then prevent
these aircraft from connecting cities in North America and Europe and
equipment requirements that increase weight and prohibitively decrease the
range (Risk P).
- ------------- ............ .  . ..................
Table 7: Highlighted Risks (Operator Revenue)
Risk Category Description
M Policies and Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate
Procedures in Europe vs. FANS-1/A mandate in the NAT
P Technology Uncertainty in approval of Iridium-based equipage to
meet requirements for data link mandate and 25 NM
reduced lateral separation
Figure 14 is a graphical depiction of the likelihood and Operator revenue
impact for all of the risks. The Operator Revenue category considers a risks'
potential impact to the revenues of operators possibly through a reduction in
the number of aircraft operating in the North Atlantic or equipment
requirements that add weight to an aircraft, subsequently making North
Atlantic routes unserviceable.
Figure 14: Operator Revenue Impact: Mandate and Reduced Separation
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6.4 Graphical Dependency Pattern Depictions
The distribution of dependencies and influences can provide insight into how
the risks influence each other. Figure 15 shows the distribution of
.............
dependencies by risk category and Figure 16 shows the opposite,
distribution of influences by risk category. The technology category and the
coordination and timing category both have the largest number of
dependencies on risks from the policy and procedure category. The policy
and procedure risks can influence the level of technology and amount of
equipment needed to comply with the mandate. The policy and procedure
risks can influence the coordination and timing risks because changes and
policies can cause delays in rulemaking and other planning tasks. The risks
in the safety category, the equipage category, policy and procedure category
and business concerns category are most influenced by risks in the equipage
category. Equipage risks can influence the equipage levels and thus the
ability to meet the safety case which is dependent on the equipage level. The
level of equipage also will influence polices for unequipped aircraft and the
subsequent traffic patterns that result. Lastly, the cost and availability of
equipage is an important driver in the cost benefit analysis for operators.
Figure 15: Distribution of Dependencies
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The distribution of influences is shown in Figure 16. This graph is essentially
an inverse or a compliment of Figure 15 and highlights the strong interaction
between the risks. Figure 15 and Figure 16 show that the larger number of
. ...... .......... . .......
interactions is between the coordination and timing category and the policy
and procedure category.
Figure 16: Distribution of Influences
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6.5 Results Summary
The results of this study uncovered valuable insights in to how each risks
impacts the stakeholder value categories and how the risks influence each
other. The highest ranking risks for the aggregate impact came from the
coordination and timing, safety, and technology categories. These risks were
ranked highly because they all had the potential to delay the implementation
of 25NM lateral procedures or prevent operators from equipping, both of
which are needed to recoup the investments that are required to comply
with the mandate. The risks are highly connected and the risks and
equipage and policy and procedure categories had the highest number of
influences across all of the risks. The policy and procedure risks can
determine the penalties for not equipping and the costs for equipping
depending on what and how the restrictions are implemented. The equipage
risks can add to the difficulties of equipping by introducing economic and
supply chain barriers which can then cascade into lower equipage levels, and
thus a lower level of achieved safety and usage of 25NM lateral procedures.
Because the risks are highly connected to each other the mitigation strategies
...................
must address risks simultaneously in order to make sure both the
dependencies and influences are addressed.
7 Thesis Summary
This thesis has described a program risk assessment framework and its
application to the ICAO North Atlantic Data Link and Reduced Separation
Initiatives in support of the ICAO systems planning group. The framework
was administered in two main phases, identification and assessment, and
two mapping phases to produce the final key insights that will be used in the
risk mitigation. It was determined that the risks are highly interconnected
and dependent upon each other. The risks with the highest overall impacts
were risks that could possibly delay the implementation of the initiatives
ether through program delays or through the realization of safety barriers.
The risks that most influence other risks were policy risks that impact
restrictions for unequipped and aircraft when other critical processes could
be completed, and equipage risks that impact the amount and cost of the
equipment that must be procured in order to be compliant with the mandate
and thus the ability to utilize reduced separation procedures. The users of
this assessment must determine an appropriate mitigation strategy for going
forward. Because the risks are highly interconnected, a successful mitigation
strategy must address multiple risks simultaneously and verify that as many
of the stakeholders values as possible are not adversely impacted by the
resulting solution.
Appendix
Risk Appendices
A.0 Description
Risk A is described as "Equipage for businesses operators not available or
certified in time to meet mandate." "Equipage" refers to the FANS 1/A CPDLC
and ADS-C aircraft equipment needed to comply with the data link mandate.
A.1 Background
The data link mandate requires aircraft operating in North Atlantic Minimum
Navigation Performance Separation (MNPS) airspace to have ADS-C, and
CPDLC equipment certified against the standards in RTCA DO-
258A/EUROCAE ED-100A or ED-100 (NAT EFG 19, NAT SPG Conclusion
45/11).
Most aircraft fall into one of three categories: unequipped, partially
equipped, or fully equipped. Risk A affects aircraft from the first two
categories. Unequipped aircraft may not have equipment available due to the
system architecture of the aircraft, lack of the demand necessary to develop
the equipment, or, because proposed equipment has not been certified. For
partially equipped aircraft, there may not be a solution compatible with the
equipment already on the aircraft, or, there could be future upgrades that
will not be ready in time for the mandate.
Business operators are at a particular disadvantage for equipping. Many
business aircraft manufacturers do not have ADS-C and CPDLC equipment
available or in development. Some business aircraft operate within the
vertical limits of the proposals for data link mandate (expected to be lower
than FL390) and reduced lateral separation (FL350 to FL400 inclusive).
Business aircraft operating at these altitudes will likely be subject to the
altitude restrictions in the mandate and reduced separation procedures
without an available equipment solution to comply.
Several manufacturers have indicated to survey respondents they do not
have plans to develop equipment. Additionally, equipment costs are
expected to exceed the economic benefits of reduced separation.
A.2 Root Causes
Risk A has several root causes. These root causes are associated with the
business case, system architecture, and regulations.
A.2.1 Business Case
Equipment may not be available because the business case will not show a
positive net present value for either the avionics manufacturer or the aircraft
manufacturer to continue development. According to the respondents, the
main reason the business case fails is that there is not enough demand from
operators that could use the equipment to justify the expense of
development and certification. Another consideration is the development of
equipment for retrofit and forward fit aircraft. A retrofit for out of
production aircraft may have a more difficult business case because the
manufacturer can not count on new orders for future aircraft and the existing
operators may not elect to upgrade an older aircraft.
A.2.2 Systems Architecture
Avionics systems architecture issues can prevent manufacturers from
developing a solution for equipage. Some business aircraft do not have the
glass cockpit displays that are necessary for displaying the messages that
come from CPDLC and ADS-C for the pilots. Other aircraft may already be
equipped with ATN CPDLC equipment which cannot be integrated with the
FANS 1/A equipment and message sets needed for the mandate (ICAO SPG
45 2.2.26).
A.2.3 Regulations
Regulations that do not provide enough lead time for manufacturers to
complete development and certification of the equipment can also be a root
cause. The first target dates of the NAT SPG initiatives are only 2-3 years
away in 2012 and 2013.
A.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
Table 8: Risk A Impact Levels (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low High Low Low High None
As seen in Table 8, Risk A has high impact levels in operational efficiency and
operator costs. Risk A can affect equipage levels. Raising the data link
. ....... .
equipage level is a main goal of the mandate in support of meeting the NAT
Target Level of Safety (NAT SPG 46 3.1.15). The operational efficiency and
operator cost impact is due to the anticipated restrictions of unequipped
aircraft from optimal flight levels and flight paths. Flying non-optimal paths
and altitudes raises the fuel costs for operators and decreases their
operational efficiency. Respondents did not indicate an operator revenue
impact due to Risk A.
The low safety impact comes from a potential increase in the concentration
of aircraft operating near a single oceanic entry point due to restrictions
imposed by the regulations. Handling increased amounts of unequipped
traffic at these points will require increased controller workload for conflict
resolution and emergency descents.
ANSP costs can increase from the extra staffing needed to accommodate
unequipped aircraft.
ANSP revenues could be impacted at a low level depending on changes to the
traffic volumes of equipped and unequipped aircraft operating in each ANSP
region.
A.4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
This section will introduce the risk dependencies, influences and outcomes
from Risk A. Figure 17 shows the categorization, likelihood, and impact of
Risk A with regard to the mandate only.
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Figure 17: Risk A Aggregated Impact and Dependencies, Mandate Only
Influences
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Risk A is an equipage risk with direct dependencies on risks related to
technology, policy, certification, and business concerns. It has a high
likelihood and is a direct influence to risks related to equipage, safety and
business concerns. Figure 18 includes risks related to 25 NM lateral
separation initiatives, and adds the additional safety-related Risk T (Failure
to meet the safety case for 25 NM Lateral Separation).
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Figure 18: Risk A Aggregated Impact, Reduced Separation Only
A4.1 Direct Dependencies
Risk A, as shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18, has a medium aggregate impact
(3rd quintile) and has many dependencies and influences.
A4.1.1 Technology
Risk A's dependence on technology risks comes from the role that technology
risks play in setting the specifications and requirements for data link
equipment. Specifically, it is a technology risk and refers to the possible
delays surrounding a communication performance standard called RCP240.
Communications standards specify the time that can be taken for data link
messages to be exchanged between ANSPs and aircraft. These specifications
influence the equipment design on board the aircraft and the system
architecture that is needed to send and receive the messages.
A4.1.2 Policies and Procedures
Risk A's dependences on policy and procedural risks also come from the
roles that those risks play in setting the specifications and requirements for
the data link equipment and the likelihood of business case closing. Risk M
refers to the different equipment specifications between the North Atlantic
and Europe. These specifications are not compatible with each other
although there is an exception in Europe to allow FANS 1/A aircraft to
operate if they have airworthiness certificates issued before 2015. Risk M
creates uncertainty in the system architectures that will be needed onboard
the aircraft that will be compliant with the mandate because it makes it
unclear whether or not operators will need both types of equipment.
The measures to accommodate unequipped aircraft (Risk G), and the
procedures that operators use with unequipped aircraft (Risk H) will
determine the flight levels and allowable flight paths that unequipped
aircraft will be allowed to follow. These paths and flight levels will
determine the economic impact of not equipping for each flight and will be
factored into the operators' business case.
A4.1.3 Coordination and Training
Risk A is dependent on the coordination and training risks because they play
a role in knowing the level of demand for the data link equipment and in
setting the requirements. Late completion of the data link plan (Risk D) will
force operators to wait longer until the plan is complete in order to weigh the
costs and benefits of equipping. The rulemaking that will support 25 NM
lateral separation (Risk F) is needed for the operators and manufacturers to
know the requirements for the equipment that must be developed, and, for
individual operators to know the specific requirements for the parts of the
world in which they operate.
A4.1.4 Business Case
High costs (Risk V) can also prevent equipment from becoming available. If
the costs are to high, operators may elect not to purchase the equipment
which could lead to significantly decreased demand. If demand decreases,
the equipment development could be delayed or prevented altogether.
Table 9: Risk A Direct Dependencies
Risk D Late Completion of data link mandate plan. Not enough time for
commercial and business operators to plan to comply with the
mandate.
Risk F Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25 NM lateral
separation not completed within timeframe.
Risk G Failure to develop measures to accommodate unequipped
aircraft.
Risk L Failure to establish a plan or go forward with mitigation to meet
RCP 240. This also includes failure of ground infrastructure to
meet RCP 240.
Risk M Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate in Europe
vs. FANS 1/A mandate in the North Atlantic.
Risk V High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to meet
requirements for data link mandate and 25 NM lateral
separation.
A.4.2 Direct Risk Influences & Associated Outcomes
The risks that are directly influenced by Risk A are listed in Table 10 and
seen in Figure 17 and Figure 18.
A4.2.1 Equipage
The unavailability of equipment due to Risk A will influence the equipage
levels. The outcomes of low equipage levels can be a mixed equipage
environment (Risk I) and, a failure to achieve the percentage of equipped
aircraft (Risk Q), and the delivery of new aircraft that are equipped (Risk B,
and Risk W).
A4.2.2 Safety
Risks Q, T, and U are safety risks. The level of safety in the North Atlantic
increases with the number of aircraft that are equipped. If the equipment is
not available, the risks to reaching the appropriate safety levels increase.
Risk A influences the level of equipage and these risks because they are
dependent on the level of equipage.
A4.2.3 Policies and Procedures
Risk J relates the procedures that operators will use when they operate
unequipped aircraft. Risk A can influence the likelihood occurrence of Risk J
because operators will be more likely to have an unequipped aircraft if there
is no equipment available.
Table 10: Risks that are directly influenced by Risk A
Risk C ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other
technologies, or local rulemaking ready for implementation
of 25 NM lateral separation.
Risk H No ICAO standards to support implementation of 25 NM
lateral separation
Risk I Late completion of 25 NM lateral separation planning tasks
Risk J Operators choosing to operate in areas where other types of
surveillance are provided
Risk K Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than OTS routes
Risk Q Failure to achieve percentage of equipped flights needed to
move forward with phases of 25 NM lateral separation
Risk T Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM lateral separation
Risk U Failure to control vertical risk when 25 NM lateral
separation is implemented
Risk W Late delivery of new aircraft orders that are replacing older,
unequipped aircraft.
A.4.3 Compound Loops
There is a compound loop between Risk A (Equipage for businesses
operators not available or certified in time to meet mandate), and Risk H (No
ICAO standards to support implementation of 25 NM lateral separation)
indicated by the red double arrow in Figure 17 and Figure 18. A compound
loop occurs when two or more risks influence each other. The business case
affecting Risk A is influenced by the level of restriction resulting from Risk H.
Coordination will be required between the regulators who determine the
occurrence of Risk H, and the operators and manufacturers, who determine
the occurrence of Risk A to converge upon an anticipated level of equipage
and restrictions. These regulations also have timelines for implementation
that determine the when the operators must equip to be compliant with the
mandate and reduced separation.
A.5 Mitigation
Table 66 shows the reported mitigation difficulty for Risk A. Detection
difficulty is low because aircraft must indicate their equipment levels when
filing flight plans and when checking the aircraft's method of correspondence
with air traffic controllers. Corrective action will be difficult because of the
financial barriers posed by the business case, and the technical barriers
posed by system architectures. Coordination will be of medium difficulty.
Regulators must coordinate with both operators and aircraft manufacturers
to determine what aircraft will have equipment available and when it will be
certified. Some respondents gave Risk A a high likelihood because they
believed that several types of common business jets will not have equipment
available.
Respondents felt that little can be done to mitigate against system
architecture and business case root causes. Changing the system
architecture of an aircraft can costs millions of dollars on top of the millions
of dollars it can already cost to acquire and certify the proper equipment and
would significantly weaken the businesses case.
Business aircraft manufacturers in particular face different obstacles than
commercial aircraft manufacturers. Business aircraft manufacturers do not
know what after market avionics equipment has been installed in each
airframe currently in service, which could complicate the solution they
develop to comply with the mandate. Commercial aircraft manufacturers
more tightly control the types of avionics that are installed on their aircraft
after delivery.
Respondents felt one way to mitigate against the obstacles faced by business
aircraft manufacturers is to communicate clearly and quickly the restrictions
that will be put on business operators for not equipping through regulation
and coordination with trade groups representing the operators and
manufactures, and to facilitate an assessment of installed aftermarket
equipment against the requirements to aid in the development.
Additionally, communication between the regulators and business operators
can help to determine appropriate regulation timelines and appropriate
measures to accommodate aircraft that can not equip.
Table 11: Risk A Mitigation Difficulty
................... . . . . .. ...........
B.0 Description
Risk B is descried as "Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft
data link retrofit packages to satisfy demand". Risk B is categorized as an
equipage risk because it affects the level of data link equipage and the data
link adoption rate.
B.1 Background
Retrofit equipment must go through several processes before being certified
and installed on an aircraft. Delays can be encountered in any of these
policies and are encompassed by Risk B. The data link equipment must first
go through a research and development processes during which the
requirements are made and the preliminary design is completed. Next, the
preliminary design must receive market confirmation, or, confirmation that
there will be sufficient demand for the package from operators. In some
cases, the market confirmation can take place during or prior to the research
and development phase. The next process is the fabrication and testing
process. This process includes both the fabrication of the prototype and
testing onboard an actual aircraft. The last process for the manufacturer is
the certification process. Operators, depending on their country of origin,
may need to obtain a supplemental type certificate certifying the new
equipment. Lastly, the equipment must be manufactured, delivered to the
operator, and installed on the aircraft.
Delays in receiving equipment can happen for a variety of reasons. Delays in
receiving equipment can have a number of outcomes that affect the
assumptions and the system performance of the mandate implementation.
B.2 Root Causes
Delays in receiving datalink equipment can happen for a variety of reasons in
any of the processes. These delays may add pressure to regulators to develop
measures for unequipped aircraft.
B.2.1 Business Case
Respondents indicated that uncertainty with the business case can cause
delays in receiving the equipment. The manufacturers need to know with
some certainty how many customers will purchase the retrofit package in
order to justify devoting the appropriate resources to development and
certification.
B.2.2 Coordination and Regulations
Lead time for manufacturers to complete development and certification of
the equipment can also be a root cause. The first target dates of the NAT SPG
initiatives are only 2-3 years away in 2012 and 2013.
B.2 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact on the stakeholder value metrics according the respondants is
given in Table 12: Risk B Impact Levels (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
Table 12: Risk B Impact Levels (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low None None None High None
Risk B has a low safety impact because it reduces the number of aircraft that
are equipped with data link.
The operator costs are high because of the economic penalties and suffered
by not having an equipped aircraft. The operator must fly with an
unequipped aircraft longer than anticipated which could result in fuel burn
penalties depending the current regulations. Delays can also cause more
aircraft downtime if a subsequent maintenance visit must be scheduled.
The respondents did not indicate an impact level for operational efficiency,
ANSP Costs and Operator Revenues.
B.3 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The dependencies and outcomes for Risk B are shown in Figure 17 and
Figure 18 for the Mandate only and Reduced Separation. Both figures show
several dependencies and influences for Risk B. As with Risk A, many of the
dependencies come from the technology, policy and procedure, and
coordination and training categories.
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Figure 19: Risk B Aggregated Impact and Dependencies, Mandate Only
Influences
The reduced separation graph shown in Figure 18 adds Risk T, failure to
meet the safety case for 25 NM Lateral Reduced Separation, as a safety risk
that is influenced by Risk B. Some of the risks that are included in the
mandate also have a lower aggregated impact relative to other risks because
more risks have been considered.
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Figure 20: Risk B Aggregated Impact, Mandate & Reduced Separation
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B3.1 Direct Dependencies
Risk B has several direct dependencies. These dependencies come from the
technology, policy and procedures, coordination and training, other equipage
risks.
The technology Risk L, Failure to establish a plan to meet RCP240 affects the
system requirements that are needed for the data link equipment. If these
equipment requirements are not set, then delays in research and
development process for the equipment can arise.
The policy and procedure risks (Risk G, Risk M) determine the economic
penalties that unequipped aircraft endure. These penalties in turn will drive
the business case for both operators and aircraft manufacturers who need to
develop new equipment. If Risk G, Failure to develop measures to
accommodate unequipped aircraft, occurs, uncertainty in the economic
penalties could force operator and manufactures to wait longer before
deciding whether or not to equip. Risk M affects operators in Europe. It
creates ambiguity as to which data link standard an operator should equip
with when operating in both the North Atlantic and Europe.
The equipage Risk A, is a determining factor in the delivery process for data
link equipment to business operators specifically. If Risk A, lack of data link
equipment availability for business operators occurs, then there will
inherently be delays in acquiring the equipment.
The business case risks can pose delays because of uncertainties in revenues
or costs coming from the decision to equip or not to equip with CPDLC. Risk
V specifically refers to the costs exceeding a threshold above which operators
cannot afford to equip. Delays can arise in equipping as ways for cost cutting
are researched.
Table 13: Risk B Direct Dependencies
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate.
Risk D Late Completion of data link mandate plan. Not enough time for
commercial and business operators to plan to comply with the
mandate.
Risk F Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25 NM lateral
separation not completed within timeframe.
Risk G Failure to develop measures to accommodate unequipped
aircraft.
Risk L Failure to establish a plan or go forward with mitigation to meet
RCP 240. This also includes failure of ground infrastructure to
meet RCP 240.
Risk M Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate in Europe
vs. FANS 1/A mandate in the North Atlantic.
Risk V High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to meet
requirements for data link mandate and 25 NM lateral
separation.
B.3.2 Direct Risk Influences & Associated Outcomes
The occurrence of Risk B introduces delays for operators wishing to equip
with datalink in the North Atlantic. These delays and the subsequent lower
equipage levels at a given time influence the likelihood and severity of other
policy, equipage, safety and business risks.
The policy and procedural risks are influenced by the occurrence of Risk B
because more unequipped aircraft will result in an increase operators that
must use procedures for unequipped aircraft. Risk J specifically describes an
increase inoperations over routes where datalink is not needed.
The equipage risks are all influenced by the level of equipage that can be
reduced by the occurrence of Risk B. If Risk B occurs, these equipage risks
are more likely to occur. Risk Q is an outcome of not achieving the approrate
level of equipped flights. Risk W, late delivery of equipped aircraft, is also a
direct outcome of delayed delivery of data link equipment. Risk I, mixed
equipage during transition, is also an outcome of a reduced number of
equipped aircraft.
The safety risks T and K are influenced by the level of equipage in the North
Atlantic. If the level of equipage is lower due to Risk B occurring, then both
Risk T and Risk K are more likely to occur. More operators may be force to
operate outside the OTS (Risk K), during the later phases of reduced
separation and the mandate if they are not equipped. Also, the safety case
may be harder to meet (Risk T) if there are fewer equipped aircraft.
The delays in receiving equipment can influence the business case for
equipping because the service life of the aircraft will go down as delays
accumulate. If the breakeven service life for equipping passes during the
delays then operators may instead choose not equip or retire the aircraft.
Risk X reflects changes in the cost benefit analysis that could be prohibitive
to equipping.
Table 14: Risks that are directly influenced by Risk A
Risk H No ICAO standards to support implementation of 25 NM
lateral separation
Risk I Mixed equipage environment during transition
Risk J Operators choosing to operate in areas where other types of
surveillance are provided
Risk K Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than OTS routes
Risk Q Failure to achieve percentage of equipped flights needed to
move forward with phases of 25 NM lateral separation
Risk T Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM lateral separation
Risk W Late Delivery of new aircraft orders that are replacing older,
unequipped aircraft.
Risk X Cost benefit analysis may show the costs outweigh benefits
B.3.3 Compound Loops
Risk B has one compound loop with Risk H: No ICAO standards to support
the implementation of 25NM lateral separation. The standards rely on an
estimate of the number of aircraft that will equip. The delays that can reduce
this number and impact the standard also rely on the standard to specify the
economic penalties for not equipping.
B.4 Mitigation
The mitigation difficulty results for Risk B are shown in Table 15.
Coordination and Likelihood received "high" responses while Detection and
Corrective action received low and medium responses respectively.
Table 15: Risk B Mitigation Difficulty
Corrective
Detection Action Coordination Likelihood
Low Medium High High
Respondents gave Risk B a low difficulty in detection level because they felt
manufacturers would be forth coming about delay in delivering the
equipment. They also felt that the process of obtaining a supplemental type
certificate would be transparent, and therefore allow for easy detection of
delays.
The corrective action difficulty for Risk B is medium. Possible corrective
actions include changing the dates of the regulation, developing measures to
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accommodate unequipped aircraft, and resolving the differences in
regulations and procedures across the world.
The coordination level for Risk B is High. All three of the suggested
corrective actions will require coordination between ANSP's, manufacturers,
and operators.
The likelihood for Risk B is high. Some respondents indicated that they
expect to received their equipped aircraft late, and, they believe that waiting
for future, complementary upgrades to their flight management systems will
be more cost effective than making a temporary upgrade to comply with the
mandate and then making a subsequent upgrade to add the rest of the
complementary features.
The main complementary feature is an increase in memory which is essential
to future operational efficiency. New RNAV approaches and new waypoint
half-degree formats add to the memory requirements of current flight
management computers. When these requirements can't be me, operators
must load east bound data for east bound flights, then load westbound data
for westbound flights. The loading can take up to 50 minutes and is
sometimes unsuccessful, requiring the process to start over again. Waiting
the memory upgrade and the datalink simultaneously is a way to avoid the
possible loading time issue when just the datalink upgrade is installed.
C.0 Description
Risk C is described as "ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other
technologies, or local rulemaking ready for implementation of reduced
separation initiatives". Some ANSPs need to install upgraded software and
hardware to support reduced separation procedures. The upgraded
software and hardware is needed to process conflict resolution under the
newly defined reduced separation procedures and to send and receive
CPDLC signals to and from aircraft. Local rulemaking is some regions is
needed to satisify the safety concerns local authorities. Rulemaking typically
involves completing safety analysis and adding some local specifics to the
operating procedures. If ether the hardware and software is not ready in
time, or, the local rulemaking is not completed in time, the reduced
separation initiatives could be delayed. Risk C is a coordination and timing a
risk that only affects reduced separation initiatives.
C.1 Background
The automation systems are necessary for ANPSs to process conflicts and
position reports with the increased volume of traffic and the reduced
separation procedures. The automation systems must also be able to interact
with systems from other ANSPs to coordinate traffic handoffs so some
coordination will be required. Some ANSPs such as the Shanwick, Ireland,
and Gander can delay initiatives in the entire North Atlantic because they lie
in critical parts of the region that are often used by the organized track
system.
C.2 Root Causes
Respondents did not feel there were significant technical barriers to
implementing reduced separation procedures in ANSPs. They felt instead
that lack of planning, lack of financial resources, and the business case would
be the key root causes preventing ANSPs from updating their equipment.
Lastly, some respondents felt that the 25 nautical mile lateral separation
standard needed to be further defined before an ANSP planning process
could begin.
C.2.1 Planning & Standards Definition
Planning was the most common root cause cited by the respondents. The
implementation, testing and certification process can be long and will require
significant resources in planning to complete. Some respondents indicated
that the planning process is dependent on further definition and testing of
the 25NM lateral standard to update the conflict resolution software. One
respondent estimated that the process could take between 12 and twenty 28
months depending on the ability to get new software implemented (between
3 and 12 months), the time needed complete test cases for 25 NM lateral
separation (3 months) and the time needed to complete definition of the
25NM lateral separation (2-4 months).
Most respondents felt that only a software change was necessary but one
respondent (Norway) did need to upgrade some of the hardware.
C.2.2 Resources
Some ANSPs may not have the necessary resources to complete the planning
and implementation process for 25NM lateral separation. The level of
resources can vary between ANSPs based on whether or not both hardware
and software are required, and the requirements for local rule making,
C.2.3 Business Case
The Business case can also be a root cause for delayed implementation.
There will be costs associated with upgrading the equipment and
maintaining HF as a back up. Some ANSPs may elect to add revenue by
changing the charging scheme. Some airlines have asked for a uniform
charging scheme and it is unclear what if any rules will be made regarding
the fees that will be charged to operators (both equipped and unequipped).
C.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of risk C on the stakeholder value metrics according the
respondents is given in Table 8.
Table 16: Risk C Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
High High High Medium Medium Medium
Risk C has a high safety and operational efficiency impact but it is conditional on
the behavior of adjacent ANSPs. If Risk C occurs and an ANSP can't support
reduced separation, the implementation of 25 NM lateral reduced separation in an
adjacent ANSP can pose high safety risk. If the adjacent ANSP reverts to the
previous 60NM separation, then there is no safety impact. Additionally, the
North Atlantic may not be able to realize is peak operational efficiency if the
reduced separation initiatives are delayed.
The ANSP Costs impact can be high if the planning required to implement
reduced separation is incomplete depending on what costs were not anticipated.
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The costs can include software upgrade costs, possible hardware costs, training
costs, and possibly the cost of maintaining a backup system. There could be
additional costs if local rulemaking is required. These costs can include safety
analysis, testing, and the costs of making possible revisions to the standard.
ANSP revenue impact and the operator cost impact will be medium. The revenue
impact will depend on the charging scheme that ANSPs adopt when reduced
separation initiatives begin. If revenue is charged on a per message basis then
revenue will be equal to: rev = messages per plane * Number of planes. Changes
in the charging scheme can affect the number of planes if operators choose other
routes to reduce messaging costs. The operator cost impact will also equal
messages per plane * number of planes. The number of messages per plane is
expected to increase when reduced separation initiatives are implemented because
more position reports will be needed to maintain the level of safety.
Operator Cost impact can be medium if the occurrence of Risk C influences
traffic levels. One of the goals of the reduced lateral separation initiatives is to
increase the capacity of the airspace. If the initiatives are delayed then the
operators may loose revenue from not being able to increase their capacity.
CA Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The dependencies and outcomes for Risk C are shown in Figure 17. Risk C
affects the reduced separation initiatives only although it is impacted and
influenced by risks that impact the mandate. Risk C forms several
compound loops with risks from the reduced separation initiatives. It also
has two dependences and two influences.
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C4.1 Direct Dependencies
Risk C has two direct dependencies as shown in Table 9 and Figure 17, one
from the coordination and timing category and one from the policy and
procedure category.
The ANSP automation systems supporting reduced separation must be able
to communicate with the automation systems from adjacent ANSPs in order
to handle handoffs and conflict resolution at ANSP boundaries. Risk E
represents a failure to get the automation systems across the North Atlantic
coordinated which will in turn will delay the readiness of the ANSPs and the
reduced separation initiatives.
The communication protocol and procedures must be agreed upon before
the new automation systems and reduced separation procedures can become
operational. The automation systems need to send and receive messages
from aircraft with the protocol and the pilots must acknowledge and act
upon the messages sent from ANSPs and other aircraft. Currently there are
conflicting protocols and standards for CPDLC between the North Atlantic
(FANS 1/A) and Europe (ATN). If the differences cannot be resolved in time
then the ANSP implementation can be delayed.
Table 17: Risk C Direct Dependencies
Risk E Failure to achieve effective coordination with other ANSPs
(harmonization of technical methods and operating methods)
Risk M Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate in Europe
vs. FANS 1/A mandate in the North Atlantic.
C.4.2 Direct Risk Influences & Associated Outcomes
The outcome of Risk C has two direct influences in the technology and
equipage categories as seen in Figure 17 and referenced in Table 10. In the
technology category, the ground infrastructure must perform well enough to
meet the standards of RCP240. RCP240 is a communication standard that
determines the maximum amount of time that messages can be exchanged
between ANPSs and aircraft. Risk L represents a failure of the ground
infrastructure to meet this standard and its outcome is influenced by the
software and hardware readiness of the ANSPs. The hardware changes that
ANSPs need to plan for to mitigate against risk C should include the
hardware compliance to the 25 NM lateral communication standard
(currently anticipated to be RCP240).
Risk Q represents a failure to achieve the percentage of equipped flights
needed to move forward with phases of 25NM lateral separation. Delays in
ANSP readiness can influence an operators decision to equip if it is unclear
when a given region will support reduced separation and if there will be
corresponding economic penalties.
Table 18: Risks that are directly influenced by Risk C
Risk L Failure to establish a plan to go forward with mitigation to
meet RCP240. This also includes failure of ground
infrastructure to support RCP240.
Risk Q Failure to achieve percentage of equipped flights needed to
move forward with phases of 25NM lateral separation
C.4.3 Compound Loops
Risk C has compound loops in the technology, coordination and timing, and
safety categories. These loops are listed in Table 19 and shown in Figure 17.
These loops reflect the interdependence between these categories and the
level of coordination required to get the technology working, meet the safety
standards, and agree on the communication standards with in the time frame
of the initiatives.
Risk R represents a failure to agree on the communication standards. ANSPs
may need to implement new software and hardware depending on
standards. Conversely, without knowledge of these standards, ANSPs cannot
procure compliant equipment. One of these standards is RCP240 which is
part of risk L.
Risk S represents late completion of 25NM lateral separation tasks. Some of
these tasks involve standards that are ANSPs need to upgrade their software
in hardware. ANSP readiness including testing is also encompassed in these
tasks. If ANSPs are delayed in getting software and hardware for reduced
separation up and working than Risk S is more likely to occur.
Risk T represents a failure to meet the safety case for 25NM lateral
separation. The safety case has many requirements including
communication requirements that are influenced by the hardware of the
ANSPs to meet them. Risk T can also affect Risk C if changes to the standards
are needed to meet the safety case.
Risk U represents a failure to control the vertical risk when 25NM lateral
separation is implemented. The vertical risk involves aircraft flying on the
same lateral track or direction that come too close in altitude. This risk
should be evaluated during testing so it can influence the readiness of ANSPs
by forcing software or hardware changes. It can also be influence by the
performance ANSPs in operation if there is a failure or the equipment does
not perform as expected.
Table 19: Risk C Compound Loops
Risk R No ICAO communication navigation and surveillance standards
available to support implementation of 25NM lateral separation
Risk S Late completion of 25NM lateral separation tasks
Risk T Failure to meet safety case for 25NM lateral separation.
Risk U Failure to control vertical risk when 25NM lateral separation is
implemented.
C.5 Mitigation
Table 15 shows the mitigation difficulty results for Risk C. Respondents gave
Risk C a low detection difficulty because operators won't be able to file for or
use reduced separation procedures if the ANSP equipment is not ready.
ICAO and the ANSPs will communicate any changes to the operating
procedures if necessary to the pilots.
Corrective action is rated is high because it will require changing the
initiatives, adding new hardware or software and possible retraining ANSP
employees. One respondent commented that coordinating in ICAO meetings
would be the best way to mitigate against the root causes from planning. A
readiness survey completed by each ANSP would work well in ensuring that
reduced separation can be implemented in the anticipated timelines.
The coordination required to mitigate against Risk C is medium. In addition
to coordinating through ICAO meetings, ANSPs much coordinate their
software with each other to ensure handoffs and conflict resolution work
seamlessly.
Respondents felt that the likelihood of Risk C was low. Some of the ANSPs
participated in the survey. All indicated they had plans to equip in time for
the reduced initiatives or that they were already equipped. Most of the
respondents indicated that only software upgrades were needed but one
ANSP indicated that a hardware update was needed as well.
Table 20: Risk C Mitigation Difficulty
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D.0 Description
Risk D is a coordination and timing risk described as "Late Completion of
data link mandate plan. Not enough time for commercial and business
operators to plan to comply with mandate (e.g. determination of entire flight
level spectrum and OTS tracks where mandate is to be applied). Risk D as
stated is both a risk and an outcome. The risk is completing the data link
mandate plan late and the outcome is that operators may not have enough
time to equip. The data link plan currently has stated timelines but
incomplete details on how to equip and the penalties for not equipping.
Operators who are waiting for more details may not have enough time to
equip if the mandate takes too long to complete.
D.1 Background
The data link mandate plan in Table 21 shows timelines for phased
introductions of restricted airspace that only FANS 1/A equipped aircraft can
operate in. However the definitions of which tracks will be affected and the
flight and the flight levels are significant to the economic impact of not
equipping. The flight levels especially need to be known before operators
can make a decision. There is also a significant amount of time required to
equip. The manufactures must develop and certify equipment and the
operators must procure the equipment and schedule aircraft downtime for
installation. The total length of the process can vary and if the data link plan
details aren't ready in time, it may not be feasible for an operator to equip
before the restrictions are implemented.
Table 21: Data Link Mandate Plan
Year Airspace Where Flight Levels Where Remarks
Applicable Applicable
7 Feb 2013 *To-be-determined OTS *To-be-determined Aircraft to be equipped in
tracks FL's order to operate at specified
FL's, however, NAT SPG to
explore measures to
accommodate
non-equipped aircraft
5 Feb 2015 *MNPS Airspace *To-be-determined Remark above applies
FL's
*Operational Restrictions. Operators/aircraft not appropriately equipped and, as
required,
authorized could be restricted from operation on specified tracks or airspace at specified
flight levels.
Additional Note:
European Air Navigation Planning Group (EANPG) proposed exemption to data link
requirement in designated European airspace: aircraft with an individual certificate of
airworthiness first issued before 1 January 2014 and fitted with data link equipment
certified against requirements specified in RTCA DO-258A/EUROCAE ED-100A (or ED-100)
are exempted for the life of that particular airframe.
D.2 Root Causes
The respondents identified two root causes for late completion of the
datalink mandate plan: lack of coordination between the regulators and all
the stakeholders, and, lack of progressive review after the mandate details
are set. The details of these root causes are discussed in the following
section.
D.2.1 Poor Coordination
Poor coordination was cited as the main root cause for the occurrence of Risk
D. Respondents felt that a high level of coordination between regulators,
operators, and manufacturers would be the best way to pick dates that work
for as many people as possible. Respondents also pointed out that they
would like to see the enforcement dates harmonized with European CPDLC
initiatives and harmonized procedures worldwide.
D2.2 Lack of Progressive Review
Lack of progressive review of the data link mandate was also cited as a root
cause. A progressive review is necessary to both incorporate all the analysis
that is been done in support of the planning tasks, and, to make sure all the
stakeholders are aware of what is expected of them and the complete details
of how to comply with the rules. The planning process is iterative so it is
important that everyone agrees and is aware of the final plan when it is put
in place.
D.3 Impact on Stakeholder Values
The impact on stakeholder value metrics for Risk D is given in Table 21.
Table 22: Risk D Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low High Very Low Low Medium None
The low safety impact is due to a fewer than desired number of aircraft
operating in the NAT with CPDLC. This is the due to the anticipated outcome
of operators not having enough time to equip.
The operational efficiency impact is high due the implications of the likely
outcomes. Operators that do not have enough time comply will have to
follow the procedures put in place for unequipped aircraft. An unanticipated
high number of these aircraft could put a significant strain on the operational
efficiency of the North Atlantic, especially if they are all forced to the same
oceanic entry points and flight paths. Operators may also have a need to
schedule extra downtime for the aircraft in order to equip them with CPDLC
which also hurts the efficiency of their operation.
The impact to ANSP Costs is indicated as very low. These costs are likely
from unanticipated staffing or software changes that come from changes to
the data link mandate plan.
The impact on ANSP revenues is indicated as low. The low impact is due to
traffic fluctuations (ether positive or negative) due to the late completion of
the plan. The ANSP brings in revenue by charging for messages exchanged
between the aircraft and the ANSP. If there are fewer aircraft or fewer
messages due to fewer aircraft having CPDLC, the overall revenue could
change. Alternatively, HF messages for unequipped aircraft could be priced
higher than data link messages from CPLDLC equipped aircraft so ANSP
revenue could also increase to slightly higher than expected levels.
The impact to Operator Costs is stated as medium. These costs can come
from unanticipated requirements for equipping, unscheduled aircraft
downtime to equip and, from the increase in fuel burn from flying routes
designated for unequipped aircraft. Late completion of the data link
mandate plan can force operators into any or all of those three scenarios if
they do not have enough time to comply.
The respondents did not indicate an impact of this risk to Operator revenue.
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D.4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The dependencies of Risk D are shown in Figure 22 and Figure 23. Risk D
affects both the mandate and reduced separation initiatives. Risk D is a
coordination and timing risk that has both dependencies and influences in
the policy and procedure category, coordination and timing, equipage and
safety.
Figure 22: Risk D Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 23: Risk D Dependencies and Influences, Mandate and Reduced Separation
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Table 23: Risk D Direct Dependencies
Risk E Failure to achieve effective coordination with other ANSPs
(harmonization of technical methods and operating methods)
Risk JOperators choosing to operate in areas where other types of
surveillance are provided.
Risk K Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than OTS routes.
Risk E is a coordination and timing risk that describes a failure to adequately
coordinate with other ANSPs to facilitate handoffs and other types of
communication. If the proper coordination between ANSPs is not in place or,
if there are barriers preventing from occurring then the data link mandate
plan must be postponed, causing the occurrence of Risk D.
Risk J is a policy risk that describes a possible scenario in which many
aircraft choose to operate routes with radar coverage if they are forced to
operate outside of the OTS. Risk J however would only occur if unequipped
operators were forced to operate outside the OTS by policy because flying in
area with radar coverage represents a large, uneconomical path diversion. It
is a safety risk because it could result in too much traffic using a specific
route (blue spruce route) which could cause congestion and delays. The
likely occurrence and consequences of risk J occurring could force changes to
the data link mandate plan that result in delayed implementation.
Risk K is a safety risk that describes an increased number of aircraft
operating outside of MNPS airspace as a possible consequence of the
mandate and reduced separation procedures. If the occurrence of risk K is
determined to have a high likelihood and pose a significant safety risk, the
data link mandate may need to be revised and could pose a significant delay
to implementation.
Table 24 shows the
Table 24: Risk DDirect Influences
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk B Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft
Risk H Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft
Risk S Late completion of 25NM lateral separation planning tasks
Risks A and B are equipage risks that depend on a clear data link mandate
plan that instructs operators and manufactures how to equip. Delays in
completing the data link mandate plan can cause delays down stream in
creating the equipment (Risk A) and delivering equipped aircraft (Risk B).
Risk H is a policy risk that encompasses the implications of restricted
airspace for unequipped operators. These restrictions will come in the final
data link mandate plan and the 25NM reduced separation plan.
Risk S is a coordination and timing risk describing the late completion of the
25NM lateral separation planning tasks. The 25NM lateral separation
initiatives depend on the CPDLDC and ADS-C technology that is required in
the datalink mandate plan. If the data link mandate plan is delayed, the
25NM lateral planning tasks could also be delayed.
The compound loop for Risk D is listed in Table 25.
Table 25: Risk D Compound Loops
Risk Q Failure to achieve percentage of equipped flights needed to
move forward with phases of 25NM lateral separation
Risk Q is an equipage risk that was identified as a compound risk with Risk D.
Risk Q can influence the occurrence of risk D because increasing the number
of equipped aircraft is the main objective of the data link mandate. If it is
clear that the plan will not sufficiently increase the number of equipped
aircraft then the plan could be altered or delayed. Conversely, the success of
the data link mandate plan, including its timeliness influences the number of
equipped aircraft and the operators who are deciding to equip.
D.5 Mitigation
The mitigation difficulty for Risk D is described in Table 26. The detection
difficulty is very low because the data link mandate plan will be published by
ICAO and all of the operators and ANSPs will be made aware any changes or
delays.
Respondents rated corrective action as "high" and coordination as "very
high". This is likely due the complexity of technical and procedural
dependencies surrounding the data link plan. The technical details and the
procedural details need to be agreed upon by all of the ANSPs to work
effectively. The 25NM lateral plan has timelines that also depend on the
successful implementation of the data link mandate plan. Respondents did
mention that coordination is the best way to mitigate against a possible delay
of the data link plan.
The respondents felt Risk D had a medium likelhood of occurrence. They
noted that while there is a timeline for the data link plan in place, the details
and flight levels still aren't clear. They also noted that they would like to see
the timelines harmonized with the timelines from European CPDLC
mandates.
Table 26: Risk D Mitigation Difficulty
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E.0 Description
Risk E is described as "Failure to achieve effective coordination with other
ANSPs (Harmonization of technical systems and operating methods)".
Coordination is needed between ANSPs to facilitate handoffs and collision
detection as aircraft move from one ANSP region of airspace to another.
Handoffs are exchanges of information about an aircraft that its transferred
from one ANSP to another and contain speed, altitude, flight plans, call signs
and other information. The operating methods need to be harmonized to
minimize human error amongst operators who are flying between ANSPs
and to reduce the need for duplicate CPDLC equipment on board the aircraft.
Failure to properly coordinate could result in lower operational efficiencies
and possibly higher costs to ANSPs.
E.1 Background
ANSPs around the world have various procedures for issuing clearance,
assigning flight paths and cruising altitudes, and for communicating with
pilots and ANSPS. As CPDLC became more widely adopted by operators and
ANSPs, the messages between ANSPs and pilots became digital and the
different procedures and message formats were used in different parts of the
world. The message format describes of the content of the messages, the
formats in which they are sent, and other technical details of how the
messages are exchanged. Different communication procedures and message
formats in different regions of the world can be confusing to pilots and lead
to human error. With specific regard to reduced separation procedures, not
all flight management computers support the display of the half-degree
tracks required when reduced separation procedures are in place.
E.2 Root Causes
Risk E has several root causes that are related to coordination with
stakeholders and incompatibilities with technical specifications and delays in
software upgrades:
E.2.1 Inadequate Coordination with Stakeholders:
The ANSPs must coordinate with all of the stakeholders to ensure that the
technical systems and procedures are compatible and operate efficiently.
Some coordination between North Atlantic ANSPs is facilitated by ICAO but it
must also be done on the local level with domestic, adjacent ANSPs. If
proper coordination with domestic ANSPs is not present, technical problems
could come up during testing and implementation that could delay the
initiatives and result in reduced operational efficiecny.
E.2.2 Delays in system software upgrades
Delays to the system software upgrades can delay or prevent efforts to
harmonize with other ANSPs. It is possible that each ANSP will choose a
unique software vendor to perform upgrades and it may not be clear until
the upgrade is complete or partially done that a system integration effort
with adjacent ANSPs needs to take place. Failure to recognize and plan for
the systems integration work could add delays to the harmonization between
ANSPs.
E.2.3 Incompatible technical specifications
Incompatible technical specifications between ANSPs can also be a root
cause. Some of the technical specifications need to change to facilitate entry
of the half -degree tracks for reduced separation, and to harmonize the
CPDLC message sets and procedures worldwide. If the same standards are
not adopted by all ANSPs, then it is possible that information between ANSPs
may not be exchanged properly.
E.3 Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of Risk E to stakeholder values is shown in Table 27.
Table 27: Risk E Impact to Stakeholder Values
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Medium High Medium None None None
Respondents gave the impact of Risk E a medium safety impact. Having
different procedures can increase the likelihood of human error by the pilots.
It is possible for pilots to confuse the procedures between ANSPs and regions
during flight path changes. There could also be a higher likelihood of human
error if ANSP staff perform handoffs manually by hand if their software
systems can't communicate.
The operational efficiency impact was listed as "high". Impacts to
operational efficiency can come at the transition points between two ANSPs
if different procedures are used and different systems are used. The
transition time can take longer if it needs to be carried out manually and that
may cause the need for more aircraft separation which decreases the
operational efficiency. Local ANSPs may not support the same separation
standards which could force an adjacent ANSP that participates in reduced
separation procedures to increase the space between aircraft close to the
transition point.
ANSP cost impact could be medium if extra staffing is required to handle
communications with adjacent ANSPs or if unanticipated software upgrades
are needed to facilitate automatic communication with adjacent ANSPs.
The respondents did not indicate an impact to ANSP revenues, operator
costs, or operator revenues.
E.4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The dependencies of Risk E are shown in Figure 24, and Figure 25. Risk E is a
coordination and training risk with only one direct dependency and
influences several categories including technology policy and procedures,
and, coordination and timing.
Figure 24: Risk E Dependencies, Mandate Only
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Figure 25:Risk E Dependencies, Mandate and Reduced Separation
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Risk E does not have any direct dependencies although forms a compound
loop with Risk R.
Risk E has several direct influences in the technology, policy and procedure
and coordination and timing categories.
Risk L describes a failure to determine a communication standard for 25NM
lateral separation. Although RCP 240 has been defined, it still needs to be
tested to verify that it is satisfactory for 25NM lateral separation and that all
of the equipment can maintain the standard with large volumes of traffic.
These tests require coordination between ANSPs to conduct.
Risks H and G are policy risks that describe the operating implications for
unequipped aircraft. Risk H describes restricted access to airspace for
unequipped operators and Risk G represents a failure to develop measures
for unequipped aircraft. The ANSPs must coordinate and agree on how to
handle the volume of unequipped aircraft that may be restricted from using
parts of the North Atlantic when the initiatives take effect. If Risk E occurs,
the procedures for handling unequipped aircraft could consequently become,
complex, inefficient and force the occurrences of risks H and G.
Risk E also influences other coordination and timing risks that are critical to
the planning tasks that involve ANSPs and must be completed before the
initiatives can take effect. The data link mandate plan (Risk D) and the 25
NM lateral separation plan (Risk S) require ANSPs to agree on procedural
and technical requirements. The automation systems (Risk C) also need to be
linked with those from adjacent ANSPs to ensure readiness for the initiatives.
Table 28:Risk E Direct Influences
Risk L Failure to establish a plan or go forward with mitigation to meet
RCP240.
Risk H Restricted access to airspace for unequipped operators
Risk G Failure to develop measures to accommodate unequipped
aircraft
Risk D Late completion of data link mandate plan
Risk C ANSP failure to automation systems ready
Risk S Late completion of 25NM lateral separation
Risk E has one compound loop with Risk R as shown in Figure 25 and Table
29. Risk R is a technology risks that represents a failure to produce
technology standards for 25NM reduced separation. These standards are
needed by the ANSPs to properly tune the software that assists air traffic
controllers and to ensure their hardware can meet the target level of
performance specified in the standards.
Table 29: Risk E Compound Loops
Risk R No ICAO standards to support implementation of 25NM reduced
separation
E.5 Risk E Mitigation Difficulty
The mitigation difficulty for Risk E is show in Table 30. The detection
difficulty was given a medium rating. The detection of the issues stemming
from a lack of ANSP coordination will take time to detect as the problem
materializes.
The respondents indicated that communication takes place between the
stakeholders but that the appropriate action is much more difficult to
accomplish. The high ratings for corrective action and coordination are likely
a result of this perceived difficulty to take action. In some cases, respondents
felt that action was hard to take because of the long time scales required for
the coordination, testing, and appropriate analysis to be completed.
Respondents felt that Risk E had a "medium" likelihood of occurrence. They
did recognize that ANSPs participate in the NAT meetings but that they could
be constrained by time and resources to take the appropriate corrective
action.
Table 30: Risk E Mitigation Difficulty
... ....................... .   .........
F.0 Description
Risk F is described as "Rulemaking to support datalink mandate and 25NM
lateral separation (if required by ANSP) not completed within mandate
timeframe". Rulemaking is a process that is sometimes required by local
authorities to certify new equipment and operating procedures. Even
though the ICAO certification process could be complete, the local
rulemaking process could still delay the implementation of 25NM lateral
separation.
F.1 Background
Rulemaking is an analysis and approval process performed by local
authorities in order to allow new operating procedures or equipment into
local airspace. In some cases local authorities may elect to add requirements
after their own independent rulemaking process in addition to the work that
is done by international organizations such as ICAO. There are also cases
where local rulemaking is required and not optional. The local authorities
have the final say with regard to which regulations and procedures will be
used in their respective regions. Failure to complete rulemaking could delay
the implementation of 25NM initiatives because they depend in part on
agreement between authorities in all of the North Atlantic regions.
F.2 Root Causes
Respondents felt that the only root cause for Fisk F occurring is that the
rulemaking process can be time consuming.
F.2.1 Time Consuming Process
The main root cause for this risk is that the rulemaking process can be time
consuming. The respondents agreed that the rulemaking process is an
important safety step that must be taken when new rules, equipment and or
procedures are adopted. They did not give specific timelines or estimates but
one ANSP respondent described their rulemaking process as a safety check
for local ground equipment software to ensure that it complies with the new
rules or procedures set by ICAO. They said that live tests would be
performed along with a separate safety analysis. It is possible for the
rulemaking process to vary across ANSPs so some processes may be more
time consuming than others.
F.3 Impact on Stakeholder Values
The impact on stakeholder values for risk F is shown in Table 31.
Table 31:Risk F Impact on Stakeholder Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low High Low Low Medium Medium
Respondents gave Risk F a low safety impact. Although rulemaking is
required to ensure local safety standards are met, the new processes won't
be implemented until local rulemaking actually occurs and the processes are
locally certified. The low impact could come from other safety risks
associated with having other regions operate with new procedures while
rulemaking is completed in separate region or, subsequent lower levels of
equipped air traffic due to delays in implementing the initiatives.
The impact to operational efficiency can be high if the 25NM lateral
initiatives are delayed or if the initiatives are partially implemented. Delayed
implementation of the initiatives coupled with traffic increases over time
could result in more congestion and thus reduced operational efficiency.
ANSP costs are low due to the possible increases preparation costs that can
come from delays. The operator costs are medium due to an inability to
recoup back the investment in equipment from not using 25NM reduced
separation procedures while the initiatives are delayed.
ANSP Revenue and Operator Revenue impact are low and medium
respectively. These impacts would be due to the possible delays into the
increases in traffic and airspace capacity that would be possible if initiatives
weren't delayed by the rulemaking process.
F.4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The dependencies, influences and compound risks of Risk F are shown, in
Figure 26 and Figure 27. Risk F is a coordination and timing risk with direct
dependencies and influences in several categories including technology,
policy and procedures, coordination and timing, and business concerns.
Figure 26:Risk F Direct Dependencies and Influences
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Figure 27: Risk F Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
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Risk F has a dependence on the technology risk L (meeting & verifying
RCP240 for the safety case) because the rulemaking process needs a
standards definition to accurately verify and test.
Risk F has a dependence on the coordination and timing risk D also because
the rulemaking process needs a standards definition to accurately verify and
test. Although the datalink equipment requirements are defined, the
harmonization of procedures could change the message formats and the
correct message formats are needed for local rulemaking.
Risk F has a dependence of the safety risks U (25NM lateral vertical safety
case failure after implementation) and T (25NM lateral safety case after
implementation). ***Is this possible? Doesn't rulemaking need to be
completed before 25NM lateral is implemented in a given region?***
Risk F also has a dependence on the business case risk X (Cost benefit
analysis may show costs outweigh the benefits of initiatives). If the costs due
in outweigh the benefits for the data link mandate or 25NM lateral
separation, the ANSPs and local authorities may elect not to proceed with the
rulemaking process. This decision would likely be influenced by ICAO and
the intentions of other ANSPs after the cost benefit analysis is completed.
Table 32: Risk F Direct Dependencies
Risk L Failure to establish a plan or go forward with mitigation to meet
RCP240.
Risk D Late completion of Data link Mandate plan
Risk U Failure to control vertical risk when 25NM lateral separation is
implemented
Risk T Failure to meet safety case for 25NM lateral separation.
Risk X Cost benefit analysis may show that costs outweigh the benefits
of implementing the data link mandate and/or 25NM lateral
separation.
Table 33 shows the direct influences of Risk F.
Risk F can influence the policy and procedure risk J (Operators choosing to
operate in areas where other types of surveillance are provided) and the
safety risk K (Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than OTS routes). The
restrictions imposed by rulemaking and by ICAO can eventually force
unequipped aircraft out of the OTS or out of MNPS airspace, both including
optimal flight levels for most aircraft. If the rulemaking process results in
upholding or extending the 2015 restrictions in the initiatives for the entire
MNPS airspace, unequipped operators may indeed be forced to operate in
areas where surveillance is provided, causing the occurrence of Risk J. If
there are restrictions that affect certain oceanic entry points during climb
and descent flight phases, unequipped operators may choose alternate
routes outside the OTS accordingly causing the occurrence of risk K. The
respondents however noted that the main cause of risk K was the ability of
the airlines to monitor winds in realtime while the OTS is only updated twice
the day. The realtime wind information sometimes leads operators filing
flight plants outside of the OTS to take advantage of recent or expected wind
changes.
Risk F can also influence the equipment risks A (Business Operator equipage
not available) and B (delays in delivering retrofit equipment) if the
rulemaking process changes the airspace restrictions of the equipment
requires for operating in a local region. Such changes could cause an
operator to ask for changes to the retrofit equipment which could in turn
cause delays. One possible example is the additional requirement for
onboard datalink recording that came from a rulemaking process. The
equipment to due the recording wasn't part of the ICAO initiatives and
ordering could delay the delivery of the equipment or the aircraft.
Table 33: Risk F Direct Influences
Risk J Operators choosing to operate in areas where other types of
surveillance are provided
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time.
Risk B Potential delays in manufacturers delivery aircraft data link
retrofit packages to satisfy demand
Risk K Increased traffic on MNPS routes other than OTS routes
Risk F has two compounds loops (related reduced separation only) as shown
in Figure 27 and Table 34. Risk R is a technology risk that describes a failure
of ICAO to define and agree on all of the standards needed to go forward with
25NM lateral. These standards are needed for rulemaking and a failure to
complete them quickly enough would result in the occurrence of risk F.
Alternatively, the results from the local rulemaking process in each region
could influence and update these standards causing Risk R to occur.
Risk S is a coordination and timing risk that describes a failure to complete
the planning tasks for 25NM lateral separation. Risk S can depend on or
influence Risk F depending on when the planning tasks fall behind schedule.
The technical standards and restrictions are needed for the rulemaking
process to initially take place. If the process for defining these standards and
restrictions fall behind schedule, then Risk F will likely occur. Alternatively,
if the rulemaking process leads changes in the standards or restrictions, the
remaining planning tasks for 25NM lateral separation could also be delayed
while the revisions take place, causing Risk S to occur.
Table 34: Risk F Compound Loops
Risk R No ICAO standards available for 25NM Separation
Risk S Late completion of 25 lateral separation planning tasks
F.5 Risk F Mitigation Difficulty
The mitigation difficulty for Risk F is shown in Table 35. The detection
difficulty was given a low rating. Most of the delays coming from the
rulemaking process won't take affect until the actual process but will likely
be apparent in the planning process.
The respondents indicated that corrective action difficulty will be high. They
suggested that the best mitigation strategy against rulemaking delays is to
allow an appropriate amount of time to complete the process before setting
an implementation date for the initiatives. Any changes to the standards or
equipment coming from rulemaking would also be difficult to correct. One
possible example would be changing the separation distances if RCP240
doesn't meet the safety criteria for 25NM lateral or if the Iridium satellites
don't meet RCP240. Changing the standard would require resources,
coordination and time to implement and analyze.
Respondents also indicated the coordination difficulty will be high. The
ANSPs will need to coordinate with ICAO when and how their rulemaking
processes will occur. The ANSPs may also need to coordinate with local
ANSPs. The overall process can take time because ICAO must address all of
the concerns of each ANSP that may come from rulemaking. One possible
strategy is to gather the necessary information is to survey the ANSPs about
their rulemaking processes. The coordination difficulty will also be high if
changes to the datalink or reduced separation standards are needed.
Respondents felt that Risk F had a "medium" likelihood of occurrence. They
indicated that the rulemaking process can be time consuming and it has
inherent uncertainties. The uncertainties can include the time to address
new concerns, and the time to secure the resources to perform the testing.
Table 35: Risk F Mitigation Difficulty
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G.0 Description
Risk G is described as a "failure to develop measures for unequipped
aircraft". When the reduced separation procedures are implemented,
aircraft that do not have FANS 1/A based CPDLC and ADS-C equipment will
not be able to safely operate close to equipped aircraft that are using the
procedures. A failure to develop measures to accommodate these
unequipped aircraft could have many undesirable outcomes for those
operators and could also create congestion and unsafe operating conditions
if there are too many unequipped aircraft operating in a confined
geographical area.
G.1 Background
Unequipped aircraft will not be able to utilize reduced separation procedures
because they lack the CPDLC equipment needed for send automatic position
reports over the North Atlantic and the ADS-C equipment needed to receive
position information from nearby aircraft. However, it is important to
develop measures for unequipped aircraft because there will likely be a
significant number of aircraft that aren't equipped ether because equipment
is unavailable, is uneconomical, or the aircraft is too old to justify the
expense. As many as 50 percent of the aircraft that use the North Atlantic
could be unequipped so if the measures to accommodate them don't exist,
many operators could be affected.
The reduced separation plan as currently written gradually phases out the
airspace in the North Atlantic that unequipped aircraft can use. In addition
to having measures to accommodate unequipped aircraft, the measures must
also ensure that a strain is not put on a single ANSP or that there aren't
excessive levels of congestion at points where the unequipped aircraft are
forced to operate. Some respondents also interpreted this risk as the
inability for unequipped aircraft to get access to optimum flight levels.
Possible ways to accommodate unequipped aircraft economically include
issuing waivers or setting aside airspace for unequipped aircraft to operate.
Some operators have indicated that their aircraft need to use the optimal
tracks in order to complete their missions.
G.2 Root Causes
The respondents identified two root causes for a failure to develop measures
to accommodate unequipped aircraft: the inability for the NAT stakeholders
to agree on measures to equip aircraft and, as a consequence of the
requirements of safe reduced separation flight.
G.2.1 Agreement between the stakeholders
Agreement between the stakeholders of the North Atlantic airspace (NAT)
(operators, ANSPs and regulators) must take place in order to implement at
NAT wide strategy for accommodating unequipped aircraft. The nuances of
each ANSPs geography, oceanic entry points, and the ability of the aircraft to
complete their routes with various restrictions could all make NAT-wide
agreement difficult to acheive. In the case that an agreement is not reached,
there are negative implications for the operational efficiency in the North
Atlantic. Waivers may be needed by operators on a case by case basis, delays
and controller workload could increase if large volumes of aircraft are force
to fly in an area that is too confined, or, some aircraft may not be able to
complete their routes.
G.2.2 Regulator Consequence
One operator viewed the restriction of optimum flight paths from
unequipped aircraft the risk instead of a failure to produce an
accommodation strategy. In order to ensure that safety requirements are
met, unequipped aircraft must fly sufficiently far away from equipped
aircraft when equipped aircraft are using reduced separation procedures.
So the decision to implement reduced separation in the North Atlantic could
itself prevent unequipped aircraft from operation on optimum flight routes.
G.3 Impact on Stakeholder Values
The impact on stakeholder values for risk G is shown in Table 36.
Table 36: Risk G Impact to Stakeholder Values
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low Medium Very Low None High None
The safety impact for the Risk G is low and operational efficiency impact is
medium. The possible outcomes of Risk G that could lead to a safety and
operational efficiency impact include an excessive number of waivers for
unequipped aircraft inclusion in reduced separation airspace, excessive
unequipped traffic in narrow corridors, and non implementation of the
initiatives.
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The ANSP Cost impact is very low. An outcome of Risk G that could lead to a
cost impact on ANSPs is non-implementation of the initiatives. Non-
implementation would possibly force ANSPs to maintain the costs of HF and
increase staffing as traffic increases.
The operator cost impact is high. The cost impact comes from two possible
outcomes: For unequipped aircraft, their flight paths could be forced out of
the OTS or, into suboptimal flight levels. Both of these outcomes result in a
larger fuel burn. The second outcome is a non-implementation of the
initiatives. The operator cost impact would come from the money spent to
equip in anticipation of the mandate that could not be recouped in the
anticipated fuel burn cost savings.
The respondents did not indicate an impact to ANSP Revenues and Operator
Revenues.
G.4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The dependencies and influences of Risk G are shown in Figure 28, and
Figure 29. Risk G is a policy and procedure risk that has dependencies on
coordination and timing risks, other policy risks, equipage risks and business
concerns. It influences risks in the technology, policy and procedure,
coordination and timing, and equipage categories.
Figure 28: Risk G Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 29: Risk G Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
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Risk G has dependencies in several categories. These dependencies result in
two out comes that affect risk G. The first outcome is a reduction the
perceived need for unequipped aircraft accommodations. The second
outcome is a limitation on the possibilities of the accommodations.
There are several risks that can contribute to a change in the perceived need
for unequipped aircraft accommodations (ether positively or negatively).
Risk W is an equipage risk describing the late delivery of new aircraft orders
that replace unequipped aircraft. If operators are going to replace their
aircraft soon, there may be less pressure on regulators to find new
accommodations. Risk V (high costs preventing operators from equipping)
will have the opposite effect of increasing the need for unequipped aircraft
accommodations. If the costs to equip are too high, there will be an increased
amount of pressure on regulators to come up with regulations because there
will be more unequipped aircraft.
Risk E is a coordination risk that describes a failure in coordination for
ANSPs. ANSP coordination is needed across the NAT so that
accommodations for unequipped aircraft can be agreed upon and
implemented. Accommodation strategies such as waivers, and using
unequipped tracks require the coordination of ANSPS and a failure to
coordinate would make implementing these strategies more difficult or
impossible. Risk J is a policy risk that describes a set of regulations that
would force unequipped aircraft into areas with radar coverage. If these
regulations are implemented, it may be more difficult for regulators to find
economical ways to accommodate unequipped aircraft. Radar coverage
routes such as the blue spruce route are uneconomical for many routes so it
could be crucial to have accommodation strategies that allow unequipped
aircraft to fly within the OTS.
Table 37: Risk G Direct Dependencies
Risk J Operators choosing to operate in areas where other types of
surveillance are provided
Risk E Failure to achieve effective coordination with other ANSPs
Risk W Late delivery of new aircraft orders replacing unequipped
aircraft
Risk V High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to meet
requirements for data link mandate and 25NM lateral
separation
The Risk G direct influences are show in Table 38. Risk R, Risk H, and Risk S
can be thought of as simultaneous consequences of not sufficiently
completing regulations. Risk R encompasses all of the standards needed for
25NM lateral which include the accommodations for unequipped aircraft.
Risk H, restricted airspace for unequipped aircraft, is a consequence of the
occurrence of Risk G, and the implementation the regulations as currently
written which restrict MNPS airspace. Risk S, late completion of 25NM
lateral standards can also be a consequence of an inability to resolve the
needs of unequipped aircraft.
Risks A and B are equipment risks that depend on the accommodations for
unequipped aircraft. Not having regulations for unequipped aircraft or
having them completed at a late date can affect decision to develop
equipment for business operators (Risk A) and create delays in delivering the
equipment (Risk B).
Table 38: Risk G Direct Influences
Risk R No ICAO communication, navigation, surveillance standards
available to support implementation of 25NM lateral separation
Risk H Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft
Risk S Late completion of 25NM lateral separation planning tasks
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk B Potential delays in manufacturers delivery aircraft data link
retrofit packages to satisfy demand.
G.5 Mitigation Difficulty
The mitigation difficulty for risk G is shown in Table 39. The detection
difficulty is low because all the regulations affecting unequipped aircraft will
need to be published by ICAO. The anticipated corrective action required for
Risk G is medium. Possible corrective actions include issuing a limited
number of waivers, not proceeding with the later phases of 25NM lateral
separation that restrict the OTS and MNPS airspace, or, setting aside special
airspace for unequipped aircraft. All corrective actions will require some
level of coordination (listed as medium) with ANSPs and operators. The
difficulty will be in finding a solution that is both economical for unequipped
aircraft and maintains the intended level of safety. Respondents indicated
that risk G has a low likelihood. There are a significant number of
unequipped aircraft operation in the North Atlanticaand there are aircraft
that will be exempt such as state aircraft, and aircraft that cannot equip so it
is unlikely that accommodations for unequipped aircraft will not be made.
Table 39: Risk G Mitigation Difficulty
Corrective
Detection Action Coordination Likelihood
Very Low Medium Medium Low
H.0 Description
Risk H is a policy risk described as "Restricted access to airspace for
unequipped operators". The data link mandate and the reduced separation
initiatives both have implementation phases that progressively restrict
airspace for unequipped operators. The final phase airspace restriction as
currently written encompasses all MNPS airspace in the North Atlantic which
would prohibit unequipped aircraft from flying at their optimal flight levels
with the exception of the blue spruce route which is out of the way for most
destinations. The main outcome of concern of Risk H is that the restrictions
may make transatlantic routes uneconomical for a larger number
unequipped aircraft, which may be necessary for safety reasons when 25NM
lateral separation is implemented.
H.1 Background
The safe operation of reduced separation procedures is relies on separation
of unequipped aircraft from the reduced separation airspace. There are
analysis models and tests which determine safe separating distance between
equipped aircraft and non-equipped aircraft. Additionally, reduced
separation procedures will increase the capacity of the North Atlantic for
equipped aircraft as well as operational efficiency. The reduced separation
procedures therefore require some restrictions to achieve the goals in a safe
manner. Operators that are unequipped may be forced to use routes across
the North Atlantic that are uneconomical and may not be able to continue
operation. Additionally, these operators can make up a significant
percentage of the operators using the North Atlantic so the restrictions could
significantly reduce the utility of the North Atlantic for air travel.
H.2 Root Causes
The respondents identified "consequence of regulations" as the root cause.
The regulations or policies ultimately what determine whether or not
airspace is restricted. The regulations are be influenced by a number or
stakeholders including operators, regulators, and ANSPs. The regulations
also must meet safety standards to prevent possible collision and other
hazardous scenarios.
H.3 Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Table 40 shows the impact of the occurrence of Risk H on stakeholder values.
Table 40: Risk H Impact to Stakeholder to Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low High Medium Low Medium Medium
The Safety impact and the ANSP Revenue impact were rated as "low" for Risk
H. Restricting airspace for unequipped operators will have a safety impact if
the unequipped aircraft create congestion in the places where they are
allowed to fly. The ANSP revenue and Operator revenues can be impacted by
the changes in traffic that take place due to the restrictions.
The operational efficiency impact is listed as high. Operational efficiency can
be impacted by congestion from handling large volumes of unequipped
aircraft. Operator costs along with their individual operational efficiency
can also be impacted specifically for unequipped aircraft operators who must
operate at sub optimal altitudes or flight paths to cross the North Atlantic.
H.4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The dependencies and influences for Risk H are shown in Figure 30, and
Figure 31. Risk H is a policy and procedures risk that has risk dependencies
in all categories except for safety. It influences one safety risk and one policy
risk.
Figure 30:Risk H Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 30 shows the dependencies and influences for Risk H for the reduced
separation plan. Risk S, a coordination and timing risk and Risk R a
technology risk policy and procedure risk are now present as direct
influences.
Figure 31: Risk H Dependencies and Influences (Reduced Separation)
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H.4.1 Risk H Direct Dependencies
Risk H has several dependencies shown in Table 41 that can affect both the
likelihood of its occurrence and the scale of its impact. The policy for
unequipped aircraft will depend on the number of unequipped aircraft that
seek to operate in the NAT, and whether or not there is a consensus amongst
ICAO members on the technical limitations and possible restrictions. The
number of unequipped aircraft will influence the amount of airspace needed
for unequipped aircraft and scale to which the procedures for
accommodating them or not accommodating them can be implemented.
Consensus is needed amongst the ICAO members to ensure that all aircraft
and ANSPs meet the technical standards needed and that the all ANSPs
enforce the same rules throughout the NAT.
The technology (Risk P), policy (Risk G), equipage (Risk W) and business
concern (Risk V) risks all affect the number of the of unequipped operators in
the North Atlantic. The occurrence of Risk P could render many aircraft that
are equipped iridium satellite hardware for CPDLC unequipped. The
occurrence of Risk G, "failure to develop measures for unequipped aircraft"
will leave many unequipped aircraft without a clear way to traverse the
North Atlantic. The late deliveries of equipped aircraft (Risk W) will prolong
the use of unequipped aircraft scheduled for replacement in the North
Atlantic. The high costs for retrofitting (Risk V) could also keep operators
from ordering retrofit kits or new equipped aircraft. The occurrence of all
these risks could substantially influence the level of equipage and the
regulation strategy for accommodating unequipped aircraft.
There also risks that can influence the coordination tasks needed in order to
implement restrictions or accommodations for unequipped aircraft. A failure
to coordinate between ANSPs (Risk E) can delay the approval of more
restrictions. These risks can delay the coordination tasks which can in turn
delay the approval of more restrictions or accommodations. Late completion
of the data link mandate plan (Risk D) can also cause delays to the approval
of accommodations or restrictions.
Table 41: Risk H Direct Dependencies
Risk B Potential Delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data
link retrofit packages to satisfy demand
Risk P Uncertainty in approval of Iridium-based equipage
Risk G Failure to develop measures to accommodate unequipped
aircraft
Risk E Failure to achieve effective coordination with other ANSPs
(Harmonization of technical systems and operating
methods)
Risk D Late completion of data link mandate plan. Not enough time
for commercial and business operators to plan and comply
with mandate (e.g. determination of entire flight level
spectrum and OTS tracks where mandate is to be applied
etc)
Risk W Late delivery of new aircraft orders that are replacing older,
unequipped aircraft.
H.4.2 Risk H Direct Influences
Risk H has several direct influences as shown in Table 42. The outcomes of
Risk H can be a delay in approval of restrictions and approval restrictions
that force unequipped aircraft outside of the OTS and MNPS airspace. Delays
in restrictions can influence the timely completion of other restrictions such
as those for 25 NM planning tasks (Risk S) and 25NM reduced lateral
separation standards (Risk R).
The restrictions that come from Risk H can also influence the paths that
unequipped aircraft have available to take through the NAT. Unequipped
aircraft could be restricted from the OTS (Risk K) or restricted from MNPS
airspace (Risk J).
Table 42: Risk H Direct Influences
Risk R No ICAO communication, navigation and surveillance
standards available to support implementation of 25NM
lateral separation
Risk J Operators choosing to operate in areas where other types of
surveillance are provided
Risk S Late completion of 25NM lateral separation planning tasks
Risk K Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than OTS routes
H.4.3 Compound Loops
As shown in Table 43, Risk H has two compound loops with risks in the
equipage category: Risk A and Risk B. The business case affecting equipage
for business operators (Risk A) and retrofit kits (Risk B) are influenced by
the level of restriction resulting from Risk H. Conversely, the possible
restrictions that can emerge from the occurrence of Risk H are influenced by
the number of unequipped aircraft that will need to use the North Atlantic.
Table 43: Risk H Compound Loops
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk B Potential Delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data
link retrofit packages to satisfy demand
H.5 Mitigation
The mitigation difficulty for risk H is shown in Table 44. The detection of
Risk H is listed as low. Any restrictions for unequipped aircraft would need
be published by ICAO and observed by the operators and ANSPs. The
corrective action difficulty is medium. Corrective action would require
coordination amongst the stakeholders to get regulations or
accommodations approved and enforced within the North Atlantic. The
level of coordination required is high. There must be coordination between
ANSPs, regulators and operators in order to get new regulations or
accommodations approved. The regulatory process can also be time
consuming because it requires ICAO approval and local rulemaking. The
likelihood is listed as high. It is already known the CPDLC and ADS-C will be
required to implement reduced separation procedures so some level of
restriction will be required to prevent unequipped aircraft from using
airspace for reduced separation procedures.
Table 44: Risk H Mitigation Difficulty
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1.0 Description
Risk I is an equipage risk described as "Mixed equipage environment during
transition". The percentage of equipped operators depends on a number of
factors, including costs and availability. It is likely that during transition,
some operators will have data link equipage and some will not during the
transition to reduced lateral separation. A mixed transition environment
can have negative outcomes including reduced operational efficiency, and a
reduced level of safety.
1.1 Background
Operators that use the North Atlantic are required to have the proper
navigation equipment specified for Minimum Navigation Performance
Airspace (MNPS) airspace. The minimum level of navigation performance
will increase to include Controller Pilot Data Link (CPDLC) and Automatic
Surveillance (ADS-C) when the initiatives are implemented. The process for
equipping can take a significant amount of time and requires resources from
stakeholders so it is foreseeable that all operators may not be able to equip
before the phases and final implementation resulting in a mixed equipage
environment. A mixed equipage environment will require air traffic
controllers to ensure a safe level of separation between equipped aircraft and
unequipped aircraft. Exemptions, waivers, and accommodations for exempt
aircraft in the airspace could complicate the task of maintaining safe
separation resulting in reduced operational efficiency and possible safety
concerns.
1.2 Root Causes
Risk I is has two root causes that were identified by the respondents. The
respondents felt that both the plans of operators who make up a significant
percentage of the NAT airspace, and the possible measures to equip
unequipped aircraft would be root causes for Risk I.
1.2.1 Operator Plans
Operators who occupy a significant percentage of NAT operations can have a
correspondingly significant effect on the equipage levels depending on their
equipment upgrade plans and current status of equipage. Several economic
and technical factors will go in to the operators decision such as cost and
equipment availability. If enough operators decide not to equip or decide to
wait long periods of time before equipping, the chances of Risk I occurring
will increase.
1.2.2 Measures to Accommodate Unequipped Aircraft
Measures to accommodate unequipped aircraft (Non-occurrence of Risk G)
can also be a root cause for risk I. The operators will likely make their
decisions to equip based on a number of economic and technical factors. The
economic incentives to equip such as reduced fuel burn could be reduced if
there are measures to accommodate unequipped aircraft and may in turn
influence operators to wait longer to equip, increasing the likelihood of risk I.
1.3 Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of Risk I to stakeholder value metrics is shown in Table 45.
Table 45: Risk I Impact to Stakeholder Values
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Medium Medium Low None High Medium
The safety impact is given as medium. One possible outcome that could
impact safety is the possible mixing of unequipped aircraft and equipped
aircraft in MNPS airspace. Some unequipped aircraft may be given waivers
to use the North Atlantic airspace or, possible navigation errors can lead an
unequipped aircraft into restricted airspace. The unequipped aircraft report
their position less frequently so a navigation error could take longer from an
unequipped aircraft to detect than an error from a CPDLC equipped aircraft.
The operational efficiency impact is listed as medium. The impact to
operational efficiency can come as a result of the need to handle large
volumes of unequipped aircraft. These large volumes of aircraft will be
allowed to take progressively fewer flight paths across the North Atlantic as
the phases of Reduced Separation and the Mandate plan take affect. Large
volumes of unequipped aircraft confined to small parts of the airspace could
lead to congestion, delays in clearance, or could make the available routes
across the North Atlantic uneconomical to operate for unequipped operators.
The ANSP cost impact is listed as low. ANSP costs could be impacted by
increased levels of staffing needed to handle the remaining volumes of
unequipped aircraft during transition.
The operator costs are indicated as high. The congestion and delays from
accommodating both unequipped and equipped aircraft with different
separation procedures can result in significant fuel burn penalties for the
. .... .....................  -- __ --..... . . .
operators. These fuel burn penalties can result in a high impact depending
on the price of the fuel and the extent to which the aircraft cannot operate at
its optimal path and altitude.
Operator revenues are listed as medium. Operator revenue can be impacted
by the traffic fluctuations that come as a result of the new regulations for
flying in the North Atlantic. Traffic could decrease if operators potentially
choose to retire aircraft that don't meet the regulations or the cost of
equipping to be too high. Traffic could increase if the additional capacity
from reduced separation is used to add more planes and service across the
North Atlantic.
The respondents did not indicate an impact to ANPS revenues.
1.4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The risks that directly influence Risk I and are influenced by Risk I are shown
in Figure 32, and Figure 33. Risk I is an equipage risk with direct
dependencies on other equipage risks and a business concern risk.
Figure 32: Risk I Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 33: Risk I Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate and Reduced Separation) [add
risk S]
Dependencies
Likelihood
Very Low Low
Compound Loops
Medium High Very High
Categories
Technology P&P O&T Equipage Safety
Impact
Highest Fourth Third Second First
Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth
*NUUU(
Business
Concrns
WA
Influences
Technology
7
P&P
C&T
Equipage
Safety
0
Business
1.4.1 Risk I Direct Dependencies
Risk I has several direct dependencies as indicated in Table 46. All of these
risks affect the equipage level in the North Atlantic which will increase the
likelihood of a mixed equipage environment. The occurrence of the
equipage risks A (equipage for business operators not available) and B
(delays in manufacturers delivering data) affects the availability of
equipment to operators. The occurrence of Risk W (late delivery of new
aircraft) will affect the time that unequipped aircraft remain in the North
Atlantic before they are replaced or, temporarily increasing the equipage
levels. The occurrence of Risk V (high costs preventing operators from
equipping) can temporarily reduce the equipage level in the North Atlantic
until the new aircraft are delivered.
Table 46: Risk I Direct Dependencies
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk B Potential Delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data
link retrofit packages to satisfy demand
Risk W Late delivery of new aircraft orders that are replacing older,
unequipped aircraft.
Risk V High Costs preventing operators from retrofitting to meet
requirements
1.4.2 Risk I Direct Influences
Risk I has one direct influence as shown in Table 47. Risk I can influence the
coordination and timing risk S (Late completion of 25NM lateral separation
planning tasks) if mixed equipage levels result in the delayed
implementation of 25NM lateral implementation. If the equipage levels are
below the expected level at the time of implementation, regulators may
choose to set aside fewer tracks or implement measures to increase the
equipage levels.
Table 47: Risk I Direct Influences
Risk S | Late completion of 25NM lateral separation planning tasks.
1.5 Mitigation
The mitigation difficulty for Risk I is shown in Table 48. The detection is
listed as low because aircraft must indicate their equipage level when filing
for flight plans. It is possible to use the data from filed flight plans to
measure the equipage levels in the North Atlantic. The corrective action is
listed as high. Some possible corrective actions include changing the
regulations, providing subsidies for equipage, and changing the dates for
enforcement for each phase. All of these actions and other corrective would
require considerable economic and human resources to implement.
Additionally, the time required to change the equipage level or the
regulations would also be significant. The coordination required is listed as
medium. Increasing the availability of equipage will require coordination
between the operators and manufactures. Changing the regulations will
require coordination between operators, manufacturers and ANSPs. The
likelihood is listed as high. There are currently many aircraft operating in
the North Atlantic that are equipped. There are also several aircraft that do
not have available equipage for operators that wish to equip so it is likely
that the level of equipage during transition will not be 100%. The actual
equipage level during transition will be influenced by the extent to which the
barriers to equip such as high costs, and equipment availability affect the
operators opportunity to equip and the operators decision to equip.
Table 48: Risk I Mitigation Difficulty
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J.0 Description
Risk J is a policy risk described as "Operators choosing to operate in areas
where other types of surveillance are provided". There will be airspace
restrictions imposed to keep unequipped aircraft from unsafely operating in
25NM reduced separation airspace. However, due to many barriers to
equipping, there will likely be a significant number of unequipped aircraft
operating in the North Atlantic. If Risk J occurs, unequipped aircraft may not
have an economical way to cross the North Atlantic or, they may be forced
into constricted airspace which could cause excessive levels of congestion.
J.1 Background
The Flight Information Regions in the North Atlantic are shown in Figure 34.
An example of Organized Track System (OTS) overlaid on the North Atlantic
is shown in Figure 35. The OTS is meant to organize traffic flying between
Europe and North America. Each phase of the Mandate Plan and the 25NM
Reduced Separation Plan progressively reduce the number of tracks and the
overall airspace that unequipped aircraft can use. If the data link mandate
plan is implemented as currently written (Table 50), it will represent an
occurrence of Risk J: unequipped operators who are not exempt must use the
areas where radar is provided if their aircraft wish to operate at the cruising
altitudes covered by MNPS airspace. The occurrence of risk J could make
crossing the North Atlantic uneconomical for these operators because of the
need to travel further North to Sondrestrom and Reykjavik FIRs instead of
flying through the Gander and Shanwick FIRs.
Figure 34: North Atlantic Flight Information Regions
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Figure 35: West-Bound Organized Track System Example
J.2 Root Causes
The respondents associated two root causes with Risk J. They are: a
consequence of the restrictions in the data link mandate and the 25NM
lateral Separation Plan, and, non-compliance with the data link mandate.
The data link mandate plan and 25NM lateral separation both impose
restrictions on airspace for unequipped aircraft which can limit the routes
operators have available to cross the North Atlantic, possibly to places where
radar coverage is available. In compliment to the restrictions, operator non-
compliance can result in an operators' subsequent decision to operate in
places where radar coverage is provided.
J.2.1 Policy Restrictions
The data link mandate and 25NM reduced separation plan have restrictions
that can limit the routes an unequipped operator has to cross the North
Atlantic-possibly to the places where radar coverage is available. The
25NM reduced separation plan has a phased introduction which
progressively restricts airspace as shown in Table 49. The last phase
imposes restrictions on targets of opportunity outside the OTS in MNPS
airspace. These targets of opportunity could possibly limit operators to
routes where radar coverage is available such as the blue spruce route.
Table 49: 25NM Reduced Separation Plan
Date Separation Data Link Nav Surveillance
Reduction Comm Requirement Requirement
Requirement
2012 *25 NM lateral on FANS 1/A CPDLC RNP tbd FANS 1/A ADS-C
2 OTS tracks meeting meeting
Phase 1 between 350-400 appropriate (Note: anticipate appropriate
(inclusive) standards standards
RNP 4)
2013 *25 NM lateral on FANS 1/A CPDLC RNP tbd FANS 1/A ADS-C
all OTS tracks meeting meeting
Phase 2 between 350-400 appropriate (Note: anticipate appropriate
standards standards
(inclusive) RNP 4)
2015 25 NM lateral FANS 1/A CPDLC RNP tbd FANS 1/A ADS-C
expanded to meeting meeting
Phase 3 targets of appropriate (Note: anticipate appropriate
opportunity in standards standards
NAT Region RNP 4)
between 350-400
(inclusive)
The data link mandate plan shown in Table 50 has two phases that
progressively restrict airspace. The last phase also could limit operators to
routes where radar coverage is available because it restricts all of MNPS
airspace to aircraft that are equipped with data link.
Table 50: Data Link Mandate Plan
Year Airspace Where Flight Levels Where Remarks
Applicable Applicable
7 Feb 2013 *To-be-determined OTS *To-be-determined Aircraft to be equipped in order
tracks FL's to operate at specified FL's,
however, NAT SPG to explore
measures to accommodate non-
equipped aircraft
5 Feb 2015 *MNPS Airspace *To-be-determined Remark above applies
FL's
J.2.2 Non-Compliance
Non-compliance with equipment requirements for the data link mandate and
the 25 NM lateral separation plans can cause operators to operate in places
where radar coverage is provided. Noncompliance can occur for several
types of reasons including economic circumstances, resource and equipment
availability, or delivery delays of new aircraft or equipment. Non-
compliance can severely limit the available airspace an operator can uses,
especially if they need to fly within the flight levels that are specified in the
restrictions.
J.3 Impact to Stakeholder Metrics
Table 51 shows the impact of the occurrence of Risk J on stakeholder value
metrics.
Table 51: Risk J Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low Low None None None None
Respondents indicated that Risk J would have a low safety and a low
operational efficiency impact. One possible outcome risk J that could cause
both a safety and an operational efficiency impact is a significant increase in
traffic on the "blue spruce" route where radar coverage is required.
Increased traffic could result in a significant level of congestion along the
routes and at the oceanic entry points. However, the impacts would likely be
low because conventional radar coverage is provided.
J.4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The dependencies and influences for Risk J are shown in Figure 36, and
Figure 37 shows the dependencies and influences of risk J for the reduced
separation plan. Risk S, a coordination and timing risk are now present as a
direct dependence.
Figure 37. Risk J is a policy risk with dependencies in the coordination and
timing, equipment, and business concern categories. There influences in
both the policy and coordination and timing categories.
Figure 36: Risk J Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 37 shows the dependencies and influences of risk J for the reduced
separation plan. Risk S, a coordination and timing risk are now present as a
direct dependence.
Figure 37: Risk j Dependencies, Influences (Reduced Separation)
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J.4.1 Risk J Direct Dependencies
Risk J has several dependencies shown in Table 52 that can affect both the
likelihood and impact of Risk J. All of the dependent risks can have an
outcome that will affect the number of aircraft in compliance.
The policy risk H (Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft) can
force operators to use areas where radar coverage is provided if the
restrictions encompass the operators' desired cursing altitude and all of
MNPS airspace. The MNPS airspace restriction appears in the second phase
of the mandate as shown in Table 50.
The coordination and timing Risks F (Rulemaking to support 25NM lateral
Separation) and S (Late Completion of 25NM lateral planning tasks) can
result in delays in resolving ambiguities in the mandate. These ambiguities
can cause operators to delay their decisions to equip which can the result in a
lower data link compliance rate. A lower compliance rate would also result
in an increased number of unequipped aircraft that will possibly be forced to
use areas of radar coverage.
The equipage risks A (Equipage for business operators not available), B
(Potential Delays in manufactures delivery data link retrofits), and W (Late
delivery of new aircraft orders) can also result in a lower data link
compliance rate. Risk A can have a longer effect than Risks B and W because
Risk A would constitute an inability to equip while Risks B and W represent
delays to equipping. A lower compliance rate due to the equipage risks
occurring would also result in an increased number of unequipped aircraft
that will possibly be forced to use areas of radar coverage.
The business concern Risk V (high costs preventing retrofits) can also
influence the data link compliance rate. The occurrence or Risk V can
represent economic cost constraints that keep operators from equipping.
These costs can come from the equipment, the aircraft downtime, the
certification and training, and low remaining aircraft service life. There are
various strategies for mitigating the costs, including purchasing new aircraft
to achieve a longer service life of the new equipment. In other cases,
resource constraints and also hinder an operators ability to meet the costs,
even if there is likely to be a profit in the future. In any case, high costs can
prevent operators from equipping which could result in more unequipped
aircraft that need to use areas where radar coverage is available.
Table 52: Risk J Direct Dependencies
Risk H Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft
Risk F Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25NM lateral
separation not completed within mandate timeframe
Risk S Late completion for 25NM lateral planning tasks
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk B Potential Delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data
link retrofit packages to satisfy demand
Risk W Late delivery of new aircraft orders that are replacing older,
unequipped aircraft.
Risk V High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to meet
requirements for data link mandate and 25NM lateral
separation
J.4.2 Risk J Direct Influences
Respondents indicated that Risk J influences one policy and procedure risk
(Risk G) and, one coordination and timing risk (Risk D) as shown in Table 53.
If Risk J occurs, ambiguity and uncertainty regarding the number of aircraft
that will be in compliance, the accommodations that will be needed for
unequipped aircraft can arise. These ambiguities can delay or make it more
difficult to come up with accommodations for unequipped aircraft (Risk G).
These ambiguities can also make it more difficult to complete the final details
of the data link mandate plan such as the flight levels for enforcement and
the final restrictions (Risk D).
Table 53: Risk J Direct Influences
Risk G Failure to develop measures to accommodate unequipped
aircraft
Risk D Late completion of data link mandate plan. Not enough time
for commercial and business operators to plan and comply
with mandate (e.g. determination of entire flight level
spectrum and OTS tracks where mandate is to be applied
etc)
J.5 Risk J Mitigation Difficulty
The mitigation difficulty for risk J is shown in Table 54. The respondents
gave the detection, corrective action, coordination categories low difficulty
ratings. Risk J is a policy risk so detection will occur through published
regulations. The corrective action could involve changing the regulations to
allow more airspace for unequipped aircraft to operate. One possible way to
allow more airspace for unequipped aircraft is to suspend subsequent phases
of the ether the data link mandate plan or the 25NM lateral separation plan.
Coordination would be required between the ANSPs through ICAO to
suspend subsequent phases of the mandate or reduced separation plan.
Respondents listed the likelihood as medium. The airspace restrictions will
be influenced by the number of unequipped aircraft that need to cross the
North Atlantic. If the number of unequipped aircraft does not fall sufficiently,
it may be necessary to suspend the last phases of the mandate and reduced
separation plan until more operators can equip.
Table 54: Risk J Mitigation Difficulty
K.0 Description
Risk K is a safety described as "Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than
OTS routes". There will be airspace restrictions imposed for unequipped
aircraft to keep them from unsafely operating in 25NM reduced separation
airspace. However, due to many barriers to equipping, there will likely be a
significant number of unequipped aircraft operating in the North Atlantic. If
Risk K occurs, significant numbers of unequipped aircraft may be forced to
use random routes within Minimum Navigation Performance (MNPS)
airspace. Aircraft flying along these routes are more likely to have gross
navigation errors (GNE) which could possibly have a safety impact.
K.1 Background
The Flight Information Region is shown in Figure 34 and an example of
Organized Track System (OTS) overlaid on the North Atlantic is shown in
Figure 35. The OTS is meant to organize traffic flying between Europe and
North America. Each phase of the Mandate Plan and the 25NM Reduced
Separation Plan progressively reduces the number of tracks and the overall
airspace that unequipped aircraft can use. If the plan is implemented as
currently written, it will represent an occurrence of Risk K: unequipped
operators who are not exempt must use the areas outside of MNPS airspace.
The occurrence of risk K could increase traffic outside of the OTS and
increase the number of Gross Navigation Errors because they are more likely
to occur on random routes.
Figure 38: North Atlantic Flight Information Regions
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Figure 39: West-Bound Organized Track System Example
K.2 Root Causes
The respondents associated three root causes for risk K. They are: a
consequence of the restrictions of in the data link mandate and the 25NM
lateral Separation Plan, operator non-compliance with the data link mandate,
and increased sophistication flight planning. The data link mandate plan and
25NM lateral separation both impose restrictions on airspace for unequipped
aircraft which can limit the routes operators have available to cross the
North Atlantic, to places outside the OTS and possibly to places where radar
coverage is available. In compliment to the restrictions, operator non-
compliance can result in an operators' subsequent decision to operate in
places where radar coverage is provided. Lastly, some operators have
increased their sophistication in flight planning by using real-time wind
information to compute the optimal routes. This information sometimes
favors routes outside of the OTS because the OTS is updated with wind
information only twice per day.
K.2.1 Policy Restrictions
The data link mandate and 25NM reduced separation plan have restrictions
that can limit the routes an unequipped operator has to cross the North
Atlantic. The 25NM reduced separation plan has a phased introduction
which progressively restricts airspace as shown in Table 49. The last phase
restrictions the entire MNPS airspace which could limit operators to routes
where radar coverage is available such as the blue spruce route.
Table 55: 25NM Reduced Separation Plan
Date Separation Data Link Nav Surveillance
Reduction Comm Requirement Requirement
Requirement
2012 *25 NM lateral on FANS 1/A CPDLC RNP tbd FANS 1/A ADS-C
2 OTS tracks meeting meeting
Phase 1 between 350-400 appropriate (Note: anticipate appropriate
(inclusive) standards standards
RNP 4)
2013 *25 NM lateral on FANS 1/A CPDLC RNP tbd FANS 1/A ADS-C
all OTS tracks meeting meeting
Phase 2 between 350-400 appropriate (Note: anticipate appropriate
standards standards
(inclusive) RNP 4)
2015 25 NM lateral FANS 1/A CPDLC RNP tbd FANS 1/A ADS-C
expanded to meeting meeting
Phase 3 targets of appropriate (Note: anticipate appropriate
opportunity in standards standards
NAT Region RNP 4)
between 350-400
(inclusive)
The data link mandate plan shown in Table 50 has two phases that
progressively restrict airspace. The last phase also could limit operators to
routes where radar coverage is available because it restricts all of MNPS
airspace.
Table 56: Data Link Mandate Plan
Year Airspace Where Flight Levels Where Remarks
Applicable Applicable
7 Feb 2013 *To-be-determined OTS *To-be-determined Aircraft to be equipped in order
tracks FL's to operate at specified FL's,
however, NAT SPG to explore
measures to accommodate
non-equipped aircraft
5 Feb 2015 *MNPS Airspace *To-be-determined Remark above applies
FL's
K.2.2 Non-Compliance
Non-compliance with equipment requirements for the data link mandate and
the 25 NM lateral separation plans can force operators to operate outside of
the OTS and possibly where radar coverage is provided. Noncompliance can
occur for several reasons including economic circumstances, resource and
equipment availability, or delivery delays of new aircraft or equipment.
Non-compliance can severely limit the available airspace an operator can
uses, especially if they need to fly within the flight levels that are specified in
the restrictions.
K.2.3 Real-Time Wind Information
Some of the operators are able to use real-time wind information to aid in
flight planning while the OTS is updated twice per day with new wind
information. In some cases, the software with updated wind information can
show an optimal route that is outside the OTS causing the operator to file for
a route in MNPS airspace. The perceived time savings in climbing outside of
OTS airspace can also be a factor that can show an optimal path outside of
the OTS.
K.3 Impact to Stakeholder Metrics
Table 57 shows the impact of the occurrence of Risk K on stakeholder value
metrics.
Table 57: Risk K Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Medium High None None None/Medium None
The respondents gave Risk K a medium impact for safety and high impact for
operational efficiency. The outcome of Risk K that can affect safety is an
increase in gross navigation errors (GNE). Gross Navigation Errors occur
when incorrect navigation information is input into the aircraft computer
and the airplane flies away from its intended path. They are more likely to
occur on routes outside of the OTS because there are no aircraft wakes flying
along the same path for reference. Additionally, some airlines have an
automatic input capability from the Air Traffic Controller to the aircraft with
pilot verification. According to one respondent, this practice helps reduce
GNE's.
The operational efficiency and operator cost (Medium impact) can be
impacted when there is a significant difference between the optimal paths
(which typically lie within the OTS) and the paths that are taken outside the
OTS but within MNPS airspace. The increase in fuel used can impact
operator costs, and the increase in block time for the oceanic crossing can
increase with impacts operational efficiency for the operator. The
respondents indicated that there would be no impact to operator costs for
the mandate because the restrictions likely wouldn't take affect until reduced
separation initiatives are implemented. The ANSP operational efficiency can
also be impacted if an increase in operator workload is required to handle
unequipped aircraft that fly outside of the OTS in MNPS airspace.
K.4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Compound
Loops
The dependencies and influences for Risk K are shown in Figure 40, and
Figure 41. Risk K is a safety risk with dependencies in the coordination and
timing, equipment, and business concern categories. There is an influence in
the coordination and timing category and one compound loop in the policy
category.
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Figure 40: Risk K Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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The dependencies and influences of Risk K for the reduced separation
initiatives are shown to Figure 41. Risk S, a coordination and timing risk is
now present and forms a compound loop with Risk K.
Figure 41: Risk K Dependencies and Influences (Reduced Separation)
Dependencies Compound Loops
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K.4.1 Risk K Direct Dependencies
Risk K has several dependencies shown in Table 58Table 52 that can affect
both the likelihood and impact of Risk K. Most of the dependent risks have a
possible outcome that will affect the number of aircraft in compliance. One of
the risks can limit the available airspace for use by unequipped operators.
The policy Risk H (Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft) can
force unequipped operators to use areas outside of MNPS airspace. Phase 2
of the 25 NM lateral separation plan (Table 49) restricts the unequipped
aircraft from using the OTS and Phase 3 will expand further to targets of
opportunity.
The coordination and timing Risks F (Rulemaking to support 25NM lateral
Separation) and S (Late Completion of 25NM lateral planning tasks) can
result in delays in resolving ambiguities in the mandate. These ambiguities
can cause operators to delay their decisions to equip which can the result in a
lower data link compliance rate. A lower compliance rate would also result
in an increased number of unequipped aircraft that will operate on routes
outside the OTS.
The equipage Risks A (Equipage for business operators not available), B
(Potential Delays in manufactures delivery data link retrofits), and W (Late
delivery of new aircraft orders) can also result in a lower data link
compliance rate. Risk A can have a longer effect that Risk B and W because
Risk A would constitute an inability to equip while Risks B and W represent
delays to equipping. A lower compliance rate due to the equipage risks
occurring would also result in an increased number of unequipped aircraft
that will possibly be forced to operate on routes outside the OTS.
The business concern Risk V (high costs preventing retrofits) and a cost
benefit analysis with unfavorable results (Risk X) can also influence the data
link compliance rate. The occurrence or Risk V can present economic
constraints that keep operators from equipping. These costs can come from
the equipment, the aircraft downtime, the certification and training. The
occurrence of Risk X can deter operators from investing in retrofits in favor
of absorbing the economic penalties of high fuel burn by not operating in the
OTS. It will also make it clearer to regulators that many operators may
choose not to or may not be able to equip. There are various strategies for
mitigating the costs, including purchasing new aircraft to achieve a longer
service life of the new equipment. In other cases, resource constraints can
also hinder an operators ability to meet the costs, even if there is likely to be
a profit in the future. In any case, high costs can prevent operators from
equipping which could result in more unequipped aircraft that need to use
areas where radar coverage is available.
Table 58: Risk K Direct Dependencies
Risk H Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft
Risk F Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25NM lateral
separation not completed within mandate timeframe
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk B Potential Delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data
link retrofit packages to satisfy demand
Risk W Late delivery of new aircraft orders that are replacing older,
unequipped aircraft.
Risk V High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to meet
requirements for data link mandate and 25NM lateral
separation
Risk X Cost benefit analysis may show that costs outweigh the
benefits of implementing the data link mandate and/or 25
NM lateral separation
K.4.2 Risk K Direct Influences
Respondents indicated that Risk K can influence one coordination and timing
risk (Risk D). If risk K occurs, ambiguity and uncertainty regarding the
number of aircraft that will be in compliance, the accommodations that will
be needed for unequipped aircraft can arise. These ambiguities can also
make it more difficult to complete the final details of the data link mandate
plan such as the flight levels for enforcement and the final restrictions (Risk
D).
Table 59: Risk K Direct Influences
Risk D Late completion of data link mandate plan. Not enough time
for commercial and business operators to plan and comply
with mandate (e.g. determination of entire flight level
spectrum and OTS tracks where mandate is to be applied
etc)
K.4.3 Risk K Compound Loops
Table 60 shows the compound loops formed with Risk K. Risk K forms a
compound loop with Risk S (Late completion for 25NM lateral planning
tasks), a coordination and timing risk. The occurrence of Risk S can lead to
ambiguity in the restrictions for unequipped aircraft and economic penalties
for not equipping. These ambiguities can cause operators to delay their
decisions to equip and continue operating unequipped aircraft. They may
also be inclined to operate these aircraft outside of MNPS airspace while the
regulations are clarified. The occurrence of Risk K can also lead to the
occurrence of Risk S. If more aircraft start to operate outside of the OTS, it
may be more difficult to determine targets of opportunity and effectively
weigh the airspace demands of unequipped aircraft. These difficulties
could result in delays of the 25NM lateral plan.
Table 60: Risk K Compound Loops
Risk S Late cornletion for 25NM lateral lannin tasks
K.5 Risk K Mitigation Difficulty
The mitigation difficulty for risk K is shown in Table 54. The respondents
gave the detection, coordination categories low difficulty ratings. Risk K is
associated with air traffic patterns so detection would occur through traffic
surveys.
The corrective action was rated by respondents as high. Corrective action
could involve changing the 25NM lateral separation regulations to include
common routes outside of the OTS as targets of opportunity. One possible
corrective action is to keep the MNPS airspace restriction for unequipped
aircraft that is currently in the data link mandate plan. This would both
represent the occurrence of Risk J and and force unequipped aircraft outside
of MNPS airspace.
Coordination would be required between the ANSPs through ICAO to decide
on targets of opportunity and implement 25NM lateral separation outside of
the OTS.
Respondents listed the likelihood as high. The respondents indicated that
some operators already use MNPS airspace instead of the OTS to take
advantage or real time wind information and possibly quicker climb times.
The airspace restrictions that may force unequipped aircraft to operate
outside of the OTS will be influenced by the number of unequipped aircraft
that need to cross the North Atlantic. If the number of unequipped aircraft
does not fall sufficiently Risk K will have a higher likelihood of occurrence.
Table 61: Risk K Mitigation Difficulty

L.0 Description
Risk L is a technology risk described as "Failure to establish a plan or go
forward with mitigation to meet RCP240. (This also includes failure of
ground infrastructure to support RCP240)". RCP240 is a communication
standard that specifies communication performance standards such as time
allowed to exchange communication messages between aircraft and ANSPs.
The ANSP ground equipment, the CPDLC/ADS-C equipment on board the
aircraft, and the satellite communication service must meet this
communication standard. Failure of ANSP infrastructure to meet RCP240
could create delays for the phased implementation of both the mandate and
reduced lateral separation. A failure of the satellite(s) to meet RCP240 or,
the failure CPDLC/ADS-C equipment to meet the standard could result in
costly redesigns and delayed delivery of compliant retrofits. Failure to
establish whether RCP240 will be required will create uncertainty, and
ambiguity for ANSP ground and CPDLC/ADS-C equipment manufactures who
are trying to meet the standards and could also further delay the delivery of
compliant equipment. Operators who purchase equipment before knowing
the standard may face severe cost overruns if the equipment turns out not to
be compliant with the communication standard.
L.1 Background
There are several equipment performance standards that accompany a new
set of procedures and separation distances. These standards are there to
ensure the appropriate level of safety is maintained with the procedures and
separation distances are in use. RCP240 is a standard for the required
performance of communications equipment. The communications
equipment includes ground equipment, the satellite equipment and the
equipment onboard the aircraft must meet these standards in order to be
compliant. An occurrence of Risk L would create uncertainty with the
equipment manufactures and the ANSPs and Operators who must purchase
the equipment. This uncertainty could result in delayed purchasing
decisions, and cost overruns if the purchased equipment doesn't meet the
future communication standard if ether of these could result in delayed
compliance.
L.2 Root Causes
The respondents identified several root causes associated with Risk L: failure
of the communication standard to meet the safety standard for reduced
separation, the high cost of implementation, and the possible lack of
acceptance of the standards by Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs).
L.2.1 Failure to Meet Safety Standards
A failure to meet safety standards could cause a modification to the
communication standard or an abandonment of the standard altogether.
Analytical simulations are performed before the standard is adopted but live
flight tests must be completed before the standard can be implemented. A
discrepancy between the flight tests and the simulations could cause
significant revisions to the standard or the adoption of a stricter standard
altogether. Additionally, the infrastructure itself could fail to meet the
communication standard. The infrastructure could fail to deliver the
messages in time or could fail to function under the increased stress on
system as data link usage increases.
L.2.2 Cost of Implementation
The cost of equipment upgrades for implementing RCP240 could be
prohibitive for some operations. RCP240 will require ground station
upgrades in some regions and will also require the satellites to remain
available. The planned Irridium satellite is expected to become operational
and compliant with RCP240 a failure to do so (risk P) could result in cost
over runs for operators who need switch to the Inmersat satellite. If the
costs for complying with RCP240 are prohibitive, certain ANSPs may choose
not to implement RCP240 or a more relaxed standard may need to be used
for reduced separation.
L.2.3 Lack of acceptance of RCP240
The ANSPs will be required to accept RCP240 through local rulemaking
before implementation. The ANSPs could decide to reject RCP240 if they feel
their equipment cannot meet the specification, if the specification is too
stringent, or if flight tests indicate the standard is not sufficient.
L.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of risk L on the stakeholder value metrics according the
respondents is given in Table 62.
Table 62: Risk L Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics (Mandate/Reduced Separation)
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
High Medium/High None None Very Low None
The respondents indicated a high impact for both Safety and Operational
Efficiency categories. A possible outcome of Risk L that could impact safety
would be the failure of the ground infrastructure under the increased stress
of RCP240 and reduced separation procedures. The volume of messages
that are sent when reduced separation procedures are implemented could
increase significantly relative to the volume of messages sent during the
mandate because there may be more aircraft and the procedures would
likely require more frequent position updates. The ground and satellite
infrastructure will still be required to meet RCP240 with the increase in
message volume and a failure to meet RCP240 could pose safety risks to the
aircraft operating the in the airspace. The respondents did indicate that they
did not feel reduced separation procedures would be implemented without
establishing a communication standard. Operational efficiency could also
be impacted by a failure of the ground infrastructure. A failure would force a
reversion back to the 60 mile separation and increase times needed to
receive climb clearance and reduce the number of aircraft that can operate
on optimal flight path tracks with in the Oceanic Track System (OTS). A
medium impact to Operational Efficiency is listed for the mandate only
because aircraft would already be in 60NM/60NM separation.
The respondents also indicated a very low impact to operator costs. A cost
impact could come from ether a failure of the ground infrastructure in flight
which would cause a reversion back to the HF system, or, from a difference in
the required number of messages as a result of RCP240 or reduced
separation procedures.
L4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The dependencies and influences for Risk L are shown in Figure 42, and
Figure 43. Risk L has two dependencies in the coordination and timing
category, one compound loop with a technology risk, and, it influences a
coordination and timing risk and two equipage risks.
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Figure 42: Risk L Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 43 shows Risk L's dependencies and influences for both the mandate
and reduced separation initiatives. The coordination and timing Risk C is
added as a dependency and, the safety risks T and U are added as influences
when reduced separation initiatives are considered.
Figure 43: Risk L Dependencies and Influences (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
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L4.1 Risk L Direct Dependencies
Risk L has two direct dependencies listed in Table 63, both in the
coordination and timing category. Risk C, ANSPs failure to have automation
systems ready for 25NM lateral separation, can result in inadequate ground
infrastructure for RCP240 which would cause an occurrence of Risk L. It is
possible however that RCP400, a less stringent standard than RCP240 could
be accepted for 25NM lateral separation. Risk E, failure to achieve effective
coordination with other ANSPs could have the outcome of the ANSP software
not being ready for RCP240. The software is responsible for communicating
with adjacent ANSPs, collision warnings and processing datalink messages.
If the software can't communicate other ANSPs, it could become more
difficult to meet RCP240 at the transition points between ANSPs.
Table 63: Risk L Direct Dependencies
Risk C ANSPs failure to have automation, other technologies, or local
rulemaking ready for implementation of 25NM lateral
separation.
Risk E Failure to achieve effective coordination with other ANSPs
(harmonization of technical methods and operating methods)
L4.2 Risk L Direct Influences and Associated Outcomes
Risk L influences one coordination and timing risk, two equipage risks and
two safety risks which are listed in Table 64. The equipage risks A (Equipage
for business operators not certified in time to meet mandate) and B (Delays
in delivery CPDLC retrofit packages) will likely occur if the communication
requirements for the data link equipment are not agreed upon by the ICAO
participants and local rulemaking authorities. The communication
requirements will feed directly into the design requirements for new CPDLC
systems and could affect changes to existing systems that are delivered for
retrofit. The coordination and timing Risk F (Rulemaking to support data
link and 25NM lateral separation not completed in time) also requires
agreement on communication standard. The communication standard is an
important part of the standards set for both the mandate and 25NM lateral
separation and is needed by ANSPs and local authorities for consistency: they
need to test the same standards that will be implemented. As with Risk F,
the communication standard is needed to evaluate the safety case described
in Risk T (failure to meet safety case for 25NM lateral separation). If RCP240
can't be met, the safety case for 25NM may also suffer or need to be relaxed.
The safety Risk U (failure to control vertical risk when 25NM lateral
separation is implemented) can be affected by the ability of the aircraft and
ground infrastructure to meet RCP240. Although it is unlikely that vertical
risk will be difficult to control, the risk would increase if the messages
weren't not exchanged as quickly as assumed in the safety case and
described in RCP240.
Table 64: Risk L Direct Influences
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk B Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data link
retrofit packages to satisfy demand.
Risk F Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25NM lateral
separation (if required by ANSP) not completed within mandate
time frame.
Risk T Failure to meet safety case for 25NM lateral separation
Risk U Failure to control vertical risk when 25NM lateral separation is
implemented
L4.3 Risk L Compound Loops
Risk L forms one compound loop with the technology risk P (Uncertainty in
approval of Iridium-based equipage to meet requirements for data link
mandate and 25NM lateral reduced separation). The communication
standard that is set for RCP240 and 25NM lateral reduced separation will be
the standard that Iridium is tested against. If the Iridum satellite cannon
meet the RCP240 standard, it will force all operators equipped, with RCP240
to switch satellite receivers could significantly delay the implementation of
25NM lateral reduced separation. Conversely, a failure of Iridium to meet
RCP240 would likely influence what communication standard used for 25NM
lateral and the mitigation strategies for meeting RCP240. If Iridium does not
meet RCP240, ANSPs may be forced to upgrade their ground infrastructure
to make up for the time lag.
Table 65: Risk L Compound Loops
Risk P Uncertainty in approval of Iridium-based equipage to meet
requirements for data link mandate and 25NM reduced lateral
separation.
L.5 Mitigation
Table 66 shows the reported mitigation difficulty for Risk L. The
respondents indicated a low detection difficulty for Risk L. The detection of
issues coming up with RCP240 would come up ether during flight testing, or
in the ICAO supporting analysis and would be reported in the ICAO meetings.
The respondents indicated that corrective action for the occurrence of Risk L
would be very difficult. Possible corrective actions include upgrading ANSP
ground infrastructure, switching to the Inmersat satellite communication
service, and changing the communication requirement for 25NM lateral
separation. Each of these corrective actions would require at least one
stakeholder (operators, ANSPs, ICAO, or local regulatory authorities) to
invest significant amounts of time and financial resources. Any of these
changes made would also need to have their performance verified through
both a safety analysis and live testing. The respondents listed the
coordination required as very high. Any changes to the communication
standard would need to be approved by all of the ANSPs that participate in
ICAO local authorities and be implemented by aircraft manufacturers and
airlines. The respondents indicated a high likelihood for Risk L. They did
not believe that there would be a significant mitigation effort in place to meet
RCP240 but they also indicated that they believed RCP240 would be met by
both the ground infrastructure and both satellite communication services
(Inmersat and Irridium).
Table 66: Risk L Mitigation Difficulty
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M.0 Description
Risk M is a policy and procedures risk described as "Lack of harmonization in
technologies and procedures: ATN (Air Telecommunication Network)
Controller Pilot Data link (CPDLC) mandate in Europe vs. FANS-1/A mandate
in the North Atlantic Airspace (NAT). These two CPDLC technologies are
incompatible with each other because they use different message sets
(predefined message formats for communication between pilot and air traffic
controller) and different ways to transmit communications with the ground.
To date, aircraft manufacturers have not be able to install dual ATN and
FANS 1/A systems or "dual stacks" on a single aircraft and operators have
had to choose between one technology or the other. However, some
manufacturers have plans to give new aircraft dual stack capability in the
future. The conflict in the two mandates could effectively prevent aircraft
that enter service after 2015 from servicing routes between the North
Atlantic and Europe. The difference in procedures between the two regions
can also encourage human errors when pilots must operate in both regions.
M.1 Background
There are currently two Controller Pilot Data link (CPDLC) technologies in
existence: FANS 1/A and ATN. FANS 1/A is noted for its compatibility with
space based satellites, making it the best candidate for over water
operations. It is currently mandated under the North Atlantic Mandate plan
for use starting in 2013 and has been in use on select routes in the Pacific
Ocean. The Pacific Ocean region does however use different procedures than
the North Atlantic. ATN is already an ICAO certified standard and has been
adopted for over-land use in Europe and other regions. ATN is also
mandated for future use in Europe starting in 2013 in the European Air
Traffic Management plan adapted from the Single European Sky plan (SESAR
ATM). To date, the two technologies are incompatible and cannot be
installed simultaneously on the same aircraft. There have been attempts to
harmonize the CPDLC technology globally but the ATN technology would still
need to undergo fundamental hardware in order to communicate with
satellites.
The two mandates, the North Atlantic Mandate and the European Mandate
need to be harmonized in order to ensure CPDLC equipped aircraft can
service routes between North American and Europe. The North Atlantic
mandate cannot provide exceptions for ATN use because ATN does not work
over water. The European Mandate does provide some exceptions for FANS
1/A equipped aircraft as long as they are made before 2015. After 2015,
both mandates, as currently written, would effectively disallow all aircraft
built after 2015 from servicing routes between North America and Europe
with the Ocean Track System (OTS) unless they were equipped both FANS
1/A and ATN CPDLC equipment. Additionally, the different procedures,
message sets and formats need to be harmonized to reduce human error for
pilots that are used to using one CPDLC technology and that need operate in
regions where another CPDLC technology is in use.
A graphical description of which aircraft will be allowed to fly where and
when is shown in Figure 44 (Mandate only), Figure 45 (reduced separation
before 2015), and Figure 46 (reduced separation after 2015). A green box
indicates that the aircraft is allowed to fly in that region. A yellow box
indicates that the aircraft can fly in some parts of that region. A red box
indicates that the aircraft cannot fly in that region within the specified
altitudes.
Figure 44: Aircraft-Airspace Compatibility (Mandate Only)
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Figure 45: Aircraft-Airspace Compatibility (Reduced Separation before 2015)
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Figure 46: Aircraft-Airspace Compatibility (Reduced Separation after 2015)
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M.2 Root Causes
The respondents identified three root causes associated with the occurrence
of Risk M. The first is the European Air Traffic Master Plan which mandates
the use of the ATN CPDLC technology in European domestic airspace at the
typical cruising altitudes for commercial aircraft. The second is the existing
ICAO endorsement of the ATN CPDLC technology in contrast to FANS 1/A
which is not currently endorsed by ICAO. Lastly, they identified the technical
and procedural incompatibilities between the two CPDLC message sets and
the operating procedures in the North Atlantic and Europe.
M.2.1 2015 Compliance Deadline in the European Air Traffic Master Plan
The European Air Traffic Master Plan is a result of a definition plan (Single
European Sky Air Traffic Management Plan (SESAR)) and has been Endorsed
by the European Union. The plan currently includes a mandate for aircraft to
use the ATN CPDLC technology at certain altitudes. The European mandate is
included in section M.6 of this appendix. The plan does include exceptions
for FANS 1/A aircraft but does requires all aircraft entering service after
2015 to be equipped with the ATN CPDLC technology.
M.2.2 Existing ICAO Endorsement of ATN
The ATN CPDLC technology is currently an endorsed ICAO standard. This
endorsement could make it difficult to merge the two standards or encourage
airlines and operators that use ATN to switch to a different CPDLC
technology.
M.2.3 Incompatible Message Sets and Procedures
FANS 1/A and ATN both have message sets that are displayed to the pilot on
the instrument panel and specific procedures for communicating with
ground controllers. These messages contain clearance information, flight
path information and other information critical to the pilot. The messages
have different formats so an ATN message sent a FANS 1/A aircraft may not
display correctly and, a FANS 1/A message sent to an ATN aircraft may also
not display correctly. Additionally, there are regional procedures in place
for communicating with the air traffic controllers that include but aren't
limited to logging in to the data link system, send and receiving clearances,
requests to climb and descend, and acknowledgement of received messages.
Minor differences in these procedures will also need to be resolved before
the systems can be merged and to prevent human errors. The GOLD
document started by the FAA is intended to harmonize these messages sets
and procedures.
Lack of over water compatability of ATN? (Not highlighted as a root cause
but this is the reason the Mandate can't have exceptions for ATN).
M.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of Risk L on the stakeholder value metrics according the
respondents is given in Table 67.
Table 67:Risk M Impact on Stakeholder value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low Medium Low Low Medium Medium
The respondents indicated low impacts to Safety, ANSP Costs, and ANSP
Revenues. Safety can be impacted by human errors that come from
differences in procedures and messages sets between the North Atlantic and
Europe. One respondent indicated that there is a significant potential for
human error due to truncation of the latitude and longitude displays on the
flight management computers of some aircraft. The truncation makes the
half-degree tracks needed for 25NM lateral separation indistinguishable
from the whole degree tracks that are currently used unless the pilot
manually down selects the waypoint for verification on the flight
management computer. Manual pilot verification of waypoints is a
mandatory procedure with some airlines but not with all airlines. Not
verifying the half-degree track waypoints could make a human error in
entering the waypoint harder or take longer to detect. The possibly for
human error can be reduced by having the ANSPs send flight plan changes
directly to the aircraft and airline without a second manual entry needed
from a dispatcher or pilot and, by making waypoint verification mandatory
for all operators. Additionally, if the differences in procedures between the
European Domestic Airspace, and the North Atlantic remain, there could be
significant confusion and congestion at European oceanic entry points
(OEPs).
ANSP costs, European ANSP costs specifically can be impacted by the need to
support two CPDLC messages sets, FANS 1/A and ATN. These ANSPs would
be required under the European Mandate to accommodate ATN and the
North Atlantic Mandate to accommodate FANS 1/A. They will need to
coordinate with their domestic ANSPs and have software that accommodates
both message sets. ANSP revenues can be impacted if the volume of messages
changes as a result of not resolving the differences between ATN and FANS
1/A mandates. Aircraft that are ATN equipped may need to revert back to HF
over the North Atlantic which could result in them sending fewer messages
than FANS 1/A equipped aircraft operating under reduced separation
procedures.
The respondents indicated medium impacts to Operational Efficiency,
Operator Costs, and Operator Revenues. Operational Efficiency can also be
affected by human errors stemming from using different procedures. One
respondent mentioned that at OEPs in Europe where the procedures switch,
there could be considerable congestion due to possible errors or
incompatibilities. This respondent mentioned that harmonization efforts
such as the GOLD document were the best way to mitigate against these
errors. Operator costs and revenues can be impacted by the need to add
future "dual stack" equipment that would support both ATN and FANS 1/A,
and, the possible restrictions that could prevent service to city pairs that
were previously served by an operator.
M.4 Dependencies and Influences
The dependencies and influences for Risk M are shown in Figure 47 and
Figure 48. Risk M does not have any dependencies or compound loops but
influences two coordination and timing risks, three equipage risks, and two
business concern risks.
Figure 47: Risk M Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 48 shows Risk M's dependencies and influences for both the mandate
and reduced separation initiatives. The coordination and timing risks C and
S are added as influences.
Figure 48: Risk M Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
Dependencies Compound Loops Influences
Technology
7
P&P
C&T
Equipage
Safety
Business
Likelihood
Very Low Low Medium High Very High
Categores
Business
Technology P&P C&T Equipage Safet Conmrs
voo0
Impact
Highest Fourth Third Second First
Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth WA
. ...................  - - .1- . . .....
M4.1 Risk M Direct Influences and Associated Outcomes
Risk M has several direct influences as shown in Table 68. The influential
outcomes of Risk M are, uncertainty for operators in whether to equip with
FANS 1/A, or a dual stack that also supports ATN, conflicting or incompatible
procedures with domestic ANSPs that use the ATN CPDLC technology, and a
dramatic increase in the cost of for equipping if a dual stack or software
upgrades for harmonization and human error mitigation are required.
Risk M can influence the equipage risks A (Equipage for business operators
not available or certified in time to meet mandate) B (Potential delays in
manufacturers delivering aircraft data link retrofit packages to satisfy
demand), and W (Late Delivery of new aircraft orders that are replacing
older, unequipped or unequippable aircraft) if there is uncertainty in the
requirement for dual ATN and FANS 1/A equipment or "dual stacks" for
aircraft that enter service 2015 that wish to serve Europe and North
America. A dual stack configuration could require significant changes to the
aircraft system architecture and insight delays in delivery (Risk B, and Risk
W) certification, and availability (Risk A).
Risk M can influence the coordination and timing risks C (ANSPs failure to
have automation systems, other technologies or local rulemaking ready for
implementation of 25NM reduced separation), and S (Late completion of
25NM lateral separation planning tasks) if the differences in procedures
between the North Atlantic and European domestic ANSPs become
problematic and cause congestion and human errors at European OEPs. The
European ANSPs are however expected to support FANS 1/A aircraft because
of the exceptions listed in the European Mandate (Appendix 6). Although the
occurrence of Risk M would represent a lack of harmonization,
harmonization efforts could delay 25NM lateral implementation (Risk S) and
the timing of ANSP compliance (Risk C).
Risk M can influence the business concern risks V (High costs preventing
operators from retrofitting to meet requirements for data link mandate and
25NM lateral reduced separation) and W (Cost benefit analysis may show
that costs outweigh the benefits) if future aircraft are required to have dual
stack capability, or, if current FANS 1/A and ATN equipped aircraft are
required to undergo software upgrades for harmonization and to mitigate
against human errors. Although the European mandate does currently allow
for FANS 1/A aircraft to operate at the optimal flight levels, FANS 1/A only
aircraft that enter service after 2015 will still be prohibited unless this
conflict is resolved. If the conflict goes unresolved (the occurrence of Risk
M), the manufacturers will need to invest significant resources to develop
dual stack capabilities which will drive up the cost of equipage for operators
(Risk V). Risk M could also cause unanticipated costs for operators if there
are aircraft that were scheduled for delivery before 2015 but are delayed
until after 2015 because those operators may need to add equipment to fly
their intended routes. These costs could be prohibitive (Risk V and Risk W)
and significantly weaken the business case for CPDLC equipment.
Table 68: Risk M Direct Influences
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk B Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data link
retrofit packages to satisfy demand.
Risk C ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other technologies
or local rulemaking ready for implementation of 25NM reduced
separation.
Risk S Late completion of 25NM lateral separation planning tasks
Risk V High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to meet
requirements for data link mandate and 25NM lateral reduced
separation.
Risk W Late Delivery of new aircraft orders that are replacing older,
unequipped or unequippable aircraft.
Risk X Cost benefit analysis may show that costs outweigh the
benefits
M.5 Mitigation
Table 66 shows the reported mitigation difficulty for Risk M. The
respondents indicated a very low difficulty for detection. The two policies
that would control the occurrence of Risk M, the European CPDLC Mandate,
and the North Atlantic CPDLC Mandate will both be published before they are
implemented. The respondents indicated a high difficulty of corrective
action. Possible corrective actions include the harmonization of procedures
and messages through the data link GOLD document, adding exceptions to
the European mandate for FANS 1/A aircraft that enter service after 2015,
policy harmonization between the European and North Atlantic CPDLC
requirements, and, possible software and hardware upgrades for aircraft to
accommodate both ATN and FANS 1/A equipment. All of these corrective
actions would require significant amounts of coordination to implement and
some would require significant financial resources. The respondents
indicated that the coordination difficulty to mitigate or correct against Risk M
would be very high. Risk M is a policy risk and, ICAO and all of the domestic
aviation regulatory authorities must approve any changes to the policies. In
the case of Risk M, it is also necessary to coordinate with aircraft
manufacturers so that they produce software and hardware that is
compatible with the set of procedures that will be adopted. The respondents
indicated that Risk M has a high likelihood. They mentioned that ATN is an
ICAO approved standard and that it is unlikely to be rolled back in the
European mandate. Additionally, ATN can't be used over water so the North
Atlantic ANSPs must use FANS 1/A in order to have a CPDLC capability. All
of the respondents who mentioned risk M did say that establishing world
wide CPDLC standard and set of procedures would be the best way to
confront Risk M and differences between the CPDLC operating procedures in
the North Atlantic, the Pacific, and Europe.
Table 69: Risk M Mitigation Difficulty
Corrective
Detection Action Coordination Likelihood
Very Low High Very High High
M.6 European Mandate
EURO MANDATE:
3.3.1.1 All concerned aircraft operating flights as general air traffic in accordance with
instrument flight rules in the airspace defined below shall be equipped with context
management (CM) and controller-pilot data link communications (CPDLC) applications
capable of supporting the following data link services: data link initiation capability, air
traffic control clearance, air traffic control communications management and air traffic
control microphone check:
a) from 7 February 2013, in the following FIRs/UIRs above FL285:
Amsterdam FIR, Wien FIR, Barcelona UIR, Brindisi UIR, Brussels UIR, Canarias UIR,
France UIR, Hannover UIR, Lisboa UIR, London UIR, Madrid UIR, Milano UIR, Rhein
UIR, Roma UIR, Scottish UIR and Shannon UIR; and
b) from 5 February 2015, in the following FIRs/JIRs above FL285:
Bratislava FIR, Bucuresti FIR, Budapest FIR, Kobenhavn FIR, Ljubljana FIR, Nicosia
FIR, Praha FIR, Sofia FIR, Warszawa FIR, Finland UIR south of 61'30', Hellas UIR,
Malta UIR, Riga UIR, Sweden UIR south of 61*30', Tallinn UIR, Vilnius UIR.
11 ............ .  11 . ..........  .  . ............. 
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Note.- Requirements for the CM and CPDLC applications to support the data link
services described are contained in RTCA DO-280B/EUROCAE ED- 11OB
Interoperability Requirements Standard For ATN Baseline ] (INTEROP ATN B]) and
RTCA DO-290/EUROCAE ED- 120 Safety and Performance Requirements Standard for
Air Traffic Data Link Services in Continental Airspace (Continental SPR Standard),
including Changes 1 and 2, with the exceptions that:
a) Uplink message 135, CONFIRMASSIGNED LEVEL, and Uplink message 233, USE
OF LOGICAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT PROHIBITED, will not be used by the ground
systems; and
b) Downlink message 38, ASSIGNED LEVEL (level), is not required by the aircraft.
3.3.1.2 Conformance to the equipage requirement and operator's approval shall be
verified by the State of Registry or the State of the Operator, as appropriate.
3.3.1.3 Aircraft are exempted from the requirement stipulated in 3.3.1.1 in the following
cases:
a) aircraft with an individual certificate of airworthiness first issued before 1 January
2011 are exempted until 5 February 2015;
b) aircraft with an individual certificate of airworthiness first issued before 1 January
2014 and fitted with data link equipment certified against requirements specified in
RTCA DO-258A/EUROCAE ED-1O0A (or ED-100) are exempted for the life of that
particular airframe;
c) aircraft which have a certificate of airworthiness issued before 31 December 1997 and
which will cease operation in the airspace referred to in Paragraph 3.3.1.1 before 31
December 2017 are exempted from the requirement stipulated in 3.3.1.1;
d) state aircraft;
e) aircraft flying in the airspace referred to in Paragraph 3.3.1.1 for testing, delivery and
for maintenance purpose; and
f) operators of types of aircraft reaching the end of their production life and being
produced in limited numbers, or types of aircraft for which re-engineering costs required
would be disproportionate due to old design, may, based on this criteria, request from the
appropriate authority the granting of an exemption. Such requests shall be made prior to
30 September 2012 and include detailed information justifying the need for the granting
of the exemption.
End of new text
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N.0 Description
Risk N is a policy and procedure risk described as "Impact of ICAO Annex 6
data link communications airborne recording standard". Annex 6 Section 6.3
(Section N.6) requires aircraft with Controller-Pilot Data link (CPDLC)
capability to record all data link messages on board the aircraft. Annex 6
first went into effect for aircraft that were certified after 2005 and then for
all aircraft. Many aircraft however, were designed without a capability for
recording data link messages. Operators of these aircraft may face an
additional cost of complying with the data link mandate if Annex 6 remains in
effect and other operators could decide the cost of equipping is too high.
N.1 Background
The Annex 6 recording standard is a standard issued by the ICAO that
requires aircraft that are data link equipped to record all data link messages
sent between the aircraft and the air traffic controller. The standard was
issued after many aircraft were built and those aircraft consequently do not
have the capability to record the messages on board. There are substantial
costs associated with adding that capability and some unequipped operators
could be deterred from equipping. Removing the Annex 6 recording
standard could encourage quicker adoption of data link equipment amongst
operators. There may also be a new version of Annex 6 that could potentially
add further costs.
N.2 Root Cause: Enforcement of Annex 6
The respondents listed the enforcement of the Annex 6 policy itself as the
root cause. They noted that although the policy has been written, it has not
yet been enforced and, that very few if any operators have the data link
recording capability onboard the aircraft. The respondents indicated that the
Annex 6, if it were enforced, would likely be enforced through local
rulemaking. Operators that are based or operate in the rulemaking regions
that enforced the rule would be forced to comply or suspend data link
operations.
N.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of Risk N on stakeholder value metrics according to respondents
is given in Table 70.
Table 70: Risk N Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low High None None High None
The respondents indicated the occurrence of Risk N would have a low impact
to Safety. Risk N can reduce the percentage of equipped aircraft operating in
the North Atlantic and in turn, reduce the level of Safety if operators are
forced to stop flying until they get the recording equipment. Operational
Efficiency (High Impact) would also be affected because the operators would
have to temporarily suspend their data linked equipped aircraft from
operating in the North Atlantic until the recording equipment is designed,
delivered and installed. This assumes that the restrictions that would be in
place in 2016 are consistent with the current mandate and reduced
separation plan.
The respondents indicated the occurrence of Risk N would have a high
impact to Operational Costs. The impact to costs would come directly from
the costs incurred in upgrading the recording equipment to comply with
Annex 6.
N.4 Dependencies and Influences
The dependencies and outcomes for Risk N are shown Figure 49. Risk N does
not have any dependencies and influences one Business Concern risks. The
dependencies and influences of Risk N and their relative impacts are
identical for both the mandate only and, when both the mandate and reduced
separation are considered so only one graph is pictured.
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Figure 49:Risk N Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate only and Mandate + Reduced
Separation)
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N4.1 Risk M Direct Influences and Associated Outcomes
Risk M has one direct influence as shown in Table 71. Risk N influences the
business concern risk V (High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to
meet requirements for data link mandate and 25NM lateral reduced
separation) by increasing the cost of retrofitting an aircraft to meet the data
link mandate. The increase in cost comes from the need to purchase
recording equipment and associated down time for installation.
Table 71: Risk N Direct Influences
Risk V High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to meet
requirements for data link mandate and 25NM lateral reduced
separation.
N.5 Mitigation
The mitigation difficulty for Risk N is listed in Table 72. The respondents
indicated a low difficulty for detection. The operators would be notified of
the enforcement of Annex 6 through ICAO and local rulemaking authorities.
The corrective action, coordination and likelihood were all given "High"
ratings by the respondents. Possible corrective actions include giving the
ANSPs the only recording responsibilities or, subsidizing the data link
recording equipment for the operators. There would be a substantial
amount of coordination required for both of the suggested corrective actions.
The local rule makers would likely require some sort of analysis to show that
ANSPs recordings would be sufficient in a safety investigation and, possibly
an ICAO committee to put out a ruling on the matter. The funds to subsidize
recording equipment would be substantial and would need to be pooled from
ether ICAO or local government funds. It may also be possible to penalize
aircraft that don't have recording equipment and use those funds to
subsidize new equipment purchases. The respondents listed the likelihood
as high. They felt that local rule makers did see a safety benefit in recording
on board the aircraft in addition the ground recordings and would likely
enforce the Annex 6 in the future.
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Table 72: Risk N Mitigation Difficulty
N.6: ICAO Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft, Section 6.3.1.5
6.3.1.5 All aeroplanes for which the individual certificate of airworthiness is
first issued after 1 January 2005, which utilize data link communications and
are required to carry a CVR, shall record on a flight recorder, all data link
communications to and from the aeroplane. The minimum recording
duration shall be equal to the duration of the CVR, and shall be correlated to
the recorded cockpit audio.
6.3.1.5.1 From 1 January 2007, all aeroplanes which utilize data link
communications and are required to carry a
CVR shall record on a flight recorder, all data link communications to and
from the aeroplane. The minimum recording duration shall be equal to the
duration of the CVR, and shall be correlated to the recorded cockpit audio.
6.3.1.5.2 Sufficient information to derive the content of the data link
communications message and, whenever practical, the time the message was
displayed to or generated by the crew shall be recorded.
Note.- Data link communications include, but are not limited to,
automatic dependent surveillance (ADS), controller-pilot data link
communications (CPDLC), data link flight information services (D-FIS)
and aeronautical operational control (AOC) messages
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0.0 Description
Risk 0 is an equipage risk described as "End of service life of 13 satellite
services expected about 2016. New equipage may be required to use classic
aero services via 14 satellites". The need for new equipment would affect
operators who have had the 13 satellite communication equipment for FANS
1/A installed. When the new 14 satellites enter service, those aircraft that
were previously data link compliant would become noncompliant and/or be
forced to purchase an upgraded communications service and, replace the
previous equipment. There is a possibility that the current equipment could
be supported by the new system, but ICAO does not have a standard or
jurisdiction over the communication protocol for the satellites. The
possibility of replacing existing data link software onboard the aircraft and
purchasing a new communications service could result in significant cost
overruns for the operators and decrease the number of equipped aircraft
operating in the North Atlantic.
0.1 Background
13 and 14 are low earth orbit satellites that operate in a constellation to
provide telecommunications coverage for various applications including
FANS-1/A data link messages over the North Atlantic. The current 13
satellites are scheduled for replacement in 2016, or, one year following the
last phases of the mandate and reduced separation. The replacement
satellites may use a different communications protocol which would result in
a requirement to upgrade equipment on existing fleets. There is also a
possibility that a service upgrade would be required to communicate with
the new 14 satellites. The service upgrade and equipment upgrade could
both result in significant cost incursions for the airlines and temporarily
reduce the number of equipped aircraft operating in the North Atlantic.
0.2 Root Causes
The respondents indicated two root causes for the occurrence of Risk 0: the
lack of ICAO authority or control over satellite service policies, and, the
technical requirements for communicating with upgraded satellites.
0.2.1 Lack of ICAO Authority over Satellite Service Policies
The service policy of no longer supporting Classic Aero Services, which are
currently used on the 13 satellites, will be enforced by the satellite provider.
ICAO does not have the regulatory leverage to over turn the policy.
Additionally, the bandwidth used for data link operations is only a small
percentage of the satellite total bandwidth. There is a competing satellite
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service, Inmersat, but it requires different equipment, including a heavier
transmitter. The 14 satellites will use the Swift Broadband services which
should provide some enhancements relative to the Classic Aero Service.
0.2.2 Technical Requirements for communicating with 14 satellites
The 14 satellite constellation is expected to offer enhanced capabilities over
the 13 satellites. There may be corresponding technical requirements for
offering these enhancements such as a different satellite communications
protocol and/or a different transmitter. Both of these requirements would
cause the operators to incur significant costs that are related to upgrading
the equipment as soon as the 13 satellites are shut down.
0.3 Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of Risk 0 on stakeholder value metrics according to respondents
is shown in Table 73.
Table 73: Risk 0 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
High High None None High None
The respondents indicated Risk 0 would have a high impact to Safety and a
medium impact Operational Efficiency. The occurrence of Risk 0 would
significantly but temporarily reduce the number of equipped aircraft in the
North Atlantic and thus significantly impact safety. Many data linked
equipped aircraft use the Classic Aero Services with 13 satellites because the
fees are lower and the transmitter is lighter than the competing service used
with the Inmersat satellite. The time to equip with new transmitters could
be significant and that downtime would impact the operational efficiency of
the operators.
The respondents also indicated there would high impact to Operator Costs.
These costs would come from the lost revenue due to aircraft downtime, the
equipment costs for new transmitters, and the increase in service fees for the
Swift Broadband Service.
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0.4 Dependencies and Influences
The dependencies and influences of Risk 0 are shown in Figure 50 and Figure
51 shows Risk O's dependencies and influences for both the mandate and
reduced separation initiatives. The safety risk T is added as an influence.
Figure 51. Risk 0 does not have any dependencies or compound loops. It
influences one business concern risk (V) and one safety risk (T).
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Figure 5O: Risk 0 Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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and reduced separation initiatives. The safety risk T is added as an influence.
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Figure 51: Risk 0 Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
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04.1 Risk 0 Direct Influences and Associated Outcomes
Risk 0 has two direct influences shown in Table 74. The influential
outcomes of Risk 0 are a new satellite protocol that would require a many
aircraft to buy new data link equipment, and a temporary reduction in the
number of equipped aircraft operating in the North Atlantic.
Risk 0 can influence the safety risk T (Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM
lateral separation) with both of its outcomes. First, the new satellite
protocol, although intended to outperform the classic aero services, may
harm the safety case for 25NM lateral after 2015 if it does not meet the
communication standard implemented at that time. Second, the temporary
reduction in the number of equipped aircraft inherently reduces the level of
safety because more network stress will be put on the High Frequency Voice
(HF) network.
Risk 0 can influence the business concern risk V (High costs preventing
operators from retrofitting to meet requirements for data link mandate and
25NM lateral reduced separation) by increasing the costs needed to comply
with the data link mandate and 25NM reduced separation initiatives. The
costs would come from the cost of the new transmission equipment needed
aboard the aircraft, and the cost associated with installing the equipment.
Table 74: Risk 0 Direct Influences
Risk T Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM lateral separation
(Feasibility analysis may find that better performance is
needed. Actual performance may not meet feasibility analysis
expectations)
Risk V High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to meet
requirements for data link mandate and 25NM lateral reduced
separation.
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0.5 Mitigation
The mitigation difficulty for Risk 0 is listed in Table 75. The respondents
indicated a very low difficulty of detection. The satellite providers would
need to notify operators with sufficient time to get them to convert to their
new service offering. The respondents gave both the corrective action
difficulty and the coordination difficulty a "high" rating. They noted that it
was risky for ICAO to mandate satellite based data link without any control
over the satellites themselves. In particular ICAO is not in a position to
enforce satellite availability requirements or the pricing of service plans.
Any corrective action would result in the satellite provider changing the
policy of stopping Classic Aero Services. The difficulty is that the satellite
provider has no regulatory or financial incentive to change the policy. The
respondents listed the likelihood as high. They did not see a reason why the
satellite provider would change the policy in 2016 and felt that all aircraft
using the 13 satellites would need to undergo the costly upgrades and switch
to Swift Broadband.
Table 75: Risk 0 Mitigation Difficulty
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P.0 Description
Risk P is a technology risk described as "Uncertainty in approval of Iridium-
based equipage to meet requirements for data link mandate and 25NM
reduced lateral separation". The Iridium satellite is a new satellite that has
recently entered service as part of a larger constellation. It is currently
undergoing flight tests with aircraft to ensure that the satellite meets the
communications requirements for the data link mandate and 25NM reduced
lateral separation. Some aircraft are already equipped with Iridium based
equipage and could face costly re-equipping with a different satellite service
if the Iridium satellite doesn't meet the requirements.
P.1 Background
The Iridium satellite service is a low earth orbit satellite constellation that
was recently put into orbit. The service uses a lighter transmitter and lower
service fees than the competing Inmersat service because Inmersat is a
Geosynchronous satellite where as Iridium is a Low Earth Orbit Satellite.
The testing for Iridium will ensure that the new satellites meet the
requirements for both the data link mandate and 25NM lateral separation.
The satellites were designed to the same specifications as the satellites that
are currently servicing 30NM-30NM separation in the Pacific region because
the requirements are identical to those for 25NM lateral separation. The
operators are currently equipped or purchased equipment with Iridium face
the risk of having to re-equip with a different satellite service and a different
transmitter if the Iridium satellites do not meet the requirements. There are
substantial costs with replacing a transmitter, including a weight penalty for
the heavier Inmersat transmitter.
P.2 Root Cause: Insufficient technical performance
Risk P has a single root cause: insufficient technical performance of the
Iridium based satellite service. The final verification of the performance of
Iridium can only occur through flight-testing so the financial investments had
to be made with some level of uncertainty. The respondents did indicate that
the first flight tests went well and that some operators had already received
authorization to use Iridium in data link operations. They also indicated that
the Iridium company has ordered new spacecraft in 2014 to replace the
current aircraft and upgrade the network.
Page 187
P.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of Risk P on the stakeholder value metrics according to
respondents is given in Table 76.
Table 76: Risk P Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low High None None High Very High
The respondents indicated a low impact to safety. Risk P can impact safety if
the number of equipped aircraft goes down while Iridium equipped aircraft
re-equip with a different satellite service. The respondents indicated a high
impact to operational efficiency. Operational efficiency can be impacted by a
reduction and in the number of the equipped aircraft, and by the
complications an operator would face in having to switch satellite services.
Other satellite services high heavier transmitters and the equipment costs for
both services are substantial. The time needed to re-equip could also be
substantial. During that time, the operators would have to yield to the
restrictions for unequipped aircraft. The respondents also indicated a high
Operator Cost impact. The operator costs would also be impacted by the cost
of reequipping with a different satellite service, and extra fuel needed to
carry the heavier transmitters. The impact to Operator Revenues was
indicated as very high. In some cases with short-range aircraft such as the
A318, the heavier transmitters are too heavy and will keep the aircraft from
completing its North Atlantic missions. The respondents did not indicate an
impact to ANSP costs or ANSP revenues.
P.4 Dependencies and Influences
The dependencies and influences for Risk P are shown in Figure 52, and
Figure 53 shows Risk P's dependencies and influences for both the mandate
and reduced separation initiatives. There are no additional risks present
when reduced separation initiatives are considered however Risk P's
aggregated impact relative moves from the highest fifth to the fourth highest
fifth.
Figure 53. Risk P has one compound loop with a technology risk and
influences one policy and procedure risk.
Page 188
............... - - .. ...........
Figure 52: Risk P Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 53 shows Risk P's dependencies and influences for both the mandate
and reduced separation initiatives. There are no additional risks present
when reduced separation initiatives are considered however Risk P's
aggregated impact relative moves from the highest fifth to the fourth highest
fifth.
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Figure 53: Risk P Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
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P.4.1 Risk P Direct Influences and Associated Outcomes
Risk P has one direct influence, Risk H, shown in Table 77. Risk H is a policy
risk described as "Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft". The
occurrence of Risk P could influence the likelihood of Risk H if there are
significant number of aircraft that were previously equipped with Iridium
that would no longer be equipped. The progression of restricted airspace
access (Risk H) may be delayed in order to allow the Iridium aircraft to
reequip and prevent excessive numbers of unequipped aircraft on restricted
routes.
Table 77: Risk P Direct Influences
Risk H Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft
P.4.2 Risk P Compound Loops
Risk P forms one compound loop with the technology Risk L (Failure to
establish a plan or go forward with mitigation to meet RCP240) as shown in
Table 78. Risk P can influence the occurrence of Risk L if the Iridium satellite
can meet a performance standard that works well enough for 25NM reduced
lateral separation but does not meet RCP240. Adopting a different
performance standard would reduce the cost for operators that are already
equipped with Iridium. Conversely, failing to establish a communication
standard (Risk L) or changing the communication requirements could make
the requirements for Iridium ambiguous and influence the likelihood of Risk
P.
Table 78: Risk P Compound Loops
Risk L Failure to establish a plan or go forward with mitigation to
meet RCP240. This also includes failure of ground
infrastructure to support to RCP240.
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P.5 Mitigation
Table 79 shows the reported mitigation difficulty for Risk P. The
respondents gave Risk P a low detection difficulty. Insufficient performance
of Iridium would be detected during the testing conducted by the
Performance-Based Operations and Aviation Rulemaking Committee
Communications Working Group (PARC CWG). The respondents listed the
corrective action for occurrence of Risk P as "high". Possible corrective
actions include increasing the separation distance, restricting the use of
Iridium, and replacing aircraft equipage. All of these corrective actions are
difficult to complete because of the cost and coordination that would be
needed to execute them. Any changes to the regulations would require
approval by the ICAO authorities and a supporting technical analysis. Any
changes to the technical requirements would require costly redesigns and
could add further delays and long lead times for parts and development. The
respondents indicated the coordination difficulty as "high". Any technical or
regulatory changes would require coordination between the ICAO members,
the operators and manufacturers. The respondents indicated a medium
likelihood. However, one respondent indicated that Iridium already has
operational authorization for several Boeing aircraft and that the PARC CWG
tests for FANS 1/A were going well.
Table 79: Risk P Mitigation Difficulty
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Q0 Description
Risk Q is an equipage risk described as "Failure to achieve percentage of
equipped flights needed to move forward with phases of 25NM lateral
separation". Increasing the percentage of equipped flights produces
corresponding increases in safety and reductions in the airspace needed for
unequipped aircraft.. However, the respondents indicated that there is not
an established equipage percentage level that is needed to move on with the
phases of 25NM lateral. Also, each phase of the 25NM lateral initiative
progressively restricts more airspace for the exclusive use of equipped
aircraft. If the percentage of equipped aircraft does not increase sufficiently,
then the phases of 25NM lateral separation may need to be delayed until
there are enough aircraft that can make use of the increase in airspace.
Q.1 Background
The percentage of equipped aircraft is an important metric that can be used
to measure the milestones needed to move forward with 25NM lateral
separation. Each progressive phase of 25NM lateral separation reduces the
airspace available to unequipped aircraft and increases the airspace available
to equipped aircraft. If there is an over allocation of 25NM lateral airspace,
unequipped operators could be subject to unnecessary decreases in
operational efficiency, and, there would be increases in congestion at the
oceanic entry points next to the unequipped flight paths and tracks.
However, It is important to progressively increase the airspace 25NM lateral
separation so that the increase in operational efficiency and reduction in fuel
costs can be realized by the operators that made the initial investments to
comply with the data link mandate.
Q.2 Root Causes
The respondents identified threes root causes associated with Risk Q. The
first is the lack availability of data link equipment for common aircraft. The
second is the high cost associated with acquiring the equipment and the
aircraft downtime needed to install the equipment. The last is a failure of the
data link aircraft to meet the required navigation performance while in
service.
Q.2.1 Availability of Equipment
The lack of availability of data link equipment was cited was one of the root
causes. Data link equipment may not be available for several reasons
including the aircraft systems architecture (glass cockpits are required),
insufficient demand from aircraft operators to justify development, or, a lack
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of manufacturing capacity. Aircraft that are unequipped will likely face some
operating restrictions but if equipment is not available, these aircraft will
remain unequipped and the percentage of equipped aircraft will only
increase if new aircraft are introduced.
Q.2.2 Cost of Equipment and Installation
The high costs of data link equipment and the installation can prevent
operators from having a justifiable business case for equipping. The costs of
data link equipment along can exceed $1 Million dollars depending on the
aircraft type and current level of equipage. Additionally, there is a significant
cost reflected in the loss of revenue when the aircraft is taken out of service
for the installation. These costs can in some cases exceed the resources of
the operator and or exceed the expected benefits in fuel burn from operating
in preferred airspace. The aircraft's remaining service life, if it is to short,
could also make the costs of equipping unjustifiable.
Q.2.2 Failure to meet RNP Requirements
The 25NM reduced lateral separation procedures have a Required
Navigation Performance (RNP) standard that must be met by each aircraft
participating in the procedures. The RNP standard is a method of
quantifying the probabilistic distance error of the aircraft's sensed position
relative to its actual position and then using that information to safely space
aircraft apart from one another. Although an analysis has shown that data
link equipped aircraft should be able to achieve the RNP required for 25NM
lateral separation, all of the aircraft must achieve it in flight. If there are
persistent problems with aircraft not reaching the RNP needed for 25NM
lateral, the percentage of equipped aircraft effectively decreases and the
phases will likely need to be delayed.
Q.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of Risk Q on stakeholder value metrics according to respondents
is given in Table 80.
Table 80: Risk Q Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low Medium/High Medium Medium Medium None
The respondents indicated a low impact to safety. Risk Q can impact safety
because it represents a decrease in the number of equipped aircraft. The
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respondents indicated a high impact to Operational Efficiency. Operational
Efficiency can be impacted if the 25NM lateral phases are delayed.
Consequently, the respondents indicated a medium impact to Operational
Efficiency in a mandate only scenario because of the separation distances
wouldn't change but with fewer equipped aircraft, there would be a longer
time lag for communications. The standard 60NM procedures are less
efficient for the ANSPs because more workload is required to communicate
with the aircraft, and for the operators because they cannot enjoy the
reduced fuel burn related benefits of 25NM lateral separation. The
respondents indicated a medium impact to ANSP Costs. ANSP Costs can be
impacted by the cost required to maintain the infrastructure needed to
support the original 60NM separation such as HF voice and radio. Although
HF voice will likely serve as a backup system for data link, the ANSP staffing
needed would increase of the number of equipped aircraft did not reach the
percentages needed to move on with the later phases of 25NM lateral
separation. The respondents indicated a medium impact to ANSP Revenues.
ANSP Revenues can be impacted by any changes in aircraft traffic volume or
traffic patterns that result from a failure to achieve the necessary percentage
of equipped aircraft to move forward with 25NM lateral separation. If these
percentages are not achieved, more aircraft may be forced to "outlier" tracks
or other less direct routes which could drive traffic and thus revenue from
one ANSP to another. The respondents indicated a medium impact to
Operator Costs. Operator Costs can be impacted if operators are forced to fly
less optimal routes if less airspace were available for 25NM lateral
separation procedures. Flying less optimal routes will increase the fuel burn
and thus the fuel cost to the operators. The respondents did not indicate an
impact to operator revenues.
Q.4 Dependencies and Influences
The dependencies and influences for Risk Q are shown in Figure 54 and
Figure 55. Risk Q has four dependencies, two equipage risks one technology
risk, and one coordination and timing risk. It also has one compound loop
with a coordination and timing risk.
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Figure 54: Risk Q Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 55 shows Risk Q's dependencies and influences for both the mandate
and reduced separation initiatives. The coordination and timing risk C and
the technology risk R and added when reduced separation initiatives are
considered.
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Figure 55: Risk Q Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
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Q4.1 Risk Q Direct Dependencies
Risk Q has several direct dependencies as shown in Table 81. These
dependencies influence the likelihood of Risk Q by influencing barriers to
equipping and thus the number of equipped aircraft.
The equipment risks A(Equipage for business operators not available or
certified in time to meet mandate) and B (Potential delays in manufacturers
delivering aircraft data link retrofit packages to satisfy demand) influence
the availability of equipment. Business operators make up approximately
9% of North Atlantic traffic and have difference constraints to equipping than
commercial operators (see risk Appendices A and B) such as lack of sufficient
demand and older system architectures. If equipment for business operators
isn't available (Risk A) or, there are delays in delivering the equipment (Risk
B), fewer operators will have the opportunity to equip.
The coordination and timing Risk C (ANSPs failure to have automation
systems, other technologies or local rulemaking ready for implementation of
25NM reduced separation) can influence an operators timing in equipping.
An occurrence of risk C would force regulators to delay the implementation
of 25NM lateral separation in the affected regions because of the insufficient
ground infrastructure. In some cases, an affected region could force a
delayed implementation in the entire North Atlantic. If the operators are
aware of these delays, they may elect to delay equipping or they may instead
to decide not to equip if the aircraft service life decreases too much during
the period of the delays.
The technology Risk R (No ICAO communication, navigation, and surveillance
standards available to support implementation of 25NM lateral separation),
can delay efforts to equip if the communication equipment requirements
change or become uncertain. The aircraft equipment communication
requirements specifically were established based on a safety analysis and are
identical to the requirement for 30NM-30NM separation in the Pacific Ocean
airspace region. Changes in the these requirements for any reason, would
force equipment manufactures to make costly and long lead time design
changes. The operators may decide not to equip based on the increase in
costs or, could decide to significantly delay equipage until the requirements
and implementation dates are less uncertain.
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Table 81: Risk Q Direct Dependencies
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk B Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data link
retrofit packages to satisfy demand.
Risk C ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other technologies
or local rulemaking ready for implementation of 25NM reduced
separation.
Risk R No ICAO communication, navigation, and surveillance
standards available to support implementation of 25NM lateral
separation.
Q4.2 Risk Q Compound Loops
Risk Q forms one compound loop with the coordination and timing Risk D
(Late Completion of data link mandate plan. Not enough time for commercial
and business operators to plan to comply with mandate). Risk Q can
influence Risk D if it appears that the equipping to a sufficient percentage
during current timeline will be infeasible. The regulators may then elect to
postpone some of phased implementation or, add incentives to make
equipping or complying with the data link mandate easier. Conversely,
delaying the data link mandate to make technical changes or other changes
may also cause operators to wait to equip, further reducing the percentage of
equipped aircraft at a given point in time.
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Table 82: Risk Q Compound Loops
Risk D Late Completion of data link mandate plan. Not enough time
for commercial and business operators to plan to comply with
mandate (e.g. determination of entire flight level spectrum and
OTS tracks where mandate is to be applied)
Q.5 Mitigation
Table 83 shows the reported mitigation difficulty for Risk Q. The
respondents indicated a low detection difficulty. Detection can be
accomplished by taking equipage data from filed flight plans or by surveying
operators. However, the respondents indicated that there is not an
established equipage percentage level that is needed to move on with the
phases of 25NM lateral. The current level of equipage is believed to be
around 50%. The corrective action difficulty was indicated as medium.
Possible corrective actions include delaying the phased implementation of
the mandate to allow more equipment and aircraft to be delivered, and
adding more incentives for operators to equip. Several respondents
mentioned that harmonizing the implementation dates with the European
mandate and, delaying the initiatives to allow specific data link equipment
packages to be certified would both reduce costs and allow a higher level of
compliance. The coordination difficulty was indicated as high. Any changes
to the implementation dates would require coordination and approval ICAO
and local rulemaking authorities. The rulemaking process can be time
consuming and may require back and forth changes between ICAO and the
rule makers. The likelihood was listed as "high". The respondents felt that
the high costs and the short timeline posed significant barriers for operators
trying to equip and that the equipage level would likely not rise significantly
by the time the mandate is scheduled to take effect.
Table 83: Risk Q Mitigation Difficulty
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R.0 Description
Risk R is a technology risk described as "No ICAO communication, navigation,
and surveillance standards available to support implementation of 25NM
lateral separation (for example, RNP 4 meets navigation criteria for 30 NM).
The communication, navigation, and surveillance standards are needed by
ANSPs, equipment manufacturers, and operators so they can create and
select mandate compliant equipment. For operators, the uncertainty
surrounding the standards for compliance can cause significant delays in cost
overruns. An operator may have previously invested in what may become
non-compliant equipment or, they may be forced to wait longer for an
equipment package with the appropriate upgrades. An occurrence of risk R
could also result in necessary delays to the 25NM lateral plan to allow the
regulators to complete the full set of standards.
R.1 Background
There are several equipment performance standards that accompany a new
set of procedures and separation distances. These standards are there to
ensure the appropriate level of safety is maintained while the procedures
and separation distances are in use. The equipment manufacturers,
operators, and ANSPs all need knowledge of these in advance of their
implementation in order to create and acquire compliant equipment and
systems. The standards need to be approved by ICAO and local rule makers
before they can take effect. The standards may change when new knowledge
is gained from flight test and could cause costly design changes and new
equipment purchases. Additionally, if the standards are not approved in
time, the 25NM lateral reduced separation initiative will need to be delayed.
R.2 Root Causes
The respondents identified several root causes occurrence of Risk R.
Unexpected results from the safety analysis and/or flight tests could force
the development of new performance standards or significant changes to the
procedures. The respondents cited the absence of higher performance
standards such as RNP2 as a root cause for Risk R. These standards would
be needed if the current performance standards do not perform well enough
in flight test or the supporting analysis. Lastly, poor coordination amongst
regulatory authorities such as ICAO and local rule makers was cited as a
possible root cause for the occurrence of Risk R.
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R.2.1 Unexpected Results from Safety Analysis or Flight Testing
Unexpected results from the various safety analyses and flight tests can force
changes to be made to the navigation and communication performance
standards and reveal potential flaws within the existing data link
infrastructure. The standards could ether be relaxed if safety isn't
compromised or, entirely new standards may need to be developed. The
uncertainty around the standards that can be created after flight tests or a
safety analysis can cause an occurrence of Risk R if the standards need to be
changed or reconsidered.
R.2.2 Lack of Developed Alternative Performance Standards
The lack of developed alternative performance standards can cause
significant delays if they are found to be necessary ether in flight-testing or
the support safety analysis. The respondents in particular mentioned that
the RNP2 or RNP 3.5 standard would need significant development if it is
found that the RNP4 standard is not sufficient. The respondents did not
comment on the development time that would be needed for a new
performance standard but any new standard would need to go through the
same analysis and verification processes that are currently used for 25NM
lateral separation.
R.2.3 Poor Coordination
Poor coordination between the regulatory authorities, the ANSPs and the
groups responsible for the analysis and flight tests can lead to an occurrence
of Risk R. The authorities must define the acceptable safety standards, the
performance standards that meet the safety standards, and a timeline for
implementation. The ANSPs and the operators need enough time to upgrade
the infrastructure so the local verification flight tests can be conducted by
local rulemakers. All of these tasks are critical and share dependencies
between each other. Poor coordination could cause serious delays and cause
the occurrence of Risk R.
R.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of Risk R on stakeholder value metrics according to respondents
is given in Table 84.
Table 84: Risk R Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low High Medium Low Medium Medium
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The respondents indicated a low impact to safety. An occurrence of Risk R
can impact safety if it results in a decrease in the percentage of CPDLC
equipped aircraft operating in the North Atlantic. Without the 25NM lateral
standards, operators may consequently choose not to or wait long periods of
time before equipping. The respondents also indicated a low impact to ANSP
revenues. Revenues can also be impacted by changes in traffic volume that
come as a consequence of the occurrence of Risk R. The respondents
indicated a high impact to Operational Efficiency. The delay of 25NM lateral
implementation represents a substantial impact to operational efficiency
because operators that are equipped will not be able to realize the 25NM
lateral efficiency gains such more use optimal tracks, faster climb times, and
smaller separation distances. Risk R can cause a delay to 25NM lateral
because the standards are need to be set before 25NM lateral can be
implemented. The respondents indicated Risk R would have a medium
impact to both ANSP Costs and Operator Costs. The impact to costs can
come if the standards are changed after equipment has been purchased.
ANSPs must purchase ground equipment and Operators must purchase
aircraft equipment. All of the equipment must work together to achieve the
navigation and performance standards so there will be some uncertainty
remaining until the final flight tests have been completed. In some cases,
new standards may need to be developed and in these cases, it is more likely
that new navigation or communications equipment will need to be developed
or purchased. One respondent mentioned the RNP2 as an undeveloped
standard that could cause such changes if RNP4 performance standard does
not meet the safety standard in practice. Lastly, the respondents indicated a
medium impact to Operator Revenues. Operator Revenues can be impacted
if the North Atlantic reaches capacity constraints due to the delay of 25NM
lateral from Risk R, and the positive growth in traffic. Operators may have to
decrease or hold back on planned increases in service until the standards are
set and 25NM lateral is implemented.
R.4 Dependencies and Influences
The dependencies and influences for Risk R are shown in Figure 56. Risk R
has one dependency with a policy and procedure risk. It also has three
compound loops, all with coordination and timing risks and influences three
risks, one policy and procedure risk and two safety risks.
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Figure 56: Risk R Direct Dependencies and Influences (Reduced Separation)
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R4.1 Risk R Direct Dependencies
As shown in Table 85, Risk R has one direct dependency with Risk H, a policy
and procedure risk described as "Restricted Access to airspace for
unequipped operators. Risk H can influence the occurrence of Risk R
because the distances between the airspace of equipped and unequipped
aircraft are in part a function of the required navigation performance. The
desired restrictions could in add an unforeseen requirement to the 25NM
lateral RNP standard that could delay the approval of the 25NM lateral
performance standards.
Table 85: Risk R Direct Dependencies
Risk H Restricted Access to airspace for unequipped aircraft
R4.2 Risk R Direct Influences
Risk R has three direct influences as shown in Table 86. The influential
outcomes of Risk R are a lack of performance standard definitions for
navigation performance communication performance and RNP standards, a
of surveillance standards.
Risk R can influence the policy and procedure risk G (Failure to develop
measures to accommodate unequipped aircraft) if the navigation and
communication standards are not in place. The navigation and
communication standards are needed to analytically evaluation and set safe
operating boundaries between the airspace for equipped an unequipped
aircraft.
Risk R can influence the safety risk U (Failure to control vertical risk when 25
NM lateral separation is implemented) if the 25NM lateral standards are
undefined or are not enforced and followed. While it is unlikely that 25NM
lateral could be implemented without a complete performance standard
definition, the vertical risk probability does depend on all of the aircraft's
abilities to maintain those standards.
Risk R can influence the safety risk T (Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM
lateral separation) because the safety case cannot be evaluated without a
standards definition to test against. Additionally, failure to meet the
standards once 25NM lateral is implemented can cause an occurrence of Risk
T, or, non-definition of the performance standards all together.
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Table 86: Risk R Direct Influences
R4.3 Risk R Compound Loops
Risk R forms three compound loops as shown in Table 87.
Risk C represents a failure of ANSPs to have automation systems ready.
ANSPs may need to implement new software and hardware depending on
standards. An occurrence of risk R (lack of standards) would complicate this
effort and likely result in an occurance of Risk C because ANSPs won't have
the requirements necessary to procure compliant equipment. Conversely,
local rulemaking can reveal changes that need to be made the standards
which could complicate ANSP readiness and then result in an occurrence of
Risk R.
Risk E is a coordination and timing risk represents a failure of ANSPs to
coordinate with each other. The performance standards are needed by the
ANSPs to properly tune the software that assists air traffic controllers and to
ensure their hardware can meet the target level of performance specified in
the standards. Not having these standards (Risk R) can prevent the
secondary coordination steps from taking place. Conversely, the ANSPs need
coordinate with each other before the standards are defined to ensure that
the enroute procedures and hand off procedures are compatible and don't
constrain the standards. If an ANSP does submit an unforeseen constraint on
the performance standards during rulemaking or another process, the
standards may not be fully defined when 25NM lateral is scheduled to be
implemented.
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Risk G Failure to develop measures to accommodate unequipped
aircraft
Risk U Failure to control vertical risk when 25 NM lateral separation is
implemented
Risk T Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM lateral separation
(Feasibility analysis may find that better performance is
needed. Actual performance may not meet feasibility analysis
expectations)
The 25NM lateral performance standards that are encompassed in Risk R are
needed for rulemaking and a failure to complete them quickly enough would
result in the occurrence of risk F. Conversely, the results from the local
rulemaking process in each region could influence and update these
standards causing Risk R to occur.
Table 87: Risk R Compound Loops
Risk C ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other technologies,
or local rulemaking ready for implementation of 25 NM lateral
separation (e.g. ensuring that deviations from norm are
captured quickly, etc.)
Risk E Failure to achieve effective coordination with other ANSPs
(harmonization of technical systems and operating methods)
Risk F Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25 NM lateral
separation (if required by ANSP) not completed within
mandate timeframe
R.5 Mitigation
Table 88 shows the mitigation results for Risk R. The respondents gave risk
R a "low" detection difficulty because the ICAO standards are published and
the ANSPs and operators participate in the process for creating the
standards. The respondents indicated a "High" corrective action difficulty.
Possible corrective actions include creating new standards, relaxing the
standards, and delaying 25NM lateral implementation to finish creating the
standards. Any changes tp the standards will need to go through the analysis
processes that are completed by the NAT Planning groups, possible
equipment fixes, and flight tests. Delaying the implementation of 25NM
lateral can have implications on equipage levels if operators choose to wait
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longer to equip or need to change their equipment. Additionally, delaying
the initiatives could complicate efforts to harmonize CPDLC procedures
throughout the world while other competing standards are implemented.
The respondents indicated a "Very High" rating for the coordination difficulty
of Risk R. All of the corrective actions would require extensive coordination
between the ANSPs, Operators, ICAO planning groups and local regulatory
authorities because each stakeholder has tasks that are dependant on the
tasks of other stakeholders being completed. The respondents indicated a
medium likelihood for Risk R. They noted that while the flight testing and
analysis supporting the current performance standards is moving forward,
there was still a possibility for a change in the navigation standard to RNP2
and a change the communication standard back to RCP400.
Table 88: Risk R Mitigation
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S.0 Description
Risk S is a coordination and timing risk described as "Late completion of
25NM lateral separation planning tasks". The 25NM lateral planning tasks
including setting rules, standards, implementation dates, and completing the
supporting flight testing and economic and safety analysis. These tasks are
critical to the implementation and safe execution of the 25NM lateral
separation procedures. The regulators (ICAO and local rulemakers) will
need all of these tasks to be completed before they can approve 25NM lateral
separation procedures. The operators need the tasks to be completed as
soon as possible in order to plan compliance tasks with long lead times such
as acquiring new equipment or aircraft, and scheduling equipment
installation on existing aircraft. Without the completion of all of these tasks,
the implementation is likely to be delayed and the uncertainty around the
implementations dates and equipment standards could generate prohibitive
and substantial cost overruns.
S.1 Background
There are several critical planning tasks that must be completed before new
air traffic policies or procedures are introduced. These tasks include
completing implementation timelines, performing supporting safety and
economic analysis, and setting standards for equipment, communications,
and procedures. The implementation timelines drive purchasing and other
economically significant decisions such as installation and aircraft
scheduling. If the timelines conflict with initiatives in other regions, or the
available equipment and economic resources, then the operators could be
put in a position to endure significant delays in compliance and cost
overruns. The safety and economic analysis are needed to set the technical
requirements for the equipment, the operating procedures for the aircraft,
and to properly implement the policy in a way that will not cause undue
economic burdens. As with timing, there can be significant cost overruns and
delays if the analysis are not completed before the regulations are
determined. Lastly, the operating procedures determined, and verified
before the final regulations are put into place. In many cases, the economic
investments will need to be made with enough lead time and with a low risk.
Flight testing is the last place that significant technical changes could present
themselves before the regulations are approved. Flight testing is also the last
risk reduction measure and its successful completion can drive the
purchasing the decisions for operators. There must be enough lead time
allowed between the flight tests and implementation to allow the possible
changes to be made to the regulations and to allow the operators to purchase
and install compliant equipment. These planning tasks require a deep level
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of coordination between stakeholders such as aircraft operators, regulatory
authorities such as ICAO, the European Union, and local rulemakers, and
aircraft and equipment manufacturers such as Boeing, Airbus, Honeywell,
Bombardier, and Gulfstream.
S.2 Root Causes
The respondents identified several root causes for Risk S. Delays in
modifying the air traffic control software and hardware and training new
personnel can cause delays to 25NM lateral implementation because all of
the ANSPs must be ready before implementation can take place.
Additionally, poor coordination between ICAO and the ANSPs was also listed
as a root cause. The supporting analysis that determine the appropriate
performance criteria (navigation, and communication) for the equipment
must also be completed with enough lead time to allow the manufactures to
make deliver and install compliant equipment. Any changes to the
anticipated to the criteria can be a root causes if the changes require a
substantial amount of time to comply with. Lastly, any delays in the local
authorities' granting of permission of the ICAO standards and procedures for
25NM lateral separation, could also create delays. Some rule makers require
their own independent safety and flight testing analysis while others will
accept the analysis done by ICAO.
S.2.1 Late Completion of ANSP 25NM Lateral Infrastructure
Late completion of the air traffic control infrastructure needed to support
25NM lateral separation could delay other planning tasks and the
implementation altogether. The flight tests for performance verification and
local rulemaking verification tests need the ground infrastructure to be
completed before they can take place. Some ANSP respondents did mention
that some hardware and software changes were still taking place.
Additionally, the training of personnel must also take place before the
verification testing planning tasks can be completed.
S.2.2 Poor ANSP Coordination
Poor coordination between the regulatory authorities, the ANSPs and the
groups responsible for the analysis and flight tests can lead to an occurrence
of Risk R. The authorities must define the acceptable safety standards, the
performance standards that meet the safety standards, and a timeline for
implementation. The ANSPs and the operators need enough time and
resources to comply with the timeline but can't do so until there is enough
certainty with regard to what performance standards will be used. Lastly,
the local rulemakers and ICAO regulators must verify the standards work
with analysis and flight tests. All of these tasks are critical and share
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dependencies between each other. Poor coordination could cause serious
delays and cause the occurrence of Risk S.
S.2.3 Late Completion of Supporting Analysis
Late completion of the supporting safety and economic analysis could delay
other planning tasks and implementation altogether. The safety analysis is
needed to set performance standards which are then used to create
equipment and verified in flight test. The economic analysis is needed to set
appropriate timelines, incentives, and penalties that accompany the policy
change. Late completion of ether of these analyses could delay other
planning tasks such as performance verification along with an operators'
decision or timeline for equipping.
S.2.4 Changes to Performance and Safety Standards
Unexpected results from the various safety analyses and flight tests can force
changes to be made to the navigation and communication performance
standards and reveal potential flaws within the existing data link
infrastructure. The standards could ether be relaxed if safety isn't
compromised or, entirely new standards may need to be developed. The
uncertainty around the standards that can be created after flight tests or a
safety analysis can cause an occurrence of Risk S if the standards need to be
changed or reconsidered.
S.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of Risk S on stakeholder value metrics according to the
respondents is given in Table 89.
Table 89: Risk S Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low High Low Low Low Medium
The respondents mainly felt that an occurrence of Risk S would very likely
delay the implementation of 25NM lateral separation. They indicated that
Risk S would likely have a low impact to safety. An occurrence of Risk S can
impact safety if it results in a decrease in the percentage of CPDLC equipped
aircraft operating in the North Atlantic. If the implementation of 25NM
lateral separation procedures is delayed, operators may consequently choose
not to or wait long periods of time before equipping. The respondents also
indicated a low impact to ANSP revenues. Revenues can also be impacted by
changes in traffic volume or traffic patterns that come as a consequence of
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the occurrence of Risk S. The respondents indicated a high impact to
Operational Efficiency. The delay of 25NM lateral implementation represents
a substantial impact to Operational Efficiency because operators that are
equipped will not be able to realize the 25NM lateral efficiency gains such as
more use optimal tracks, faster climb times, and smaller separation
distances. The respondents indicated a low impact to Operator Costs and
ANSP costs. ANSP costs can be impacted if there are increased equipment
and staffing associated with a delay to 25NM lateral implementation. If the
planning tasks are not complete, the ANSPs may not know their true costs
until after the planning delays are over. Similarly, Operator Costs can be
impacted by unanticipated costs coming from late planning, and, the fuel
burn costs associated with the longer continuation of the current 60NM
lateral separation.
Lastly, the respondents indicated a medium impact to Operator Revenues.
Operator Revenues can be impacted if the North Atlantic reaches capacity
constraints due to the delay of 25NM lateral from Risk R, and the positive
growth in traffic. Operators may have to decrease or hold back on planned
increases in service until the standards are set and 25NM lateral is
implemented.
S.4 Dependencies and Influences
The dependencies and influences of Risk S are shown in Figure 57. Risk S has
seven dependencies: three policy and procedure risks, two coordination and
timing risks, one equipage risk and one safety risk.
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Figure 57: Risk S Direct Dependencies and Influences (Reduced Separation Only)
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S4.1 Risk S Direct Dependencies
Risk S forms many direct dependencies as shown in Table 90. There are
three policy and procedure risks, two coordination and timing risks, one
equipage risk and one safety risk that are dependencies of Risk S.
The policy and procedure risks G, M, H can influence the likelihood of Risk S if
they result in delays to important policy and standards definitions. An
occurrence of Risk G (Failure to develop measures to accommodate
unequipped aircraft) can effectively reduce or eliminate the airspace that will
be available for 25NM lateral operations because unequipped aircraft cannot
safely conduct 25NM lateral separation procedures and there may still be a
significant number of them that need to operate in the North Atlantic. Risk M
(Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate in Europe vs. FANS-
1/A mandate in the NAT) can result in the difference in data link procedures
and communications protocols between Europe and the North Atlantic to go
unresolved. While there are exceptions that would allow aircraft to only
comply with FANS 1/A until 2015, regulators may elect to wait for the GOLD
document to be completed before implementing 25NM lateral. If these
efforts are delayed, it could the result in an occurrence of Risk S. The
outcomes of Risk H (Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft)
can result also delay in approval of restrictions and approval restrictions that
force unequipped aircraft outside of the OTS and MNPS airspace. Delays in
restrictions can influence the timely completion of other restrictions such as
those for 25 NM planning tasks (Risk S).
The coordination and timing risks D and E encompass critical time oriented
tasks that can influence the occurrence of Risk R by delaying other
dependent tasks. The 25NM lateral separation initiatives depend on the
readiness of the CPDLDC and ADS-C technology that is required in the
datalink mandate plan. If the data link mandate plan is delayed (Risk D), the
25NM lateral planning tasks could also be delayed. Risk E, (Failure to
achieve effective coordination with other ANSPs) can causes delays to ANSP
coordination tasks such as setting handoff procedures, local rulemaking and
participating in ICAO planning tasks. These tasks all need to be completed
before 25NM lateral is implemented because they are critical to maintaining
the safety and operational efficiency benefits.
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The equipage Risk I (Mixed equipage environment during transition) can
affect the timely completion of 25NM planning tasks because a certain
percentage of equipped aircraft may be required to go forward with the
implementation. If the equipage level is too low, regulators may not be able
to set aside enough airspace for equipped aircraft or, they may need to spend
extra time to plan ways to accommodate unequipped aircraft.
Lastly, the safety risk T (Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM lateral
separation) can result in a need to change the navigation and communication
performance standards. Changing the navigation standards requires analysis
time plus possibly more time for new equipment to be developed, installed,
and tested. In effect, an occurrence of risk T could temporarily drive the
percentage of equipped aircraft low enough to cause a delay to the
implementation of 25NM lateral.
Table 90: Risk S Direct Dependencies
Risk D Late completion of data link mandate plan. Not enough time for
commercial and business operators to plan and comply with
mandate (e.g. determination of entire flight level spectrum and
OTS tracks where mandate is to be applied, etc.).
Risk E Failure to achieve effective coordination with other ANSPs
(harmonization of technical systems and operating methods)
Risk G Failure to develop measures to accommodate unequipped
aircraft
Risk H Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft
Risk I Mixed equipage environment during transition
Risk M Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate in Europe
vs. FANS-1/A mandate in the NAT
Risk T Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM lateral separation
(Feasibility analysis may find that better performance is
needed. Actual performance may not meet feasibility analysis
expectations)
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S4.2 Risk S Direct Influences
Risk S can influence the policy and procedure risk J (Operators choosing to
operate in areas where other types of surveillance are provided) as shown in
Table 91 if the planning tasks don't incorporate alternative measures for
unequipped aircraft. Increasing amounts of airspace are scheduled to be set
aside for CPDLC equipped aircraft in the phased implementation of 25NM
lateral. If in the last phase when all MNPS airspace is set aside for equipped
aircraft, measures to equip unequipped aircraft aren't developed, then
unequipped operators will likely have to resort to flying to areas with radar
coverage.
Table 91: Risk S Direct Influences
Risk J Operators choosing to operate in areas where other types of
surveillance are provided
S4.3 Risk S Compound Loops
Risk S forms three compounds loops that are listed in Table 92, two in the
coordination and timing category and one in the safety category. Risks C
(ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other technologies, or local
rulemaking ready for implementation of 25 NM lateral separation) and F
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(Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25 NM lateral separation (if
required by ANSP) not completed within mandate timeframe) are high
impact coordination and timing risks. The ANSPs depend on ICAO standards
definitions (Risk C) to procure automation systems and other technologies in
support of new procedures. A failure to define these standards could create
delays in procuring the equipment and would represent an occurrence of risk
C and risk F because the local rulemaking cannot proceed until a standards
definition is in place. Conversely, the standards do need to be flight tested to
satisfy local rulemaking requirements. A failure to have the systems ready
for testing could delay other planning tasks and represent and occurrence of
Risk S.
The safety risk K (Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than OTS routes)
can occur if an occurrence of Risk S results in the incompletion of planning
tasks for handling unequipped aircraft. Conversely, because 25NM lateral is
undergoing a phased implementation, the increase in traffic in MNPS routes
(risk K) can slowly build to a point where congestion and safety concerns
arise. A failure to address these concerns could then result in an occurrence
of Risk S if further planning tasks are needed for unequipped aircraft.
Table 92: Risk S Compound loops
Risk C ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other technologies,
or local rulemaking ready for implementation of 25 NM lateral
separation (e.g. ensuring that deviations from norm are
captured quickly, etc.)
Risk F Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25 NM lateral
separation (if required by ANSP) not completed within
mandate timeframe
Risk K Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than OTS routes
S.5 Mitigation
The mitigation difficulty for Risk S is
gave risk S a low detection difficulty.
shown in Table 93. The respondents
Any changes in procedures are
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published by ICAO and sent to operators and ANSPs. These changes would
include any changes to the implementation dates for 25NM lateral separation
so a change (Risk S) would not be difficult to detect. The respondents listed
the corrective action as high. If the 25NM lateral initiatives are delayed,
possible corrective actions include pushing back the mandate timelines to
give operators more time to comply, implementing the procedures on fewer
tracks in the Oceanic Tracking System (OTS), or harmonizing the dates and
procedures with the European Mandate. The respondents indicated a "very
high" rating for the coordination difficulty of Risk S. All of the corrective
actions would require extensive coordination between the ANSPs, Operators,
ICAO planning groups and local regulatory authorities because each
stakeholder has tasks that are dependant on the tasks of other stakeholders
being completed. The respondents indicated a high likelihood for Risk S.
They noted that while the flight testing and infrastructure tasks were going
well, conflict resolution with the European mandate and finalizing the
restrictions for unequipped aircraft are tasks that still need to be completed.
Table 93: Risk S Mitigation Difficulty
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T.0 Description
Risk T is a safety risk described as: Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM
lateral separation (Feasibility analysis may find that better performance is
needed. Actual performance may not meet feasibility analysis expectations).
The safety case for 25NM lateral includes many system level performance
specifications including those for communication availability, navigation
precision and many others. The equipment performance standards are
initially evaluated against the safety case analytically, tested live in flight test,
and then monitored while the new procedures are in operation. If the safety
case is not met, it may be necessary to implement new performance
standards or suspend 25NM lateral procedures.
T.1 Background
The safety case for new procedures serves as a check to ensure the desired
level of safety can be met and is being met. The respondents indicated that
much of the analytical or simulation based safety case for 25NM lateral has
already been evaluated against the current performance standards with the
follow up flight tests taking place soon. After the 25NM lateral procedures
have been approved by ICAO, it will be more difficult make changes and the
most feasible corrective action for persistent safety case violations would be
to suspend the 25NM lateral operations. If the safety case is violated before
25NM lateral is implemented, the system performance standards can be
changed. These changes could then possibly result in costly equipment
changes.
T.2 Root Causes
The respondents identified two root causes associated with Risk T. The first
root cause is a failure of the performance standards to satisfy the safety case.
Such a failure would be detected during an analytical analysis or simulation.
The second root cause was described as a failure of the equipment in meeting
the performance standards that were used to satisfy the safety analysis.
T.2.1 Performance Standards don't satisfy safety case
The performance standards can fall short of satisfying the safety case ether in
flight test or during the analytical simulations used to verify the performance
standards. One respondent indicated that RNP4 on its own did not satisfy
the safety requirements in the simulations and that RNP 3.5 or RNP2 might
need to be developed. The respondent also noted that the simulation did not
consider containment at 2*RNP 4 or 8 NM at 10-s or the communication
(CPDLC/RCP 240) and surveillance (ADS-C/type 180) to augment the
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navigation performance. GNSS may be used as an alternate requirement but
it is technology based and not performance based.
T.2.2 Equipment doesn't meet Performance Standards
Operational and technical navigational errors that occur in flight are
continuously monitored and evaluated by ICAO and local rulemakers.
Technical errors are errors that are caused by ether malfunctioning or low
performing equipment. Exceeding the required navigation precision
envelope would be one such error. Operational errors are human errors
made by ether ANSPs, pilots or other technical persons that help process
flight plan changes. These errors reduce the level of safety because they
effectively increase the probability of a collision. These errors are also
counted to evaluate the achieved level of safety in the North Atlantic each
year. The 25NM lateral procedures require degree tracks which must be
manually interrogated to be verified on some FMC's instead of being verified
by visual inspection for 1 degree tracks. If the errors accumulate too
quickly during 25NM lateral operations, regulators may conclude that the
vertical risk isn't being sufficiently controlled.
T.3 Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Table 94 shows the impact of risk T on stakeholder value metrics.
Table 94: Risk T Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Medium High Medium Low Low Medium
The respondents indicated a medium impact to Safety. Safety would be
impacted if the safety case is violated during 25NM operations. The degree
of the impact would depend on how often operational (human errors) or
technical errors (low equipment performance) occur. The respondents
indicated a high impact Operational Efficiency. Navigation Errors that cause
safety case violations can cause other aircraft to be rerouted, change speed,
or make evasive maneuvers. Additionally, if the safety case is violated, 25NM
lateral procedures may be suspended along with the corresponding
efficiency gains. The data link mandate however, should not be affected by a
suspension of 25NM lateral operations. The respondents indicated a
medium impact to ANSP costs. ANSP costs can impacted if ANSPs need to
add new equipment or staffing in order to improve the overall safety
performance during 25NM lateral separation. The respondents indicated a
low impact to ANSP Revenues. ANSP Revenues can be impacted if the traffic
Page 223
............ ..... .......... ...... ...... -- -- ........
patterns change as a result of a safety case violation: ether from a suspension
or delay of 25NM lateral operations, or from regulated changes to the 25NM
lateral airspace. The respondents indicated a low impact Operator Costs.
Operator Costs can be impacted if 25NM lateral is suspended or delayed
because the operators may not be able to be realized the anticipated
efficiency gains associated with the new procedures. The respondents
indicated a medium impact to Operator Revenues. Operator Revenues can
be impacted if the 25NM lateral is delayed and capacity limits for North
Atlantic Operations are reached. Operators may not be able to carry planned
additions to service or may even be forced to reduce existing service.
T.4 Dependencies and Influences
The risk dependencies and influences of Risk T are shown in Figure 58. Risk
T is a 25NM lateral only risk, has one technology risk dependency, three
equipage risk dependencies, and one safety risk dependency. Risk T also
influences two coordination and timing risks, one technology risk, and forms
one compound loop with a coordination and timing risk.
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Figure 58: Risk T Direct Dependencies (Reduced Separation Only)
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T.4.1 Risk T Direct Dependencies
Risk T has three equipage risk dependencies. Risk A (Equipage for Business
operators not available or certified in time to meet mandate), Risk B
(Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data link retrofit
packages to satisfy demand), and Risk 0 (End of service life of 13 satellite
services expected about 2016. New equipage may be required to use classic
aero services via 14 satellites) can all impact CPDLC equipage levels in the
North Atlantic. Equipage levels can fall if equipment is not available (Risks A
and B) or if satellite service is reduced for some existing aircraft (Risk 0). If
the equipage levels fall, the level of safety outside of 25NM lateral airspace is
also reduced because if increases in the communication delay with the HF
system. The occurrence of risk T will be affected if these equipage levels fall
below the necessary threshold level to implement 25NM lateral.
The technology risk L (Failure to establish a plan or go forward with
mitigation to meet RCP240. This also includes failure of ground
infrastructure to support RCP240) can affect the safety case if RCP240 does
not satisfy the safety standards in simulation or if the ground equipment
cannot satisfy RCP240 after it is established. Risk L can cause an occurrence
of Risk T in the simulation stage or in the flight test stage. One respondent
did note that RCP240 is in place for 30NM-30NM separation in the Pacific
region.
An occurrence of the safety risk Y (HF system may not be able to handle
future air traffic levels as a backup system) can jeopardize the safety case
during 25NM lateral separation. In the event of a ground station or satellite
failure, all operators and ANSPs using data link will need to revert to the HF
system which can handle fewer messages at a time, and takes longer to
exchange messages between pilots and air traffic controllers. If the HF
system can't handle the increases in network load from 25NM lateral, than
the level of safety would fall and operators would need to rely on on board
equipment to prevent collisions until air traffic controllers can increase their
separation back to a level where HF can meet the safety constraints.
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Table 95: Risk T Direct Dependencies
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk B Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data link
retrofit packages to satisfy demand
Risk L Failure to establish a plan or go forward with mitigation to
meet RCP240. This also includes failure of ground
infrastructure to support RCP240
Risk 0 End of service life of 13 satellite services expected about 2016.
New equipage may be required to use classic aero services via
14 satellites.
Risk Y HF system may not be able to handle future air traffic levels as a
backup system.
T.4.2 Risk T Direct Influences
The direct influences of risk T are shown in Table 96. An occurrence of Risk
T can result in a failure to satisfy the safety case for 25NM lateral ether in
simulation or in flight testing. These two outcomes can influence one
technology risk and two coordination and timing risks.
Both outcomes of Risk T can influence the technology risk R (No ICAO
communication, navigation, and surveillance standards available to support
implementation of 25NM lateral separation). If the safety case is not satisfied
during simulation, the ICAO standards for 25NM lateral may need to be
changed and will remain uncertain. If the safety case is not satisfied in flight
test, the standards may need to be changed along with the ground and
aircraft equipment.
Risk T can affect the coordination and timing risks F (Rulemaking to support
data link mandate and 25 NM lateral separation (if required by ANSP) not
completed within mandate timeframe) and R (No ICAO communication,
navigation, and surveillance standards available to support implementation
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of 25NM lateral separation (for example, RNP 4 meets navigation criteria for
30 NM) if the delays in the safety case delay other critical tasks for 25NM
lateral implementation. If the equipment fails to satisfy the safety case in the
simulation stage, local rulemaking cannot proceed (Risk F) until a new
performance standard is set. Local rulemaking may also encompass the
flight testing of the approved performance standards. Rulemaking can also
be delayed if these flight tests do not prove the equipment is working
properly. If the safety case is not satisfied in ether the simulation or during
the flight tests, other planning tasks must be added to fix the remaining
technical issues. Other 25NM planning tasks may need to be delayed (Risk S)
such as setting restrictions or unequipped aircraft, until the safety case is
satisfied.
Table 96: Risk T Direct Influences
Risk F Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25 NM lateral
separation (if required by ANSP) not completed within
mandate timeframe
Risk R No ICAO communication, navigation, and surveillance
standards available to support implementation of 25NM lateral
separation (for example, RNP 4 meets navigation criteria for 30
NM)
Risk S Late completion of 25NM lateral separation planning tasks.
T.4.3 Risk T Compound Loops
Risk T forms one compound loop with the coordination and timing Risk C
(ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other technologies, or local
rulemaking ready for implementation of 25 NM lateral separation) as shown
in Table 97. Risk C can influence the occurrence of Risk T because the ANSPs
automation systems are needed to test the equipment to see if the safety case
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is satisfied for local rulemaking. Conversely, Risk T can influence the
occurrence of Risk C. If the flight tests show that the safety case isn't
satisfied, the ANSPs may need to reconfigure their automation systems or
other technologies before the implementation of 25NM lateral separation.
Table 97: Risk T Compound Loops
Risk C ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other technologies,
or local rulemaking ready for implementation of 25 NM lateral
separation (e.g. ensuring that deviations from norm are
captured quickly, etc.)
T.5 Mitigation
The mitigation difficulty for risk T is shown in Table 98. The respondents
indicated Risk T would have low detection difficulty. The safety case is
verified in three stages, during simulations, during flight testing, and during
operational practice by monitoring aircraft movements. If the safety case
isn't satisfied at any of these stages, the ICAO and local rulemaking
authorities will be informed and the necessary corrective actions will be
taken. The respondents indicated Risk T would have a high difficulty of
corrective action. Possible corrective actions include changing or developing
new equipment performance standards (relaxing or tightening), purchasing
new equipment, and delaying implementation of 25NM lateral procedures.
All of these corrective actions would require coordination between ICAO
authorities, operators and ANSPs. Additionally, the need for new equipment
would also need to be coordinated with aircraft manufactures. The
respondent correspondingly indicated Risk T would have a very high level of
difficulty in coordinating corrective actions. The respondents indicated that
Risk T has a medium likelihood of occurrence. One respondent commented
specifically that the RNP4 would likely not be adequate for the safety case
and that RNP3.5, or RNP2 may need to be developed. RNP2 in particular has
not been approved for any operator. The respondent also mentioned that
the simulation only considered the 95% accuracy of RNP4 and that
containment of RNP4 (2*RNP4) or the communication and surveillance
abilities to augment navigational performance were not considered. The
respondent also suggested that there is a possibility for relying on a GNSS
requirement which is technology based, not performance based.
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Table 98: Risk T Mitigation Difficulty
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U.0 Description
Risk U is a safety risk described as "Failure to control vertical risk when 25
NM lateral separation is implemented". The vertical risk describes the risk of
two aircraft cruising on roughly same path but at different altitudes colliding
with each other. The aircraft can be traveling in ether the same direction,
opposite directions or may deviate from a parallel path. Vertical separation
is monitored by the ANSPs and the aircraft's onboard traffic collision
avoidance system and the ADS-C surveillance system. When 25NM lateral
separation is implemented, a data link failure could increase the risk of a
vertical collision because the position reports and communication exchanges
between the ANSPs, aircraft and other aircraft will be delayed.
U.1 Background
Aircraft collisions almost always have catastrophic consequences so it is
important to operators and ANSPs maintain a safe level of separation
between other aircraft at all times. The separation standards, position
reports, and on board traffic detections systems (TCAS and ADS-C) all
contribute to the mitigation of a collision risk. The vertical risk specifically
refers to an aircraft collision that happens when two aircraft flying on the
same path but at different altitudes come too close to each other. Data link
equipment further reduces the vertical risk because the accuracy and
frequency of the position reports are increased. In fact, the advances in
communications provided by data link are what enable 25NM lateral
separation procedures to be practiced safely. In the event of a data link
ground failure, a backup communication system such as HF radio can be used
along with the onboard surveillance systems. Or, if onboard surveillance
systems fail, the aircraft should still be able to receive messages from the
ANSPs. In any case, the vertical risk must be continuously monitored and
mitigated by all of the available communications and surveillance systems.
U.2 Root Causes
The respondents identified three root causes associated with Risk U. The
first two are failures to meet required communication or navigation
performance respectively. The last root cause is a persistent violation of
safety performance during 25NM lateral operations.
U.2.1 Failure to meet required communications performance
The required communication performance standard (RCP) specifies limits on
time the it takes for a message to travel from its sender to a destination and
back. In data link operations, a message sent between an aircraft and a
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ground controller must go through a satellite and ground station first.
Alternatively, the High Frequency Voice (HF) method relies on manned radio
relay stations to transfer messages. If the message exchange time for the
data link controllers isn't met then the detection time for navigation errors
increases which can increase the chances of a vertical collision.
U.2.2 Failure to meet required navigational performance
The required navigation precision standard (RNP) specifies limits on the size
of aircrafts navigational position error. In order to safely conduct reduced
separation procedures, each aircraft must be within the maximum allowed
distance from its calculated position. Deviations from the aircraft's
calculated position can increase the risk of collision with other aircraft
because the separation distance can become narrower and the error can only
be automatically detected by onboard surveillances and navigation systems.
U.2.3 Incidence of operational and technical errors greater than max
acceptable.
Operational and technical errors that occur in flight are continuously
monitored and evaluated by ICAO and local rulemakers. These errors are
reduce the level of safety because they effectively increase the probability of
a collision. They are also used to evaluate the achieved level of safety in the
North Atlantic each year. These errors are typically human errors of entering
in the wrong coordinates or wrong altitude. 25NM lateral procedures also
require degree tracks which must be manually interrogated to be verified
on some flight management computers (FMC's) instead of being verified by
visual inspection for 1 degree tracks. If the errors accumulate too quickly
during 25NM lateral operations regulators may conclude that the vertical
risk isn't being sufficiently controlled.
U.3 Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Table 99 shows the impact of risk U to stakeholder value metrics.
Table 99: Risk U Impact to Stakeholder value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Very High High Medium None Medium None
The respondents indicated a very high impact to Safety. Vertical Safety is a
critical component of the overall safety case. When separation reduced, the
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margin of safety is reduced but a reduction beyond a certified level in the
safety case would cause the need for immediate changes to be made. The
respondents indicated a high impact to Operational Efficiency. Operational
Efficiency can be impacted if 25NM lateral operations are suspended or, if
aircraft need to be rerouted to restore an acceptable level of vertical risk. The
respondents indicated a medium impact to ANSP costs. ANSP costs can
impacted if ANSPs need to add new equipment or staffing in order to
improve the overall safety performance during 25NM lateral separation. The
respondents indicated a medium impact Operator Costs. Operator Costs can
be impacted if 25NM lateral is suspended or delayed because the operators
may not be able to be realized the anticipated efficiency gains associated with
the new procedures. The respondents did not indicate an impact to ANSP
revenues or Operator Revenues.
U.4 Dependencies and Influences
The dependencies and influences of Risk U are shown in Figure 59. Risk U
has one technology risk dependency, one coordination and timing risk
dependency, and one equipage risk dependency. Risk U does not have any
influences or form compound loops.
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Figure 59: Risk U Direct Dependencies and Influences (Reduced Separation Only)
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U.4.1 Risk U Direct Risk Dependencies
Risk U has three direct risk dependencies as shown in Table 100. The
equipage risk A (Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate) and, the coordination and timing risk C (Potential
delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data link retrofit packages to
satisfy demand), can affect the CPDLC equipage levels in the North Atlantic if
they occur on a large scale. Although the unequipped aircraft will not be
allowed to participate in 25NM lateral procedures, the safety case does in
part depend on the equipage levels in the North Atlantic. If these equipage
levels fall below a threshold, the vertical risk safety level may not be satisfied,
possibly where equipped airspace and unequipped airspace meet.
The technology risk L (Failure to establish a plan or go forward with
mitigation to meet RCP240. This also includes failure of ground
infrastructure to support RCP240) could increase the detection time for
navigational (Vertical or Horizontal) errors relative to what is possible with
RCP240 if the communication standard is relaxed to a lower standard such as
RCP400. However, it is unlikely that 25NM lateral separation would be
implemented unless the communications standard satisfied the safety case.
Table 100: Risk U Direct Dependencies
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk C Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data link
retrofit packages to satisfy demand
Risk L Failure to establish a plan or go forward with mitigation to
meet RCP240. This also includes failure of ground
infrastructure to support RCP240
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U.5 Mitigation
The mitigation difficulty for risk U according to respondents is shown in
Table 101. The respondents indicated that Risk U would have a medium
detection difficulty. Vertical risks typically increase with human errors
which may be difficult to account for in simulation. Vertical risk is also
monitored and evaluated in operational practice which is where a detection
of a persistent problem would most likely occur. The respondents
indicated the corrective action difficulty for Risk U would be high. Possible
corrective actions include mandating the use of ADS-C to monitor vertical
navigation conformance, auto-load capability to reduce position change entry
errors, increasing the separation between unequipped and equipped aircraft
and increasing 25NM lateral separation to 30NM-30NM lateral separation or
a large distance. The regulatory changes would require coordination
between operators, ANSPs, ICAO and local rulemakers. The Auto-load
capability would require coordination between operators, ANSPs and
possibly regulators depending if a regulatory mandate is needed. If the
vertical risks occur when an unequipped aircraft crosses into the 25NM
lateral OTS on a random route, closer monitoring or stricter restrictions for
unequipped aircraft may be needed as well. The respondents
correspondingly indicated that the coordination difficulty to correct Risk U
would be high. The respondents listed the likelihood of Risk U as medium.
They noted that ICAO would not approve 25NM lateral if there were an
unacceptable vertical risk but they did acknowledge that vertical risk would
increase relative to using CPDLC in 60NM-60NM or 30NM-30NM separation
because the separation distance would go down to 25NM.
Table 101: Risk U Mitigation Difficulty
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V.0 Description
Risk V is a business concern risk described as "High costs preventing
operators from retrofitting to meet requirements for data link mandate and
25 NM lateral separation". There are several operator costs associated with
equipping for data link including equipment costs, aircraft downtime costs,
training costs. These costs can be prohibitive for several reasons including
lack of available resources, lack of available benefits, and insufficient
remaining aircraft service life. If many operators encounter high costs that
are prohibitive to equipping, the equipage level in the North Atlantic may
ether stagnate, decrease, miss targets needed to implement 25NM lateral
separation.
V.1 Background
The respondents indicated that the costs of data link equipage can vary from
a few hundred thousand dollars to over one million dollars depending on the
level of equipage the aircraft currently has. They also indicated that aircraft
manufacturers are in the process of rolling out complimentary
improvements to equipment needed for data link such as increased storage
for the flight management computer and updates to the global positioning
system. Equipping with these complimentary improvements after investing
in data link compliant can also add costs relative to waiting to do all the
updates at once. The operators could face fuel burn penalties due to
operating route restrictions but these may not outweigh the costs of not
equipping.
V.2 Root Cause
The respondents identified three root causes associated with Risk V: The
costs of data link could be unjustifiable if the benefits to do not scale with the
costs. Also the The low demand for data link upgrade go drive prices up or
make operators reluctant to offer upgrades. Lastly, the need for other future
upgrades may present an opportunity for operators to reduce costs by
waiting to complete all upgrades at one time.
V.2.1 Unjustifiable Equipment Costs
The costs for data link equipment may be unjustifiable if there is not enough
aircraft remaining service life or sufficient fuel burn savings to get a return
on the investment. The level of fuel burn improvement, the aircraft's
remaining service life, and the aircraft's current level of equipage are all
variables that can determine the time an operator has to recoup the costs
through fuel savings and efficiency improvements. However, if the costs of
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the aircraft are too high compared to the benefits and the available time
needed to use those benefits, the costs may be unjustifiable.
V.2.2 Low Data Link Equipment Demand
In addition to high equipment acquisition costs, there are also high costs
associated with the development of data link packages. The avionics and
aircraft manufacturers can only justify these costs if there is sufficient
demand for the packages from operators. One respondent estimated that as
many as 12% of the aircraft in the North Atlantic do not have data link
upgrade packages, possibly due to a lack of demand. If the development
costs for data link equipment are too high, then operators may be
permanently left without a way to equip their aircraft.
V.2.3 Future Upgrade Packages
Future upgrade packages may be available at a later date than the data link
mandate and make a short term investment for an intermediate, less
comprehensive data link upgrade unjustifiable. More than one respondent
commented that one aircraft manufacturer's flight management computer
does have a data link upgrade package available but also needs other
upgrades for increased memory storage and other features that will be
available at a later date. They commented that upgrading the flight
management computer temporarily could not be justified and would create
operational headaches because the extra data needed would force the
operators to reload other route data every time the aircraft switches from an
eastbound flight to a westbound flight. The future upgrade would not only
add additional space to the flight management computer but also include all
of the necessary data link features integrated in a way that would not affect
the aircraft turnaround times. They also commented that performing both
upgrades would add a significant cost burden compared to waiting for the
complete upgrade, even with the unequipped aircraft restrictions.
V.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of Risk V to stakeholder value metrics according to respondents
is shown in Table 102.
Table 102: Risk V Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low High Low None Medium None
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The respondents indicated a low impact to safety. Safety can be impacted if
the high costs prevent the equipage levels from reaching their maximum
potential. The margin of safety in the North Atlantic increases if more
aircraft use data link because the communication latency between aircraft
and ANSPs is reduced. The respondents indicated a high impact to
Operational Efficiency. Operational Efficiency can be impacted if 25NM
lateral becomes delayed as a result of the fewer operators equipping. A delay
to 25NM lateral would prolong use of the less efficient 60NM-60NM
operations currently in place for operators who are equipped. The
respondents indicated a low impact to ANSP Costs. ANSP Costs can be
impacted by the need to maintain HF as a backup. The costs of keeping HF as
a backup system include the equipment costs and staffing costs. In some
cases, rolling back HF capabilities may be part of the ANSP business case to
invest in data link but if HF is needed, there will not be a cost reduction. The
respondents indicated a medium impact to Operator Costs. Operator Costs
can be impacted in two ways as a result of high data link equipment costs. If
the operators choose to equip, they will be impacted by paying the high
equipment costs. If they do not equip, they will be impacted by the
increased fuel costs due to the restrictions for unequipped aircraft on
optimum tracks and in all MNPS airspace in later phases. The respondents
did not indicate an impact to Operator Revenues or ANSP Revenues.
V.4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The dependencies and outcomes of Risk V are shown in Figure 60 and Figure
61 shows Risk V's dependencies and influences for both the mandate and
reduced separation initiatives. There are not any additional risks
dependencies are influences present when reduced separation initiatives are
considered but the relative aggregate impacts of the risks do change because
more risks that affect reduced separation only are considered.
Figure 61. Risk V has three direct dependencies, one technology risk, one
policy and procedure risk, and one equipage risk. Risk V influences eight
risks: three policy and procedure risks, three equipage risks, one safety risk,
and one business concern risk.
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Figure 60: Risk V Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 61 shows Risk V's dependencies and influences for both the mandate
and reduced separation initiatives. There are not any additional risks
dependencies are influences present when reduced separation initiatives are
considered but the relative aggregate impacts of the risks do change because
more risks that affect reduced separation only are considered.
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Figure 61: Risk V Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
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V4.1 Risk V Direct Dependencies
Risk V has three direct dependencies as shown in Table 103. Risk N, a
technology risk described as "Impact of ICAO Annex 6 data link
communications airborne recording standard" can add to the costs of
equipage by forcing operators to order additional data link recording
software in order to operate in the North Atlantic. While many respondents
noted that costs of the recording hardware would be significant, they also
noted that they were unsure if the standard would be enforced even though
it has been made official. The policy Risk M (Lack of harmonization in
technologies: ATN mandate in Europe vs. FANS-1/A mandate in the NAT) can
also result in a substantial cost increase. The European and Data Link
Mandates as currently written will require aircraft that enter service after
2015 that will connect North American Destinations and European
Destinations to have both ATN and FANS 1/A equipment. Feasibility studies
have shown that the two technologies are not currently compatible and will
require significant systems architecture changes to aircraft that are currently
equipped with one of the technology. So far, the Boeing 787 has a planned
capability to support both systems simultaneously although other aircraft
may also undergoing upgrades. Risk 0 is an equipage risk described as (End
of service life of 13 satellite services expected about 2016. New equipage may
be required to use classic aero services via 14 satellites). An occurrence of
Risk 0 can result in an increase in costs if operators are forced to pay for a
more expensive satellite service, or, if new aircraft satellite equipment is
required to ether switch providers or switch services to 14.
Table 103: Risk V Direct Dependencies
Risk M Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate in Europe
vs. FANS-1/A mandate in the NAT
Risk N Impact of ICAO Annex 6 data link communications airborne
recording standard (See Appendix B)
Risk 0 End of service life of 13 satellite services expected about 2016.
New equipage may be required to use classic aero services via 14
satellites
V4.2 Risk V Direct Influences and Associated Outcomes
The high costs that can be associated with the occurrence of Risk V can have
three associated outcomes that can influence other risks: uncertainty in
equipage levels, reduced demand for data link packages and reduced
equipage levels in the North Atlantic.
The uncertainty in equipage levels can make it difficult for the regulator to
predict the demand for unequipped airspace and can subsequently influence
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the occurrence of the policy and procedure risks G, J, and H. Risk G (Failure
to develop measures to accommodate unequipped aircraft) can occur if
operators underestimate the demand for unequipped aircraft. If the demand
for unequipped airspace is thought to be low, there may reduced, insufficient
measures or airspace set aside for unequipped aircraft. Low equipage levels
can also cause more unequipped operators to use routes where surveillance
is provided (Risk J) due the airspace restrictions (Risk H) that are necessary
for safety reasons.
High costs for data link equipment as a result of the occurrence of Risk V can
reduce operator demand and cause the occurrence of other equipage risks. If
operator demand for data link equipment is low, avionics and aircraft
manufacturers may choose to devote fewer resources to development which
could delay development and certification (Risk A) or, delay deliveries of
new packages (Risk B). A mixed equipage environment (Risk I) can also
result from lower demand levels.
Lastly, the high costs of data link equipage can rise to the point where they
out-scale the available economic benefits (Risk X). Many respondents
indicated that the costs for some single data link components such as the
satellite communication hardware were likely to out-scale the benefits on
their own due their expensive nature. They also indicated that the scale of
the benefits would be due in part to the price of fuel.
Table 104: Risk V Direct Influences
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk B Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data link
retrofit packages to satisfy demand.
Risk G Failure to develop measures to accommodate unequipped
aircraft
Risk H Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft
Risk I Mixed equipage environment during transition
Risk J Operators choosing to operate in areas where other types of
surveillance are provided (e.g. radar, ADS-B)
Risk X Cost benefit analysis may show that costs outweigh the benefits
of implementing the data link mandate and/or 25 NM lateral
separation.
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V.5 Mitigation
The mitigation difficulty for Risk V is shown in Table 105. The respondents
gave risk V a low detection difficulty. High costs are likely to be detected in
several ways including reporting to ICAO by operators for the cost benefit
analysis. The respondents gave Risk V a medium correction difficulty.
Possible corrective actions include adjusting the timelines for the mandate
and reduced separation initiatives, and subsidizing the costs of equipping to
operators. Additional corrective actions include gaining pricing and
regulatory control over the pricing of satellite services, and coordinating
lower data fees. The respondents indicated a medium coordination difficulty
for Risk V. Adjusting the timelines would require coordination between
ICAO, ANSPs local rulemakers, and possibly the European Union if there is a
desire to harmonize the timelines with the European Mandate. Subsidizing
the costs for data link mandate would also require coordination between
ICAO, ANSPs, Operators, and local rulemakers to determine the source of
funds and the allocation of funds. The respondents indicated that risk V
would have a high likelihood of occurrence. Several respondents went as far
to say that the current cost of equipage is already prohibitive for most
operators and significantly outweigh the fuel burn benefits.
Table 105: Risk V Mitigation Difficulty
Corrective
Detection Action Coordination Likelihood
Low Medium Medium High
Page 246
........  -- - -- -- .... . . . ........ ....
W.0 Description
Risk W is an equipage risk described as "late delivery of new aircraft orders
that are replacing older, unequipped or unequippable aircraft". Some
operators plan to comply with the mandate by purchasing new aircraft that
are compliant to replace older aircraft with low remaining service life that
aren't compliant. Late deliveries of these aircraft could force operators to
continue operating with unequipped aircraft despite making an investment
in data link equipment. Additionally, if the problem is widespread, the North
Atlantic may not reach the target data link equipage levels when 25NM
lateral is scheduled for implementation.
W.1 Background
New aircraft typically have lead times for delivery in the range of one to five
years. The delivery schedules vary with demand for new aircraft, other
market conditions, and sometimes assembly line delays. New aircraft
programs in particular are venerable to long technical delays during the
certification process. Operators that have elected to comply with the
mandate by purchasing new aircraft are venerable to these delays and may
have to operate unequipped aircraft longer than anticipated. It may also be
more difficult to implement 25NM lateral if the equipage levels remain low
while operators wait for new aircraft to be delivered.
W.2 Root Causes
The respondents identified two main root causes associated with Risk W.
Some aircraft manufacturers, especially business jet manufacturers have not
completed development of data link packages which may not be available in
the mandate time frame. Secondly, late regulatory changes could delay
equipment production rates if equipment changes need to be made.
W.2.1 Data link Packages not Available in Mandate Timeframe
The avionics and aircraft manufacturers without data link packages will
incur development costs before a new data link package certified. There are
several aircraft, mainly business aircraft that are don't have a large enough
customer base that uses the North Atlantic to potentially justify these costs,
or, in some cases, the development time for some aircraft data link packages
may be longer than the mandate time frame. In these cases, the operators
may be forced to wait longer for the delivery of new data link equipped
aircraft or individual upgrades. One respondent estimated that as many as
12% of the aircraft in the North Atlantic do not have available data link
upgrade packages, possibly due to a lack of demand.
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W.2.2 Last Minute Regulatory Changes
Last minute regulatory changes can force equipment changes to aircraft and
or data link packages that may already be on an assembly line or in the
process of obtaining certification. Navigation and communications
requirements in particular are both carry some uncertainty and could force
some operators to make significant changes to GPS positioning equipment or,
the satellite communications equipment.
W.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of risk W to stakeholder value metrics is shown in Table 106.
Table 106: Risk W Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Medium High Low None Medium None
The respondents indicated a medium impact to Safety. Safety can be
impacted if the late deliveries delay the equipage levels from reaching their
maximum levels. The margin of safety in the North Atlantic increases if more
aircraft use data link because communication latency between aircraft and
ANSPs is reduced. The respondents indicated a high impact to Operational
Efficiency. Operational Efficiency can be impacted if 25NM lateral becomes
delayed as a result of the fewer operators equipping. A delay to 25NM lateral
would prolong use of the less efficient 60NM-60NM operations currently in
place for operators who are equipped. The respondents indicated a low
impact to ANSP Costs. They indicated that there could be "indirect costs" but
did not specify what those costs were in more detail. Possible costs include
increases in staffing for a higher HF capacity. The respondents indicated a
medium impact to Operator Costs. Operator costs can be impacted from
higher fuel burn penalties of using older aircraft on less optimal routes due
to airspace restrictions. The respondents did not indicate an impact to ANSP
Revenues and Operator Revenues.
WA Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The direct dependencies and influences for Risk W are shown in Figure 62
and Figure 63. Risk W has three dependencies, one policy and procedure
risk, and two equipage risks. Risk W also influences five risks: three policy
and procedures risks, one equipage risk, and one safety risk.
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Figure 62: Risk W Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 63 shows Risk W's dependencies and influences for both the mandate
and reduced separation initiatives. There are not any additional risks
dependencies are influences present when reduced separation initiatives are
considered but the relative aggregate impacts of the risks do change because
more risks that affect reduced separation only are considered.
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Figure 63: Risk W Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
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W4.1 Risk W Direct Dependencies
Risk W has three direct dependencies as shown in Table 107. The equipages
risks A (Equipage for business operators not available or certified in time to
meet mandate) and B (Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft
data link retrofit packages to satisfy demand) can cause delays in the supply
chain that delivers data link equipment packages. If a data link package does
not exist for an aircraft (Risk A) there will be a long lead time needed for
development and certification which can also depend on the aircraft's
current systems architecture. If there are delays in manufacturing the
equipment or certifying the equipment, delivery of the retrofit packages
could be delayed (Risk B)and operators may not be able to equip in time.
The policy Risk M (Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate in
Europe vs. FANS-1/A mandate in the NAT) can also result in the need to
make substantial system architecture changes which could delay deliveries.
The European and Data Link Mandates as currently written will require
aircraft that enter service after 2015 that will connect North American
Destinations and European Destinations to have both ATN and FANS 1/A
equipment. Feasibility studies have shown that the two technologies are not
currently compatible and will require systems architecture changes to
aircraft that are currently equipped with one of the technology.
Table 107: Risk W Direct Dependencies
Risk A Equipage for business operators not available or certified in
time to meet mandate
Risk B Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data link
retrofit packages to satisfy demand.
Risk M Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate in Europe
vs. FANS-1/A mandate in the NAT
W4.2 Risk W Direct Influences
The late aircraft deliveries that are associated with Risk W can result in
uncertainty in equipage levels and, reduced equipage levels or an increased
number of unequipped operators.
The uncertainty in equipage levels can make it difficult for the regulator to
predict the demand for unequipped airspace and can subsequently influence
the occurrence of the policy and procedure risks G, J, I, and H. Risk G (Failure
to develop measures to accommodate unequipped aircraft) can occur if
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operators underestimate the demand for unequipped aircraft and develop
insufficient accommodations for unequipped aircraft. If the demand for
unequipped airspace is thought to be low, there may reduced or insufficient
measures and airspace set aside for unequipped aircraft. Low equipage levels
can also cause more unequipped operators to use less optimal routes where
surveillance is provided (Risk J) due to the airspace restrictions (Risk H) that
are necessary for safety reasons and inherently result in a mixed equipage
level (Risk I). The restrictions in phases one and two of the 25NM lateral
could also work with high costs to cause increase presence in MNPS airspace
(Risk K).
Table 108: Risk W Direct Influences
Risk G Failure to develop measures to accommodate unequipped
aircraft
Risk H Restricted access to airspace for unequipped aircraft
Risk I Failure to control vertical risk when 25NM lateral separation is
implemented
Risk J Operators choosing to operate in areas where other types of
surveillance are provided (e.g. radar, ADS-B)
Risk K Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than OTS routes
W.5 Mitigation
The respondents indicated a low detection difficulty for risk W. Airplane
delivery rates are published by aircraft manufacturers and the operators
would likely communicate delays during the ICAO working meetings. The
respondents indicated a high corrective action difficulty. Possible corrective
actions include adjusting the timelines for the mandate and reduced
separation initiatives, or granting exemptions to operators that are suffering
late aircraft arrivals. The respondents indicated a high coordination
difficulty for Risk W. Adjusting the timelines or granting exemptions would
require coordination between ICAO, ANSPs local rulemakers, and possibly
the European Union if there is a desire to harmonize the timelines with the
European Mandate. The respondents indicated a high likelihood for Risk W.
They noted that there are new aircraft programs that are behind schedule
and that the global recession has also slowed production rates of existing
aircraft.
Table 109: Risk W Mitigation Difficulty
Corrective
Detection Action Coordination Likelihood
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Low High High High
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X.0 Description
Risk X is a business concern risk described as "Cost benefit analysis may
show that costs outweigh the benefits of implementing the data link mandate
and/or 25 NM lateral separation". Before implementing any policy changes,
ICAO will perform a cost benefit analysis. The cost benefit analysis is used to
assess the economic impacts to all stakeholders including operators, ANSPs,
and aircraft and avionics manufacturers. The cost benefit analysis is then
used to make informed policy decisions that will best achieve the goals set by
ICAO. If the cost benefit analysis shows that costs outweigh the benefits for
the data link mandate and reduced separation initiatives, then operators may
choose not to equip and regulators may be forced to make changes in order
to make implementation economically feasible.
X.1 Background
A cost benefit analysis is used to assess the costs of a policy relative to the
benefits of a policy. The ICAO planning group's cost benefit analysis for the
data link mandate plan and 25NM lateral separation will assess the operator
and ANSP costs of complying with the mandate, and the expected benefits of
both the mandate and reduced separation procedures. The expected costs
include aircraft data link equipment, ground data link equipment, data link
messaging fees, ANSP staffing costs, aircraft downtime costs, and possible HF
legacy costs. The benefits the data link mandate are primarily safety related.
The benefits for the reduced separation are mostly economic and include
increased operational efficiency and reduced fuel burn from using optimal
routes, tracks and faster climb times.
X.2 Root Causes
The respondents indicated two root causes associated with Risk X. The
operators may face high acquisition costs of data link equipment depending
on what data link components the aircraft already has and possibly a low
remaining aircraft service life. The ANSPs will incur higher costs by
operating data link for several reasons including the need to maintain HF as a
backup communications system. In both cases the economic benefits of
upgrading to datalink may simply be to small compared to the costs of
equipping, creating a prohibitively long or negative return on the investment
of capital.
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X.2.1 High Operator Costs
The costs for data link equipment may be unjustifiable if there is not enough
aircraft remaining service life or sufficient fuel burn savings to get a return
on the investment. Additionally, equipped operators will pay higher
messages costs because data link operations typically use more messages per
flight than HF operations. The level of fuel burn improvement, the aircraft's
remaining service life, and the aircraft's current level of equipage are all
variables that can determine the scale of the benefits relative to the costs.
X.2.2 High ANSP Costs
The respondents cited high ANSPs costs as a possible root cause although
there is not an indication that an ANSP may not equip. The higher ANSP
costs come from hardware upgrades, satellite service charges, and legacy
costs from maintaining data link. The ANSPs may choose to recoup these
costs by charging higher fees for data link messages to operators or by
seeking subsidies from ICAO or state governments.
X.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The impact of Risk X on stakeholder value metrics is shown in Table 110.
Table 110: Risk X Impact to Stakeholder value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
Low Medium None None High None
The respondents indicated a low impact to safety. Safety can be impacted if
the high costs prevent the equipage levels from reaching their maximum
potential. The margin of safety in the North Atlantic increases if more
aircraft use data link because the communication latency aircraft and ANSPs
is faster. The respondents indicated a medium impact to Operational
Efficiency. Operational Efficiency can be impacted if 25NM lateral becomes
delayed as a result of the cost benefit analysis showing an inadequate benefit.
Some operators also felt that the safety benefit offered by datalink would not
be practically meaningful because the probability of a collision is already
extremely low. A delay to 25NM lateral would prolong use of the less
efficient 60NM-60NM operations currently in place for operators who are
equipped. The respondents indicated a low impact to ANSP Costs. ANSP
Costs can be impacted by the need to maintain HF as a backup. The costs of
keeping HF as a backup system include the equipment costs, staffing costs,
and satellite service fees. In some cases, rolling back HF capabilities may be
part of the ANSP business case to invest in data link but if HF is needed, there
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will not be a cost reduction. The respondents indicated a high impact to
operator costs. Operator costs can be impacted if demand is reduced and
equipment prices as a result of poor cost benefit results, the increase
message fees from ANSPs attempting to recoup their upgrade costs, and if the
benefits are not as large as anticipated. The respondents did not indicate an
impact to ANSP Costs, ANSP Revenues, or Operator Revenues.
X.4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The direct dependencies and influences for Risk X are shown in Figure 64
and Figure 65. Risk X has three direct dependencies: one policy and
procedure risk, one equipage risk, and one business concern risk. Risk X
also influences one coordination and timing risk and one safety risk.
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Figure 64: Risk X Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 65 shows Risk X's dependencies and influences for both the mandate
and reduced separation initiatives. There are not any additional risks
dependencies are influences present when reduced separation initiatives are
considered but the relative aggregate impacts of the risks do change because
more risks that affect reduced separation only are considered.
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Figure 65: Risk X Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate and Reduced Separation)
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X4.1 Risk X Direct Dependencies
The direct dependencies for Risk X are shown in Table 111. The equipment
Risk B can reduce the scale of the benefits available to operators if the
aircraft service life is reduced to a level that makes the upgrade unprofitable
during the equipment delivery delays. The remaining service time may
insufficient in scaling the fuel burn benefits to a level that will allow the
airlines to recoup the costs of investment.
The policy Risk M (Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate in
Europe vs. FANS-1/A mandate in the NAT) can result in a substantial cost
increase (Risk V) that may outweigh the benefits for operators. The
European and Data Link mandates as currently written will require aircraft
that enter service after 2015 that will connect North American Destinations
and European Destinations to have both ATN and FANS 1/A equipment.
Feasibility studies have shown that the two technologies are not currently
compatible and will require costly systems architecture changes to aircraft
that are currently equipped with one of the technology. So far, the Boeing
787 has a planned capability to support both systems simultaneously
although other aircraft may also undergoing upgrades however the plans for
other new aircraft are not known at this time.
Table 111: Risk X Direct Dependencies
Risk B Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft data link
retrofit packages to satisfy demand.
Risk M Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN mandate in Europe
vs. FANS-1/A mandate in the NAT
Risk V High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to meet
requirements for data link mandate and 25 NM lateral
separation
X4.2 Risk X Direct Influences
The direct dependencies for Risk X are shown in Table 112. The outcomes
associated with Risk D that can influence other risks are possible policy
changes to improve the costs to benefits ratios for operators and ANSPs, and,
a large number of operators choosing not to equip as a result of the cost
benefit analysis showing costs greatly outweigh the economic benefits.
If policy changes are made as a result of Risk X, the coordination and timing
Risk F (Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25 NM lateral
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separation (if required by ANSP) not completed within mandate timeframe)
could occur if these changes result in more or delayed local rulemaking
verification procedures. An equipment standards change for instance, would
need to be re-tested by local rulemakers before implementation can take
place.
If the cost benefit analysis shows that the costs will outweigh the benefits,
there may be operators that subsequently choose not equip and accept the
fuel burn penalties of not equipping. The operators may file random routes
(Risk K) instead of using the Oceanic Tracking System (OTS) to minimize the
impact of the air space restrictions on fuel burn
Table 112: Risk X Direct Influences
Risk F Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25 NM lateral
separation (if required by ANSP) not completed within mandate
timeframe
Risk K Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than OTS routes
X.5 Mitigation
The mitigation difficulty for Risk X is shown in Table 113. The respondents
indicated a low detection difficulty for Risk X. Risk X would most likely be
detected when the ICAO planning groups communicate the results of the cost
benefit analysis to ICAO members. The respondents indicated a medium
corrective action difficulty. Possible corrective actions include rolling back
HF capability or substituting it for SATCOM voice services, changing the dates
of implementation or harmonizing with the European Mandate to reduce
costs, or possibly subsidizing operators that equip with data link. The
respondents indicated a high level of coordination would be required to
correct an occurrence Risk X. Switching to SATCOM voice services for
unequipped operators, harmonizing the implementation dates, and
subsidizing operators would all require an extensive amount of coordination
between ICAO operators, ANSPs, and possibly the European Union. The
respondents indicated that Risk X would have a high likelihood of
occurrence. They indicated that the equipment costs alone would likely
outweigh any fuel burn benefits. They also indicated that they did not know
what the economic value of increasing the safety margin would be.
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Table 113: Risk X Mitigation Difficulty
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Y.0 Description
Risk Y is a safety risk described as "HF system may not be able to handle
future air traffic levels as a backup system". High Frequency Voice (HF) is the
current communication technology used for exchanging positioning reports,
clearances, and flight path changes between aircraft over the North Atlantic
and Air Traffic Controllers. The messages are sent from the aircraft or ANSPs
to radio relay stations where a person must then relay the message on to its
intended destination. The latency of the message (the time it takes to send
and receive a message back) with HF radio can be as long as eight minutes.
The data link messaging system is a satellite based text messaging system
that is intended to replace data link as the primary technology for message
exchanges. Depending on the availability ratings of the satellite based
system and the overall equipage levels in the North Atlantic, HF may still be
needed as a back up system in the case of a data link failure. However, if the
HF system cannot handle an increase in traffic from a data link failure, there
could be a risk to safety and operational efficiency. Additionally, if the
capacity of HF is reduced as a result of data link implementation, then a data
link failure that causes operators to switch back to HF could also result in a
network overload.
Y.1 Background
The HF voice system is a communication system that relies on manned relay
stations to facilitate communication between aircraft and ANSPs. The long
latency time constrains both the allowable aircraft separation distances, and
aircraft climb schedules both of which can constrain fuel efficiency. The
reduced separation initiatives are meant to address these inefficiencies and
have been successfully implemented in the Pacific Ocean region. If the
capacity of HF is reduced as a result of data link implementation, or if the HF
capacity is insufficient to handle a traffic load (even if it is not reduced) then
a data link failure that causes operators to switch back to HF could also result
in a network overload.
Y.2 Root Causes
The respondents identified three root causes associated with Risk Y. North
Atlantic Regions with high traffic volumes that use data link services could
experience an overload if these volumes are too high for the HF
infrastructure that is currently in place. The safety case may have
assumptions based on the availability of HF or lack of availability of HF as a
backup system that may be incorrect and as a consequence, potential
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capacity issues may go unnoticed. Lastly, when some satellite service
providers change the terms of service or the hardware needed to
communicate with their satellites, many operators could simultaneously be
left without a data link capability.
Y.2.1 HF Phaseout
One respondent indicated that the assumptions made in the safety case may
cause a HF capacity issues to go undetected. If the safety case assumed a
sufficient availability for data link services, then HF would only be needed in
restricted airspace and outside of MNPS airspace. However in the case of a
failure, the equipped operators could revert back to HF even though HF was
not intended to be used as back up system to data link. The ANSPs may have
reduced HF staffing to only handle unequipped operators and to save costs.
Y.2.2 Satellite Service Transition
One respondent indicated that the transition of the Inmersat Satellite Service
from 13 to 14 services will temporarily render eliminate the data link
capability of 13 equipped aircraft. This respondent felt that the downtime to
modify these aircraft would be cost prohibitive and that an unexpected
increase in demand for HF communications would be a long term and short
term result.
Y.2.3 Increased Traffic Volume
Increased future traffic volume due to economic growth can be handled by
data link but may be too large for the HF network, especially if HF staffing is
scaled back as more aircraft use data link. The increased traffic volume
could overload the HF network in the case of a data link failure
Y.3 Impact on Stakeholder Value Metrics
The stakeholder value metrics for Risk Y are shown in Table 114.
Table 114: Risk Y Impact to Stakeholder Value Metrics
Safety Operational ANSP ANSP Operator Operator
Efficiency Costs Revenues Costs Revenues
High High High None High None
The respondents indicated that Risk Y would have a high impact to safety. In
the event of a data link failure, there could be a large number of aircraft that
are operating in reduced separation procedures that no longer have the
communication ability needed to maintain the desired level of safety. If Risk
Y occurs and HF becomes overloaded, the aircraft will need to rely on their
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surveillance technology to maintain safe separation distances until the
communications networks (HF and data link) can be resorted. One
respondent commented that he felt HF would not be capable of handling a
data link failure in the Irish airspace while another felt HF would be sufficient
to handle a failure in the Norwegian airspace because of a lower volume of
traffic. Similarly, Operational Efficiency (High Impact) would be dramatically
reduced because the aircraft will need to be re-separated to larger distances
and possibly hold until the ANSPs can sort out the congestion and the HF
network can be brought back online. In low traffic levels, a data link failure
would not have a high safety or efficiency impact but in a high traffic levels,
there could be significant impacts to operational efficiency. The
respondents indicated a very high impact to ANSP Costs. ANSP Costs can be
impacted by the need to maintain HF as a backup. The costs of keeping HF as
a backup system include the equipment costs and staffing costs. The ANSPs
may also need to train HF operators to handle an increase in traffic in the
event of a data link failure. In some cases, rolling back HF capabilities may be
part of the ANSP business case to invest in data link but if HF is needed, there
will not be a cost reduction. The respondents indicated a high impact to
operator costs. Operator costs can be impacted by the higher message fees
from ANSPs attempting to recoup their upgrade costs and the legacy costs for
maintaining HF as a backup system. They may also endure fuel burn costs
from holding in air traffic congestion during a data link failure. The
respondents did not indicate an impact to ANSP Revenues, or Operator
Revenues.
Y.4 Direct Risk Dependencies, Influences & Outcomes
The direct dependencies and influences for Risk Y are shown in Figure 66
and Figure 67. Risk Y does not have any dependencies or influence other
risks that affect the both mandate and reduced separation. Risk Y does
influence one safety risk that affects the 25NM lateral initiatives only.
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Figure 66: Risk Y Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Figure 67: Risk Y Direct Dependencies and Influences (Mandate Only)
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Y.2.1 Direct Influences
Risk Y influences the safety risk T as shown in Table 115. Risk T describes a
failure to meet the safety case for reduced separation. If a data link failure
occurs during data link procedures and HF is used as a backup, the capacity
limitations of HF could further increase the latency of communications
between operators and ANSPs. The safe separation distance given by the
safety case is in part driven by the communication latency. If the expected
latency is exceeded, then the margin of safety could fall below the desired
level while the aircraft are using reduced separation distances.
Table 115: Risk Y Direct Influences
Risk T Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM lateral separation
(Feasibility analysis may find that better performance is needed.
Actual performance may not meet feasibility analysis
expectations)
Y.5 Mitigation
The mitigation difficulty for Risk Y is shown in Table 116. Risk Y is a risk that
was added by one of the respondents and consequently only two
respondents were asked to assess it. The respondents indicated only "Very
High" likelihood for Risk Y because they felt the United Kingdom region in
particular would not be able to handle an increase in HF traffic from a data
link failure. They did give mitigation data for the other mitigation categories.
They felt that an HF capacity rollback as suggested during the Aeronautical
Communications Group (ACG) would not prevent operators from switching
back to HF in the event of a data link failure but that this event was not
considered in the safety case. Possible corrective actions include using
contingency procedures, increasing AIRINC staffing, and a Satellite Voice
capability (most expensive) that can be used in a data link failure, possibly
with an alternate satellite or ground service, or requiring availability and
performance guarantees from the satellite providers. The respondents
noted that adding performance guarantees was a successful approach that
was used when the Global Positioning System was being considered for
civilian use. They also noted that the staffing level, and the level of traffic
played an integral roll in how quickly the aircraft could be separated in the
event of a data link failure. The coordination difficulty for both these
corrective actions is high since they would also involve negotiations with
satellite companies in addition to the ICAO participants. Although one could
argue that this risk has already been "detected", the safety case should
consider the event of a data link failure with a corresponding rollback of HF
capacity. The operators must have an alternative way to communicate that
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will not overload a reduced or an unreduced HF network in the event of a
data link failure.
Table 116: Risk Y Mitigation Difficulty
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NAT Data Link Project Risk Event Impact Research: Interview Instrument
April 15, 2010
MIT is conducting research on the impact of various program risk events involved with the NAT SPG
Initiatives for 25 NM Lateral Separation and Oceanic Data Link Mandate (see tables in Appendix A). We
would appreciate your insights on the below questions.
Part I-b
The list below contains a set of program risk events that might occur in mandating data link and
introducing 25 NM Lateral Separation in the North Atlantic airspace. Are there any risk events not
covered on the list
a) Equipage for business operators not available or
certified in time to meet mandate
b) Potential delays in manufacturers delivering aircraft
data link retrofit packages to satisfy demand
c) ANSPs failure to have automation systems, other
technologies, or local rulemaking ready for
implementation of 25 NM lateral separation (e.g.
ensuring that deviations from norm are captured
quickly, etc.)
d) Late completion of data link mandate plan. Not
enough time for commercial and business operators
to plan and comply with mandate (e.g.
determination of entire flight level spectrum and
OTS tracks where mandate is to be applied, etc.).
e) Failure to achieve effective coordination with other
ANSPs (harmonization of technical systems and
operating methods)
f) Rulemaking to support data link mandate and 25
NM lateral separation (if required by ANSP) not
completed within mandate timeframe
g) Failure to develop measures to accommodate
unequipped aircraft
h) Restricted access to airspace for unequipped
aircraft
i) Mixed equipage environment during transition
j) Operators choosing to operate in areas where other
types of surveillance are provided (e.g. radar, ADS-
B)
k) Increased traffic in MNPS routes other than OTS
routes
I) Failure to establish a plan or go forward with
mitigation to meet RCP240. This also includes
failure of ground infrastructure to support RCP240
m) Lack of harmonization in technologies: ATN
mandate in Europe vs. FANS-1/A mandate in the
NAT
n) Impact of ICAO Annex 6 data link communications
airborne recording standard (See Appendix B)
o) End of service life of 13 satellite services expected
about 2016. New equipage may be required to use
classic aero services via 14 satellites.
p) Uncertainty in approval of Iridium-based equipage
to meet requirements for data link mandate and 25
NM reduced lateral separation
q) Failure to achieve percentage of equipped flights
needed to move forward with phases of 25NM
lateral separation
r) No ICAO communication, navigation, and
surveillance standards available to support
implementation of 25NM lateral separation
(for example, RNP 4 meets navigation criteria for 30
NM)
s) Late completion of 25NM lateral separation
planning tasks.
t) Failure to meet safety case for 25 NM lateral
separation (Feasibility analysis may find that better
performance is needed. Actual performance may
not meet feasibility analysis expectations)
u) Failure to control vertical risk when 25 NM lateral
separation is implemented
v) High costs preventing operators from retrofitting to
meet requirements for data link mandate and 25
NM lateral separation
w) Late delivery of new aircraft orders that are
replacing older, unequipped or unequippable
aircraft
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x) Cost benefit analysis may show that costs outweigh
the benefits of implementing the data link mandate
and/or 25 NM lateral separation.
y) HF system may not be able to handle future air
traffic levels as a backup system.
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Part II
For each of the program risks events above that you feel qualified to discuss, please answer the questions
below. You do not have to answer questions that you feel unqualified to answer. In addition, please
comment whether the answer is different with respect to the two different NAT SPG Initiatives being
examined (see Appendix A): 1) Oceanic Data Link Mandate, and (2) 25 NM Lateral Separation. Lastly,
please indicate whether the answer is different with respect to the various Phases planned for each
Initiative.
Risk to be described (from list above):
1. Describe in detail the cause(s) of this program risk event. Is/are the cause(s) different for the two different
Initiatives? Different between the various Phases?
2. Describe the outcome(s) of this risk. In other words, what happens when this risk materializes? Are the outcomes
different for the two different Initiatives? Different between the various Phases?
3. Does the occurrence of this risk event depend on the occurrence of other risk events? If so, which ones? Are these
dependencies different for the two different Initiatives? Different between the various Phases?
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How difficult is it to detect that this risk event has occurred?
* Very high difficulty - High difficulty e Medium difficulty * Low difficulty - Very Low
difficulty
Is this difficulty different for the two different Initiatives? Different between the various Phases?
4. How difficult is it to implement corrective action once the risk event has occurred?
* Very high difficulty - High difficulty . Medium difficulty . Low difficulty e Very Low
difficulty
Is this difficulty different for the two different Initiatives? Different between the various Phases?
5. What level of coordination is required to implement the corrective action?
* Very high coordination e High coordination e Medium coordination e Low coordination e Very Low
coordination
Is this coordination different for the two different Initiatives? Different between the various Phases?
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6. What is the probability or frequency of occurrence of this risk event?
* Very high probability
probability
and / or
- Very high frequency
frequency
- High probability e Medium probability- Low probability . Very Low
High frequency o Medium frequency - Low frequency - Very Low
Is this frequency and or probability different for the two different Initiatives? Different between the
various Phases?
IMPACT:
Please describe the impact on the following categories and how those impacts are differ between the two
initiatives and phases:
Impact on safety:
e Very high impact
None
e High impact - Medium impact * Low impact - Very Low impact e
Is this impact different for the two different Initiatives? Different between the various Phases?
Impact on operational efficiency:
e Very high impact - High impact
None
- Medium impact e Low impact e Very Low impact .
Is this impact different for the two different Initiatives? Different between the various Phases?
Impact on costs to the ANSP's
- Very high impact * High impact - Medium impact - Low impact - Very Low impact
None
Is this impact different for the two different Initiatives? Different between the various Phases?
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Impact on revenues to the ANSP's
e Very high impact - High impact - Medium impact - Low impact e Very Low impact
None
Is this impact different for the two different Initiatives? Different between the various Phases?
Impact on costs to commercial aircraft and business aircraft operators
* Very high impact - High impact * Medium impact * Low impact - Very Low impact
None
Is this impact different for the two different Initiatives? Different between the various Phases?
What is the impact on revenues to commercial aircraft and business aircraft operators if this risk event were to
occur?
- Very high impact . High impact - Medium impact - Low impact - Very Low impact
None
Is this impact different for the two different Initiatives? Different between the various Phases?
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EURO MANDATE:
3.3.1.1 All concerned aircraft operating flights as general air traffic in accordance with instrument flight rules in the
airspace defined below shall be equipped with context management (CM) and controller-pilot data link communications
(CPDLC) applications capable of supporting the following data link services: data link initiation capability, air traffic
control clearance, air traffic control communications management and air traffic control microphone check:
a) from 7 February 2013, in the following FIRs/UIRs above FL285:
Amsterdam FIR, Wien FIR, Barcelona UIR, Brindisi UIR, Brussels UIR, Canarias UIR, France UIR, Hannover UIR,
Lisboa UIR, London UIR, Madrid UIR, Milano UIR, Rhein UIR, Roma UIR, Scottish UIR and Shannon UIR; and
b) from 5 February 2015, in the following FIRs/JIRs above FL285:
Bratislava FIR, Bucuresti FIR, Budapest FIR, Kobenhavn FIR, Ljubljana FIR, Nicosia FIR, Praha FIR, Sofia FIR,
Warszawa FIR, Finland UIR south of 61'30', Hellas UIR, Malta UIR, Riga UIR, Sweden UIR south of 6130', Tallinn
UIR, Vilnius UIR.
Note.- Requirements for the CM and CPDLC applications to support the data link services described are contained in
RTCA DO-280B/EUROCAE ED-1 OB Interoperability Requirements Standard For A TN Baseline ] (INTEROP ATN B])
and RTCA DO-290/EUROCAE ED-120 Safety and Performance Requirements Standard for Air Traffic Data Link
Services in Continental Airspace (Continental SPR Standard), including Changes 1 and 2, with the exceptions that:
a) Uplink message 135, CONFIRM ASSIGNED LEVEL, and Uplink message 233, USE OF LOGICAL
ACKNOWLEDGMENT PROHIBITED, will not be used by the ground systems; and
b) Downlink message 38, ASSIGNED LEVEL (level), is not required by the aircraft.
3.3.1.2 Conformance to the equipage requirement and operator's approval shall be verified by the State of Registry or the
State of the Operator, as appropriate.
3.3.1.3 Aircraft are exempted from the requirement stipulated in 3.3.1.1 in the following cases:
a) aircraft with an individual certificate of airworthiness first issued before 1 January 2011 are exempted until 5 February
2015;
b) aircraft with an individual certificate of airworthiness first issued before 1 January 2014 and fitted with data link
equipment certified against requirements specified in RTCA DO-258A/EUROCAE ED-100A (or ED-100) are exempted
for the life of that particular airframe;
c) aircraft which have a certificate of airworthiness issued before 31 December 1997 and which will cease operation in the
airspace referred to in Paragraph 3.3.1.1 before 31 December 2017 are exempted from the requirement stipulated in
3.3.1.1;
d) state aircraft;
e) aircraft flying in the airspace referred to in Paragraph 3.3.1.1 for testing, delivery and for maintenance purpose; and
f) operators of types of aircraft reaching the end of their production life and being produced in limited numbers, or types
of aircraft for which re-engineering costs required would be disproportionate due to old design, may, based on this
criteria, request from the appropriate authority the granting of an exemption. Such requests shall be made prior to 30
September 2012 and include detailed information justifying the need for the granting of the exemption.
End of new text
- END - APPENDIX A: NAT SPG Initiatives
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Rev 3 (27 Feb 10)
Horizontal Separation Reduction Initiatives: NAT SPG/45 June 2009 Report
Date Separation Data Link Nav Surveillance
Reuto CommReduction Requirement Requirement Requirement
6 May 2010 Trial 5-minute FANS 1/A GPS meeting FANS 1/A ADS-C
longitudinal CPDLC meeting standards for meeting
separation between appropriate oceanic appropriate
eligible aircraft pairs standards. operations standards
in Shanwick FIR.
(Gander FIR at
a later date)
2012 *25 NM lateral on 2 FANS 1/A RNP tbd FANS 1/A ADS-C
OTS tracks between CPDLC meeting meetingPhase 1 (Note:
350-400 (inclusive) appropriate appropriate
standards standards
RNP 4)
2013 *25 NM lateral on all FANS 1/A RNP tbd FANS 1/A ADS-C
OTS tracks between CPDLC meeting meetingPhase 2 (Note:
350-400 appropriate appropriate
anticipateaprrit
standards standards(inclusive)
RNP 4)
2015 25 NM lateral FANS 1/A RNP tbd FANS 1/A ADS-C
expanded to targets CPDLC meeting meetingPhase 3 (Note:
of opportunity in appropriate appropriate
anticipate
NAT Region between standards standards
350-400 (inclusive) RNP 4)
*Operational Restrictions. Operators/aircraft not appropriately equipped and, as required, authorized
could be restricted from operation on specified tracks or airspace at specified flight levels.
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NAT Data Link Mandate: see next page for proposed plan to mandate data link equipage in NAT MNPS
airspace.
Proposed NAT SPG Mandate For Oceanic Data Link Equipage (FANS 1/A CPDLC and ADS-C)
Year Airspace Where Flight Levels Where Remarks
Applicable Applicable
7 Feb 2013 *To-be-determined OTS *To-be-determined Aircraft to be equipped in
tracks FL's order to operate at specified
FL's, however, NAT SPG to
explore measures to
accommodate
non-equipped aircraft
5 Feb 2015 *MNPS Airspace *To-be-determined Remark above applies
FL's
*Operational Restrictions. Operators/aircraft not appropriately equipped and, as required,
authorized could be restricted from operation on specified tracks or airspace at specified flight levels.
Additional Note:
European Air Navigation Planning Group (EANPG) proposed exemption to data link requirement
in designated European airspace: aircraft with an individual certificate of airworthiness first issued
before 1 January 2014 and fitted with data link equipment certified against requirements specified in
RTCA DO-258A/EUROCAE ED-100A (or ED-100) are exempted for the life of that particular airframe.
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Appendix B: ICAO Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft, Section 6.3.1.5
6.3.1.5 All aeroplanes for which the individual certificate of airworthiness is first issued after 1 January
2005, which utilize data link communications and are required to carry a CVR, shall record on a flight
recorder, all data link communications to and from the aeroplane. The minimum recording duration shall
be equal to the duration of the CVR, and shall be correlated to the recorded cockpit audio.
6.3.1.5.1 From 1 January 2007, all aeroplanes which utilize data link communications and are required to
carry a
CVR shall record on a flight recorder, all data link communications to and from the aeroplane. The
minimum recording duration shall be equal to the duration of the CVR, and shall be correlated to the
recorded cockpit audio.
6.3.1.5.2 Sufficient information to derive the content of the data link communications message and,
whenever practical, the time the message was displayed to or generated by the crew shall be recorded.
Note.- Data link communications include, but are not limited to, automatic dependent surveillance
(ADS), controller-pilot data link communications (CPDLC), data link flight information services (D-
FIS) and aeronautical operational control (AOC) messages
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